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ABSTRACT 
The National Waste Policy Implementation Plan advocates the outsourcing of waste 
management services by contemplating ‘multi-agency management arrangements’ and 
‘active partnerships’ between governments and industry (EPHC 2010a, p. 9). The Tasmanian 
Waste Strategy reinforces the national outsourcing approach by recommending that local 
government authorities (LGAs) engage in initiatives such as ‘collaborative partnerships’ with 
industry (Environmental Protection Authority 2009, pp. 3 & 9).  
The outsourcing of waste management services by LGAs to external service providers 
introduces another layer of accountability, resulting in the flow of waste data across 
organisational and geographical boundaries, which leads to a more complex reporting 
environment (Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis 2006). 
This thesis investigates whether the expectations of the federal Australian government with 
respect to the provision and dissemination of data through the outsourcing of municipal solid 
waste (MSW) are being fulfilled by posing the question: Are the accountability expectations 
of the Australian federal government satisfied in the outsourcing of waste management 
services by LGAs? 
This study broadly follows the institutional collective action (ICA) framework’s (Feiock 
2013) approach to explore the Australian federal government’s accountability expectations, 
due to the collective action required by multiple LGAs and their service providers in different 
jurisdictions to provide national waste data (Bel, Fageda & Mur 2014). A multi-method 
approach combining textual narrative analysis of documents, archival records and direct 
observation supplemented by semi-structured interviews is followed (Yin 2014). 
The study found that managers of LGAs and their service providers are only willing to supply 
waste data through an accountability relationship with higher levels of government based on 
compliance with minimum legal requirements. The lack of adequate waste data collection 
tools constrains the collection of outsourced waste data, whilst the collaborative outsourcing 
practices of LGAs in Tasmania’s Southern Waste Strategy Authority (SWSA) jurisdiction 
resulted in some complex forms of multi-agency arrangements and partnerships. In the 
absence of improved communication and consultation between all principals and agents, the 
accountability expectations of the Australian federal government for improved waste data 
collection systems will not be met. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the accountability expectations of the Australian 
federal government of local government authorities’ (LGAs’) outsourcing of waste services 
in Tasmania’s Southern Waste Strategy Authority (SWSA) jurisdiction. 
1.1 Background to this study 
The volume of waste in Australia has become ‘visible’ and ‘unavoidable’, and this is 
presenting itself as an ‘environmental crisis’ to the community (Qian, Burritt & Monroe 2011, 
p. 94).  
In 2011, Australia was the world’s seventh-highest producer of waste per capita, producing 
two tonnes of waste per person per year, and disposing of approximately 50% of this in 
landfill as compared with Western European countries where less than 10% of waste is 
disposed in landfill (EPHC 2010b, p. 16). In Tasmania, this percentage is much higher, being 
at least 70% (Blue Environment 2013, p. 9). In Australia, LGAs attend directly or through 
outsourcing to the collection and treatment of the great majority of municipal solid waste 
(MSW) (Blue Environment 2013, p. 79). 
The Australian Federal Government has become increasingly concerned about its obligations 
resulting from internationally binding agreements, such as the Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel 
Convention) and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Stockholm 
Convention) (SCEW 2012, p. 31). In response to these international obligations, the Council 
of Australian Governments (COAG) committed Australia to reducing the impact of waste on 
the environment and to improve the responsible treatment of hazardous waste by adopting the 
National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development in 1992 (SCEW 2012, p. 2).  
To give effect to this national strategy, a need for a regulatory framework for waste 
management and resource recovery in Australia was identified, and in November 2009 
Australia’s environment ministers through the Environment Protection and Heritage Council 
endorsed the National Waste Policy: Less waste, more resources.
1
  
                                                 
1
 Participants in the course of this study believe that the delay in adopting a national waste policy was the 
consequence of the Hawke-Keating and Howard governments’ disagreeing on whether the national strategy 
should be executed through national or state policy directives (Interviewee 8). 
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The overarching aims of the national policy are to generate less waste; to reduce the amount 
of waste for disposal; to manage waste as a resource; and to ensure safe and environmentally 
sound waste treatment, disposal, recovery and reuse (EPHC 2010a, p. 5). 
In order to prioritise critical initiatives and to assign responsibilities in respect of the National 
Waste Policy, a National Waste Policy Implementation Plan was jointly developed by all 
Australian governments, with input from industry, business and the community. It was 
approved by the Environment Protection and Heritage Council (EPHC) on 5 July 2010. The 
National Waste Policy Implementation Plan notes that the various ‘individual jurisdictions 
will continue to manage waste in line with their strategic objectives and constitutional 
responsibilities’ (EPHC 2010a, p. 4 & 5); for example, in Tasmania the Environmental 
Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 assigns responsibility to the Environment 
Protection Authority (EPA) to regulate waste management activities (Environmental 
Protection Authority 2009, p. 2). 
The various states and territories have formally adopted different waste management 
strategies in response to their obligations in respect of the National Waste Policy 
Implementation Plan. The Tasmanian government, the jurisdiction in which the SWSA 
resides, adopted the Tasmanian Waste and Resource Management Strategy (Tasmanian 
Waste Strategy) in June 2009 (Environmental Protection Authority 2009, p. ii). 
The accountability expectations of the Australian federal government with regard to the 
provision of data regarding the handling and treatment of waste are embodied in the National 
Waste Policy Implementation Plan. There is an expectation from the federal government that 
waste data collection and supporting data collection systems will be improved to facilitate the 
three-yearly national ‘current and future trends waste and resource recovery report’ (EPHC 
2010a, p. 19). 
The National Waste Policy Implementation Plan does not assign responsibility to LGAs to 
provide waste management data directly to the Commonwealth Government (EPHC 2010a, p. 
19). While constitutionally unable to enforce particular methods of MSW management on the 
states and LGAs, the Accounting and Accountability Act (2013) introduced by the Abbott 
government imposed requirements on state governments and their departments with regard to 
the provision of data. (Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013).  
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In response to the federal government’s accountability expectations, the Tasmanian 
government through the Tasmanian Waste Strategy acknowledges (p. 2) the need for 
Tasmania to establish a more sustainable approach to waste management through alignment 
with national standards and initiatives by accepting responsibility (p. 15) for providing 
national waste data and by directing (p. 8) LGAs to establish action plans to give effect to the 
strategy’s objectives (Environmental Protection Authority 2009).  
The Tasmanian state government assigned some if its responsibilities to account for national 
waste data to LGAs by remarking, ‘Continue to participate in and support national data 
collection….. State Government, Local Government, Industry Associations, Industry, 
Community organisations, the public’ (Environmental Protection Authority 2009, p. 15).  
The accountability relationship in this instance is complicated by the fact that whilst the 
federal government and state governments acknowledge local communities’ right to the 
provision of waste management services by LGAs, it imposes an additional reporting 
responsibility for waste management data through state and territory governments to facilitate 
the National Waste Report that is published every three years (EPHC 2010a, p. 19).  
The National Waste Policy Implementation Plan advocates the outsourcing of waste 
management services by contemplating ‘multi-agency management arrangements’ and 
‘active partnerships’ between governments and industry (EPHC 2010a, p. 9). The Tasmanian 
Waste Strategy reinforces the national outsourcing approach by recommending that LGAs 
engage in initiatives such as ‘collaborative partnerships’ with industry (Environmental 
Protection Authority 2009, pp. 3 & 9). 
These collaborative initiatives may take various forms, such as outsourcing through arms-
length contracting, outsourcing to public-private partnerships or outsourcing to other public 
entities (Dollery, Akimov & Byrnes 2009; Dollery, Grant & Akimov 2010).  
The outsourcing of waste management services by LGAs to external service providers 
introduces another layer of accountability; for example, recycling initiatives being outsourced 
to the private sector result in the flow of waste data across organisational boundaries and 
leads to a more complex reporting environment in respect of the waste data collection and 
dissemination process (Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis 2006). 
In the case of the LGAs active in the SWSA jurisdiction in Tasmania, waste management 
services are outsourced to a variety of different service providers, some public and some 
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private (Blue Environment 2011, pp. 26 & 27). This results in a complex network of 
relationships between many different parties, potentially with accountability problems (Cruz 
& Marques 2012). 
In light of the potential accountability problems associated with close-knit networks, for 
example, the resistance of principals to hold agents to account (Girth 2014), the question 
arises whether the outsourcing practices, as suggested and directed by the National Waste 
Policy Implementation Plan and the Tasmanian Waste Strategy, satisfy the federal 
government’s accountability expectations of improved waste data and data collection systems. 
1.2 Research question 
This thesis investigates whether the expectations of the federal Australian government, with 
respect to the provision and dissemination of data through the outsourcing of MSW 
management, are being fulfilled. The research question (RQ) of this thesis is the following: 
Are the accountability expectations of the Australian federal government 
satisfied in the outsourcing of waste management services by LGAs? 
1.3 Overview of prior relevant research  
1.3.1 Accountability of LGAs for waste data to higher levels of government 
In addition to the duty of public managers to account for their compliance with statutory 
provisions and legal requirements, some researchers argue that public managers are also 
morally accountable to society for the adoption and measuring of performance against 
sustainability targets, such as reduction of waste disposal to landfill (Bebbington et al. 2007; 
Bebbington & Gray 1993; Gray 1992, 2005, 2013; Gray, Brennan & Malpas 2013). The 
question arises whether an accountability relationship between the federal government and 
LGAs with regard to waste data exists if the moral duty to account lies with local 
communities and legal compliance lies with state laws and regulations (Aulich 2011). 
In considering accountability relationships, Lindberg (2013) argues that accountability 
consists of four key elements: (1) an agent or institution which has to give an account, (2) 
acceptance by the agent for an area or domain of responsibility, (3) a principal to whom the 
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agent must account and (4) the right of the principal to sanction the agent if the agent fails to 
account adequately.  
The fear of sanction may lead to LGA managers (agents) not adequately complying with 
governmental directives (principal) by adopting a narrow reactive approach to policy 
interventions rather than a long-term best-practise
2
 approach (Ball, Broadbent & Moore 
2002).  
Accountability challenges may also arise where the principal-agent relationship is 
characterised by ill-defined performance measures (Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis 2006; Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). Studies on performance management systems (PMS) of Australian LGAs 
found that PMS are only moderately effective and in need of improvement (Baird, Schoch & 
Chen 2012; Lee & Fisher 2007). Umashev & Willett (2008), for example, found that PMS 
systems of a large Australian LGA are constrained by various factors, including human 
resource capacity. LGAs may find it difficult to meet the accountability expectations of the 
federal government in those instances where appropriate responses to such expectations are 
not clearly formulated in the agencies’ corporate plans.  
Prior studies have also found environmental management systems of LGAs to have 
limitations to collate and distribute sustainability and environmental information to internal 
and external users. For example, Williams, Wilmshurst & Clift (2011) found the uptake and 
development of sustainability reporting in the local government sector to be limited and 
inconsistent, whilst Qian, Burritt & Monroe (2011) found that some contractors to remote or 
small LGAs do not have the capability to capture and record full waste data. 
The demand for sustainability and environmental information by higher levels of government 
is often constrained by undue expectations in unreasonable timeframes from the principals in 
some instances, with the lack of clear direction leading to uncertainty and tension between 
actors in the accountability relationship (Ball, Broadbent & Moore 2002).  Bigdeli, Kamal & 
de Ceasare (2013) suggest that higher levels of governments can strengthen inter-
organisational communication systems through funding and training of employees, while 
Moll & Hoque (2008) suggest that uncertainties and tensions in public agency relationships 
can be reduced by the introduction of a service-level agreement.  
                                                 
2
 Best-practise in the context of Tasmanian waste management is defined as ‘cost-effective measures assessed 
against the current international and national standards applicable to the activity’ (Environmental Management 
and Pollution Control Act 1994, sec 4). 
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Adequate communication is a key element in an effective accountability relationship between 
the federal government and lower-level government agencies (Burritt & Welch 1997; Reid 
2012). Lengthening chains of delegation and an increasing divide between the origins of 
government activity and the point of service delivery results in dynamic relationships 
between multiple principles and agents which may result in the public interest not being 
adequately served (Calabro & Torchia 2011; Heinrich, Lynn & Milward 2010). The 
outsourcing of waste management services thus may negatively impact on LGAs’ ability to 
collect and report waste data across organisational boundaries (Burritt & Schaltegger 2012; 
Perlman 2013).  
1.3.2 Outsourcing of waste management services by LGAs 
The decision to outsource waste management services is a complex management process 
which combines transaction costs, managerial concerns and social choice issues (Bel & 
Fageda 2010). 
A number of studies on outsourcing are in agreement that the primary motivation for 
outsourcing in both the private and public sector is transaction cost considerations, such as 
cost-saving and cash flow improvements (Chalos & Sung 1998; Lacity, Hirschheim & 
Willcocks 1994; Warner 2011; Zhu, Hsu & Lillie 2001). 
Waste management transaction costs are mostly difficult to measure due to the lack of clear 
and objective outcomes (Bel & Warner 2009), whilst modern waste management services are 
also characterised by high asset specificity, such as highly regulated landfill developments, 
capital-intensive waste transfer stations and expensive multi-purpose garbage collection 
vehicles (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2010; Williamson 1999). Public managers are 
therefore prone to outsource easily measurable services that can be monitored through arms-
length contracts and more likely to keep difficult to measure and highly asset-specific 
services such as waste management in-house (Bel & Fageda 2007, 2009; Brown, Potoski & 
Van Slyke 2008).  
Small and especially rural LGAs are restricted by a limited number of waste suppliers (Bel & 
Fageda 2011; Bel, Fageda & Warner 2010; Bel & Warner 2013; Minkoff 2013; Zafra-
GÓmez et al. 2013). In these circumstances, it becomes difficult for managers to sanction 
suppliers for non-performance due to a lack of alternative options, which may lead to 
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increased transaction costs and accountability problems (Dijkgraaf & Gradus 2007a, 2007b; 
Girth et al. 2012; Warner 2009).  
Due to the above accountability problems and high asset specificity that characterise waste 
management services, LGA managers increasingly make use of outsourcing arrangements 
such as collaborations and partnerships through inter-local relational contracting rather than 
arm’s-length commercial contracting (Bel & Fageda 2008; Bel, Fageda & Mur 2014; Bel & 
Warner 2013). Inter-local relational contracting with regard to regional waste handling and 
disposal implies a greater element of trust, with reduced levels of control and monitoring 
(Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2007).  
Social choice issues such as increased service demands which require infrastructure 
improvements characterised by political alliances also play a role in the inter-local 
outsourcing decisions of LGAs (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2006; Dollery 2010; Dollery & 
Akimov 2008a; Dollery, Akimov & Byrnes 2009; Dollery & Grant 2009; LeRoux & Pandey 
2011; Varadarajan 2009). For example, the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan and 
the Tasmanian Waste Strategy advocate the creation of best-practise waste management 
networks to improve collection and reporting of waste data to higher levels of government 
(Environmental Protection Authority 2009, pp. 2, 5 & 14; EPHC 2010a, p. 19).  
The proposed best-practise principles by design should result in suitable tools to guide 
responses to higher-order policy interventions (Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis 2006). McIvor (2008) 
suggests that theoretical frameworks for successful outsourcing derived from the scholarly 
literature can be used to develop such best-practise management systems. Vagadia (2012) 
proposes the most recent comprehensive framework for successful outsourcing by 
consolidating his findings with concepts derived from earlier scholarly work, such as McIvor 
(2008), Kakabadse & Kakabadse (2005), Lacity and Willcocks (1994), Quinn & Hilmer 
(1994) and others. 
Complex public networks are characterised by horizontal accountability relationships in 
contrast with traditional command-and-control vertical agency relationships (Bertelli & 
Smith 2010; Carr & Hawkins 2013; LeRoux, Brandenburger & Pandey 2010; LeRoux & Carr 
2010). Incomplete contracting between actors in horizontal relationships in the network may 
thus result in governance arrangements based on trust rather than written contracts (Brown, 
Potoski & Van Slyke 2006; Hart & Moore 1988, 2008).  
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The accountability implications with regard to agency relationships based on trust and the 
resulting incomplete contracting between actors in such environmental management networks 
are under researched and require more attention (Ball & Bebbington 2008; Ball, Broadbent & 
Jarvis 2006; Calabro & Torchia 2011; Doberstein 2013a). By developing an improved 
understanding of these regional network complexities, policy makers will be in a better 
position to consider what are the most effective and efficient options for collecting regional 
waste data for the purposes of reporting national waste data, as contemplated by the National 
Waste Policy Implementation Plan (EPHC 2010a, p. 19). 
1.4 Overview of the theoretical framework 
This study broadly follows the institutional collective action (ICA) framework’s approach to 
explore the Australian federal government’s accountability expectations by (i) determining 
the scale and nature of the accountability expectations, (ii) determining the response 
preferences to the accountability expectations within and across jurisdictions and 
organisations and (iii) determining what mechanisms are available to respond to the 
accountability expectations when outsourcing waste management services (Feiock 2013).  
(i) The scale and nature of the accountability expectations are determined by 
exploring the relevant data collection and reporting strategic objectives from the 
National Waste Policy Implementation Plan and the Tasmanian Waste Strategy 
against the elements of Lindberg’s (2013) accountability map.  
(ii) To explore the different response preferences to the accountability expectations 
which impact across organisational boundaries, the study followed Burritt’s (2012) 
approach (Burritt 2012). This entails an analysis of relevant narratives in LGA 
corporate plans and posing appropriate interview questions to participants.  
(iii) The National Waste Policy Implementation Plan directs the establishment of best-
practise waste management networks for remote communities (EPHC 2010a, p. 19). 
The study examines the mechanisms available to LGAs to guide the outsourcing 
initiatives by reviewing the accountability principles of best-practise outsourcing 
frameworks available in the management literature (Vagadia 2012).  
The ICA framework is underpinned by a number of research traditions and theoretical 
approaches (Feiock 2013). Transaction cost economics (TCE) is one of these theoretical 
foundations. TCE is specifically relevant to the outsourcing of waste management services 
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due to the asset specificity and measurement problems related to waste management services 
which increase supplier hold-up risk and transaction costs (Williamson 1981, 1987, 1993, 
1999).  
The ICA framework also incorporates Agency Theory, which is relevant to this study because 
potential accountability problems may arise in those instances where for-profit service 
providers act in their own commercial best interests and do not disclose sufficient 
information for adequate accountability. Senior and middle managers of LGAs may similarly 
be conflicted in providing waste data that may impact on their job security, status or social 
standing. Agency Theory is used to develop an understanding of how incongruent goals of 
principals and agents may impact on government’s accountability expectations (Brown, 
Potoski & Van Slyke 2010; Jensen & Meckling 1976; LeRoux & Pandey 2011). 
The ICA framework has not previously been applied in studies of waste management in the 
local government sector. The ICA framework has successfully been applied in studies in 
similar policy areas of water (Berardo & Scholz 2010), public safety (Andrew 2009) and 
regional planning (Gerber, Henry & Lubell 2013).  
1.5 Research methods 
The methods used are qualitative, consisting of a textual analysis of documents and 
transcribed interviews in the following sequence of steps: 
1. A narrative textual analysis of accountability provisions in the National Waste Policy 
Implementation Plan and Tasmanian Waste Strategy is conducted. The accountability 
provisions are considered against the findings of the literature review and a codebook of key 
concepts is developed. The scale and nature of problems related to the federal government’s 
accountability expectations as contemplated by the ICA framework in 1.4 (i) is established. 
Areas that require further investigation are identified and appropriate interview questions are 
posed.  
2. The most recent corporate plans for the LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction are obtained, and a 
narrative textual analysis of the corporate plans is performed by coding the documents 
against the key concepts developed in step 1. The data are analysed and interpreted. The 
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natural response preferences
3
 of LGAs resulting from the federal and state governments’ 
waste policy interventions are determined as contemplated by the ICA framework in 1.4 (ii). 
Accountability issues that require further examination are identified and appropriate 
interview questions determined. 
3. Where LGAs incorporate best-practise mechanisms in their operations, a narrative textual 
analysis of the corporate plans referred to in step 2 above are performed against the 
governance mechanisms designed to strengthen accountability available from the best-
practise outsourcing literature. The data are analysed and interpreted to determine the extent 
of adoption of such best-practise mechanisms as contemplated by the ICA framework in 1.4 
(iii). Accountability issues that require further examination are identified and appropriate 
interview questions are posed. 
4. Semi-structured interviews with selected senior and middle managers of LGAs in the 
SWSA jurisdiction, their service providers and stakeholders are undertaken to examine the 
areas of concern identified during the narrative textual analysis of documents phase. 
Interviews are triangulated with observation of practices, minutes of public meetings, 
newspaper articles and other documents of public interest where deemed appropriate.  
5. The data derived from the transcribed interviews are coded, analysed and interpreted. The 
views of interviewees regarding the scale and nature of problems related to the federal 
government’s accountability expectations as contemplated by the ICA framework in 1.4 (i) 
are reported. The views of interviewees regarding the natural response preferences of LGAs 
resulting from the federal and state governments’ waste policy interventions as contemplated 
by the ICA framework in 1.4 (ii) are reported. The views of interviewees on the extent to 
which LGAs incorporate best-practise governance mechanisms in their operations as 
contemplated by the ICA framework in 1.4 (iii) are reported. 
6. The findings in steps 1 to 5 are consolidated to draw conclusions on whether the 
outsourcing practices of LGAS in the SWSA jurisdiction have met the accountability 
expectations of the federal government. 
1.6 Summary of main results and findings 
                                                 
3
 LGA managers have a spectrum of possible responses to policy interventions, that is, a narrow reactive 
approach to demonstrate improvement on the one end or a systems approach by adopting a business excellence 
model on the other end (Ball, Broadbent & Moore 2002). 
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This study focusses in the main on the accountability of lower level agencies to higher level 
principals in the public sector. The specific context of this accountability study is the 
accountability relationship between the LGAs and their waste service providers in the SWSA 
jurisdiction, and the Australian federal government. The main findings of the study are 
summarised below with an expanded discussion and reporting of ancillary findings to follow 
in Chapters 8 and 9. 
LGA managers and the managers of their service providers are only willing to supply waste 
data through an accountability relationship with higher levels of government based on 
compliance with minimum legal requirements. They are willing to improve regional waste 
data collection systems on other grounds. Interviewees do not believe that the introduction of 
a compulsory waste disposal levy will generate sufficient funding to provide incentives for 
agencies to improve their waste data collection systems. 
Improvements to regional waste data collection systems are not adequately guided by the 
Tasmanian government due to resource constraints. The lack of adequate waste data 
collection tools constrains the collection of waste data. The partnership agreement to 
facilitate improved communication between the Tasmanian government and LGAs is 
ineffective in the SWSA jurisdiction with regard to the supply of waste data and 
improvement of data collection systems. 
Some participants do not believe that once LGAs have outsourced waste disposal services 
they should be held accountable for the supply of waste data to higher levels of government 
(Interviewee 9 ; Interviewee 12). LGAs are also constrained by the length of the contract 
periods to negotiate new clauses enabling them to demand the waste data expected by the 
federal government. 
The collaborative outsourcing practices of LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction resulted in some 
complex forms of multi-agency arrangements and partnerships. There is a lack of certainty 
whether the SWSA, Southern Tasmanian Councils Authority (STCA), Southern Waste 
Solutions (SWS) or Local Government Association of Tasmania (LGAT) network should 
have responsibility for supplying waste data to the Tasmanian government. In the absence of 
improved communication and consultation between all principals and agents, including all 
levels of government, the accountability expectations of the Australian federal government 
for improved waste data collection systems will not be met. 
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1.7 Overview of this study 
The thesis consists of nine chapters as follows: 
Chapter 1 gives the background to the study, the research question and the contribution of the 
study. It also gives an overview of the theoretical approach and the research methods adopted 
and it outlines the structure and organisation of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of the key concepts of accountability in the public 
sector and the impact of public policy on accountability and defines key terms and definitions. 
It reviews research that examines the nature of the accountability relationship between LGAs 
and higher levels of government and research regarding the outsourcing of waste 
management services.  
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework of the research and considers the relevance and 
applicability of existing research approaches for this study. It addresses the research question 
whether the outsourcing practices of LGAs are compatible with the Australian federal 
government’s accountability expectations of LGAs to adequately supply waste data for the 
purposes of national reporting. A study of the accountability expectations of the Australian 
federal government with regard to the outsourcing of waste management services by LGAs 
requires an institutional collective action approach informed by a combination of economic, 
institutional, management and sustainability theories and frameworks.  
Chapter 4 deals with the methods and access to data. It details the specific data sources, 
collection and analysis techniques used in the thesis. Use is made of NVivo software to 
support a textual narrative analysis of literature, public policy documents, corporate plans and 
transcribed interviews. The findings from an analysis of the public policy documents and 
LGA corporate plans inform the questions asked in interviews. 
Chapter 5 examines the accountability provisions contained in the National Waste Policy 
Implementation Plan and the Tasmanian Waste Strategy. It critiques public policy documents 
using concepts derived from the literature review. The responses of LGAs and their service 
providers to the waste policy interventions from higher levels of government are considered 
in the context of accountability and outsourcing literature. From the findings of the analysis, 
specific accountability issues are identified to be explored in interviews with participants in 
the SWSA jurisdiction. 
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Chapter 6 examines the governance principles contained in best-practise outsourcing 
frameworks against the corporate plans of the LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction. From the 
findings of the analysis, specific accountability issues are identified to be explored during 
interviews with participants in the SWSA jurisdiction. 
Chapter 7 presents the results of the interview process, describes the interview data and 
analyses the data. The data from the interviews are discussed in the context of governmental 
accountability directives and concepts from the literature. 
Chapter 8 examines the key findings of the thesis in relation to the research question.  
Chapter 9 concludes on the implications of the research for adoption of outsourcing best-
practise governance principles by LGAs. Implications for implementation of waste 
management public policy in outsourcing regimes anchored by LGAs are discussed. 
Limitations of the study and future research directions are identified. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review: Aspects of accountability related to the outsourcing of 
waste management services by LGAs  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter defines key terms and definitions. It examines the nature of accountability 
relationships between principals and agents in the public sector. It explores reasons why 
LGAs outsource waste management services in Australia and other international jurisdictions. 
It also explores how the attributes of LGAs and the nature of public waste management 
services impact on accountability. It considers frameworks and theoretical approaches 
available to guide successful outsourcing of waste management services by LGAs designed 
to satisfy the Australian federal government’s accountability expectations with regard to 
waste data. 
2.2 Key terms and definitions 
2.2.1 Accountability  
Gray (1992, p. 401) argues that accountability is essentially about the ‘right to receive 
information and the duty to supply it’. In his opinion, this is an essential element of 
participatory democracies (Gray 1992). The minimum duty of accountability is that of 
compliance with the law and reporting on the extent of compliance (Bebbington & Gray 
1993). In contrast, Gray (2005) contends that the right to information is not just derived from 
legal or quasi-legal sources but could also be based on moral grounds (Gray 2005).  
Accountability encapsulates both the giving and demanding of information (Broadbent & 
Laughlin 2009; Roberts & Scapens 1985). Accountability is ordinarily framed in formal 
terms regarding who becomes the accountor, whom they are accountable to, what they are 
accountable for and how they must account. The framing of accountability is mostly in legal 
terms and normally involves the production of some or other account (Bebbington et al. 
2007). 
Barton (2006) finds accountability in the public sector to include notions such as the 
provision of information, openness and transparency. He argues that accountability in the 
public sector is based on the acceptance of responsibility, explaining and justifying your 
actions whilst taking responsibility for the outcomes:  
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Accountability involves an obligation to answer for one's decisions and actions when 
authority to act on behalf of one party (the principal) is transferred to another (the 
agent) (Barton 2006, p. 257).  
Political accountability in the public sector is delivered through the traditional convention of 
democratic oversight of parliament by holding the relevant ministers responsible for 
implementing and reporting on policy implementation (Gains & Stoker 2009). 
In contrast, accountability can be also framed in managerial terms; that is, the duty to 
describe performance provides the basis for accountability (Ball & Bebbington 2008; Ball, 
Broadbent & Moore 2002). Gains & Stoker (2009) explain that accountability is strengthened 
by setting objective managerial financial and performance targets and providing information 
as to the achievement of these targets (Gains & Stoker 2009). 
Dollery & Manly (2007) argue that accountability in local government primarily centres on 
the duty to provide services to people, establishing a means to evaluate these services and 
allowing citizens to compare expected and delivered services (Dollery & Manley 2007). 
From the above, it is concluded that accountability in local government should be framed in 
terms of (i) accounting for service delivery to local communities, (ii) accounting to higher 
levels of government for compliance with laws and regulations and (iii) accounting to a 
variety of stakeholders for performance based on other moral grounds.  
2.2.2  LGAs 
In Commonwealth countries, the power of parliament to direct lower-order levels of 
government is mostly governed by statute or by a country’s constitution (Feaver & Sheehy 
2014). The Australian constitution does not mention LGAs, nor does it clarify the 
increasingly important role of LGAs as the third sphere of government providing essential 
public services (ALGA 2012, pp. 2, 4 & 5). The recent Pape and Williams high court cases 
have created great uncertainty with regard to accountability relationships between the federal 
government and LGAs, with calls being made for the constitution to be amended through a 
public referendum (ALGA 2012, p. 7).
4
  
                                                 
4
 Refer to Chapter 5 for a discussion on the accountability relationships between the three levels of government. 
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LGAs are creatures of the respective states and territories’ acts and, as such, have 
accountability obligations to those state and territory parliaments (Grant & Fisher 2011). 
LGAs are therefore legal entities, managed by duly appointed mangers, directly (in the case 
of single LGAs) or indirectly (in the case of joint LGAs), overseen by democratically elected 
councils, constituted in respect of an area by any one of the seven state and territory local 
government Acts. The varying acts confer responsibilities, powers and functions on the LGAs, 
and they have full legal capacity to perform anything necessary to perform these functions. In 
Tasmania, LGAs are governed by the Local Government Act, 1993.  
Regional authorities such as SWSA and the Copping Regional Authority trading as SWS are 
constituted as joint LGAs and governed by boards representing their member councils. The 
nature and scope of representation are determined by the rules or constitution of the relevant 
regional authority (Local Government Act 1993, sections 30 & 35). 
2.2.3 Outsourcing 
Public sector outsourcing refers to the transfer of a public service function to an external 
organisation, not necessarily in the private sector (Jensen & Stonecash 2005). Recent 
definitions of outsourcing include the concept of preferring external service provision over 
internal delivery, for example:  
…..the passing of functions previously performed in-house to outside contractors 
(Aulich & Hein 2005, p.36),  
and in a similar vein, 
...as having activities that were formerly done inside the organization now performed 
by an external supplier (Bengtsson & Dabhilkar 2009, p. 232).  
Outsourcing in the context of this study means the service delivery choice by a LGA to 
source waste management services from external service providers, public or private, rather 
than providing these services through in-house capabilities.  
2.2.4 Waste management services 
Waste in the context of this study on outsourcing by LGAs is referred to as MSW (municipal 
solid waste). 
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Authorities globally do not agree on the definition of MSW (Tonjes & Greene 2012). In the 
Australian context, there are currently differences in jurisdictional definitions, classifications 
and methods for measuring waste data (SCEW 2012, p. 17). The Environment Protection and 
Heritage Council (EPHC) coordinated the development of the National Waste Policy, which 
has a priority commitment to assess existing classification arrangements and to undertake 
national harmonisation (EPHC 2010a, p. 15). 
In anticipation of an Australian national definition for MSW, the European Union definition 
in Eurostat (2010) is adopted by this study for the time being. Their definition describes 
MSW as the following:  
…waste generated by households and other wastes, which are similar in nature and 
composition, collected and managed by or on behalf of municipal authorities, … 
similar wastes from…commerce, offices and public institutions…..and…..paper, 
plastics, food, glass, and household appliances. (Tonjes & Greene 2012, p. 758) 
Waste management services are interpreted to mean all activities undertaken by an LGA in 
accordance with the stated aims of the National Waste Policy, namely, 
...to avoid the generation of waste; reduce the amount of waste (including hazardous 
waste) for disposal, manage waste as a resource and ensure that waste treatment, 
disposal, recovery and re-use is undertaken in a safe, scientific and environmentally-
sound manner. (EPHC 2010a, p. 5) 
Waste management services in this study therefore include 1) planning, which includes 
educational initiatives; 2) collection; 3) treatment, which includes re-use, recycling and 
resource recovery; and 4) disposal to landfill. 
2.3 Accountability in the public sector and the impact of public waste policies on 
accountability 
Studies on the impact of federal and central government waste policy on local governments 
are limited. Simões & Marques (2012) conducted an extensive literature review of 107 papers 
on economic performance of the MSW sector that were published since 1965. They express 
surprise over the very limited number of publications in 45 years on the economic aspects of 
waste management. In their opinion, governance of waste is far more important than the 
reviewed articles suggest. They are particularly concerned about the lack of studies regarding 
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regulatory impacts on economic performance of waste management enterprises. Equally 
surprising is the lack of studies on benchmarking of performance. The authors conclude that 
these are important areas for future research (Simões & Marques 2012).  
In considering similar policy areas in waste management, Ball, Broadbent & Moore (2002) in 
a case study of a UK local authority on the implementation of best-value policy
5
 interventions 
by the central government remark that central-local government relations remain a major 
concern. They found the following: 
Implementation of the best-value policy in a dynamic social political environment 
places considerable demand on the managerial skills and resources of LGAs. 
The fear of not complying with governmental directives is very real, and the macro-
political agenda is keenly felt by LGA administrators.  
Confusion regarding implementation of the national policy was in some instances 
caused by uncertainty regarding lack of defined expectations, for example, ill-defined 
performance measurement indicators.  
LGA managers had a spectrum of possible responses to the best-value policy 
interventions, that is, a narrow reactive approach to demonstrate improvement on the 
one end or adopting a systems approach by adopting a business excellence model on 
the other end.  
Some senior managers do not embrace the policy intervention in its entirety, for 
example, expectations that community consultations must take place.  
The authors concluded that the key to understanding the central-local government 
relationship lies in appreciation of the fact that fundamentally central governments want to 
claim credit for achievements in implementing national policy (Ball, Broadbent & Moore 
2002). 
Barton (2006) cautions that adoption of business excellence or best-practise models as 
suggested by the UK best value policy and the Australian National Waste Policy 
Implementation Plan may lead to accountability problems because transparency is not part of 
                                                 
5
 In terms of the best-value policy, the UK Commonwealth expect LGAs to deliver and measure performance of 
service delivery both in terms of quantity and costs against three criteria, namely efficiency, economy and 
effectiveness.  
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business operations, whilst it is essential for public sector accountability. He observed that 
past Australian governments (e.g. the Kennett and Carnell governments) were proud to adopt 
business practices in their operations, and they achieved significant success in fostering 
economic growth. He argues that even though governments achieve economic success, if they 
do not amend managerial business best-practises to include notions of transparency and 
accountability, they will be punished by the electorate at election time (Barton 2006). 
Lindberg (2013) argues that policy makers rarely consider the full range of accountability 
implications when directing adoption of managerial business practices, such as the 
outsourcing of public service delivery which results in public service delivery networks. He 
argues that notions such as accounting for developing and maintaining relationships are 
mostly not included in legal and political accountability measures. If the effective functioning 
of a network resulting from outsourcing arrangements is primarily reliant on strong network 
relationships, traditional legal and political accountability measures do little to enhance the 
effective functioning of the network. He contends that actors in a network can misuse legal 
and political accountability to further personal agendas (Lindberg 2013).  
Haynes & Lynch (2013), in their study on partnerships in the UK educational public sector, 
found that partnerships imposed by central and federal governments do not work and only 
superficial compliance with past policy interventions was achieved. They found that whilst 
central funding can facilitate and incentivise partnerships, these partnerships are not sustained 
once the funding is discontinued. They conclude that simple models of collaboration initiated 
at the local level and derived from communally identified needs are far more effective and 
sustainable than complex and centrally imposed partnerships. They postulate that where 
centrally imposed partnerships are imposed policy levers, such as clear performance 
measures and inspections, are required to monitor the effectiveness of these partnerships 
(Haynes & Lynch 2013). 
Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis (2006), in their case study of one Canadian and one UK local 
authority’s waste management practices, found that an improvement in the Canadian 
council’s waste management practices was the result of pressure from the central government 
to reduce waste disposal to landfill and environmental groups and resident pressures to 
improve waste management resource recovery and recycling practices. They observe that a 
combination of these stakeholder pressures resulted in council employees becoming 
increasingly committed to environmental issues.  
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The combination of political and social pressures resulted in the Canadian council entering 
into a partnership with a private waste management company to recover energy from the 
waste stream. This resulted in contracts being drawn up between the council in the case study 
and the waste management service provider which prescribed waste reduction targets. Targets 
in the outsourcing contract did not meet targets prescribed by the central government. The 
authors found that operational factors related to such inappropriate contracts may impede 
improvement of waste management practices and reporting. They remark that managers were 
unhappy to report performance against sustainability targets due to problems with the long-
term nature of the outsourcing contract not being able to respond to changing waste reduction 
targets in a dynamic regulatory environment. 
Both the UK and Canadian cases describe a constraint in funding available to local 
government to respond to technical demands in response to pressures to improve waste 
management practises. The authors remark that pressure from the central government was 
brought to bear on UK councils to build long-term waste service solutions rather than 
avoiding the generation of waste in the first place. In order to reach waste reduction targets 
and limitations on borrowing powers, external solutions such as large-scale incineration 
through public-private partnerships become attractive. They found that UK councils are under 
increasing pressure to apply for funding under the Private Funding Initiative (PFI) scheme.  
Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis (2006) argue that from the waste authority’s perspective the request 
to contractors for waste data should be reasonable; in the short term, best-practise approaches 
should be adopted with the development of specific tools over the long term to collect waste 
data and improve waste data systems (Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis 2006). 
2.4 Why do LGAs outsource waste management services? 
Feiock (2013) suggests that LGAs have natural response preferences when confronted by 
policy interventions imposed by higher levels of government. A study of accountability 
consequences arising from public policy directives to undertake outsourcing initiatives will 
benefit from an understanding of why LGAs outsource waste management services. 
From a review of the management literature, the major reasons LGAs outsource waste 
management services are identified. 
2.4.1 Financial management, cost savings, cash flow and economic regulation 
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A number of studies on outsourcing are in agreement that the primary motivator for 
outsourcing in both the private and public sector is cost saving (Chalos & Sung 1998; Lacity, 
Hirschheim & Willcocks 1994; Warner 2011; Zhu, Hsu & Lillie 2001).  
Fixed costs can be replaced with a variable pricing structure, such as the elimination of the 
fixed cost of an in-house person providing support services. The budgeting system may 
become more flexible by replacing lumbering capital budgets with more flexible operating 
budgets. Outsourcing may accordingly improve budget preparation and financial 
management processes in these instances (Baird, Schoch & Chen 2012; Carnegie & Baxter 
2006; Kloot 2006; Lacity, Hirschheim & Willcocks 1994; Moynihan 2006; Sharma & 
Gadenne 2011).  
Attractive cash flow benefits may result from outsourcing initiatives such as cash receipts 
from the disposal of assets associated with discontinued in-house services and delayed 
contract payments (Lacity, Hirschheim & Willcocks 1994). Lacity & Khan (2009) found that 
companies experiencing financial difficulties often engage in outsourcing to alleviate 
financial pressures (Lacity & Khan 2009). With a large number of LGAs in Australia having 
reported serious financial constraints (Dollery, Byrnes & Crase 2007), it is feasible that 
similar considerations may well play a role in the outsourcing decision of LGAs. A large US 
study on the outsourcing of public services found that whilst the financial position of local 
authorities may influence their outsourcing decisions, it is not the overriding influence in 
their outsourcing decisions (Bel & Fageda 2007). 
Unanticipated changes in waste management legislation that can affect operations resulting in 
negative financial consequences may also prompt organisations to seek an immediate 
solution from external service providers rather than relying on sluggish internal processes 
(Denhardt & Denhardt 2000; LGPMC 2009, p. 5; Osborne & Gaebler 1993).  
2.4.2 Improving service delivery: Innovation, investment in technology and alleviating 
resource constraints 
Firms that can identify and maintain their competitive advantage by concentrating on core 
competencies will remain viable (Quinn 1999, 2000; Quinn & Hilmer 1994). In seeking a 
competitive edge, the trend towards outsourcing over the last two decades accelerated 
through corporate downsizing, with fewer managers assuming broader spans of control for 
revenue and cost activities (Chalos & Sung 1998). Some scholars argue that increased service 
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demands require infrastructure improvements which may prompt local government officials 
to engage in external service delivery to reduce capital outlays and prevent rate increases 
(LeRoux & Pandey 2011).  
To offer a broader product line in a short space of time to customers, delivery of some of the 
extended suite of services and products are often outsourced, in some instances even to 
competitors (Varadarajan 2009). This approach may be applicable, for example, where local 
government customers’ preferences in respect of recycling approaches are not yet fully clear 
or when such new recycling offerings are urgent. The decision is often driven by a particular 
LGA’s view of its own competitive advantage against other jurisdictions in the region 
(Minkoff 2013). 
Access to technical expertise and the availability of knowledgeable external service providers 
are important reasons why organisations engage in external service delivery (Lacity, 
Hirschheim & Willcocks 1994; Quinn 1999; Rosenberg Hansen, Mols & Villadsen 2011; 
Warner 2011). There is an increasing expectation that technology must drive productivity 
upwards and costs downwards (Kelly 2000). When direct service delivery does not deliver on 
this efficiency expectation, outsourcing may become a strategic necessity (Kang et al. 2012; 
Teng, Cheon & Grover 1995).  
The lifespan of knowledge is getting shorter with some technologies becoming redundant 
within months after announcement, affecting market structures dramatically (Tarn & Chien-
Chih 2012). Due to these rapid technological advances, organisations can ill afford to be 
captive to inappropriate or redundant technologies. LGAs are often hesitant to commit to 
recycling and resource recovery technologies due to anticipated newer technologies in the 
process of being developed. These newer technologies are mostly privately owned, resulting 
in outsourcing initiatives being undertaken (EPHC 2010b, pp. 287 & 288).  
2.4.3 Strategic considerations and personal and political influences 
The scale of economics and strategic alliances may direct an organisation’s effort towards 
external service delivery rather than in-house service delivery (Varadarajan 2009). LGAs in 
metropolitan areas increasingly externalise the development of regional landfills to large 
international waste management companies, while the operations of regional rural landfills 
are similarly being outsourced to specialist medium-sized private companies (Blue 
Environment 2011, p. 44).  
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Outsourcing decisions in the Australian public sector are influenced by staffing and labour 
issues (Bisman 2008; Purse 2009; Teicher, Van Gramberg & Holland 2006). Because labour 
costs are not the same in all geographical locations and service environments, organisations 
can reduce their labour costs by removing themselves from their existing labour costs by 
outsourcing to environments where these costs are lower (Benson & Littler 2002; Lair 2012). 
Lair (2012) is of the opinion that outsourcing also allows an organisation to claim that they 
are not responsible for the actions, or lack thereof, of their contractors. In addition to possible 
cost savings, improved unionised labour relations may be the result of outsourcing, with 
unions being forced to move from a defiant position to a pragmatic compliant response 
(Teicher, Van Gramberg & Holland 2006).  
Public managers may be motivated by political, ideological or even nefarious reasons in their 
outsourcing decisions (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2006). A US study of 134 municipalities 
found limited evidence of managers being motivated by improving social equity and valuing 
the common good of the region in their inter-local contracting decisions
6
 (LeRoux, 
Brandenburger & Pandey 2010). Results from the data suggested that some managers are 
influenced by career-enhancement ambitions when pursuing inter-council service delivery 
arrangements (LeRoux & Pandey 2011). 
Political influence does play a role in contracting decision making (Bel & Fageda 2007; 
Levin & Tadelis 2010). Empirical evidence from US studies suggests that cities with a mayor 
from a conservative ruling party are more likely to outsource public service delivery (Bel & 
Fageda 2008), whilst strengthening of regional relations and promoting regional integration 
influence public managers in external service delivery decision making (Warner 2011). 
Rodrigues, Tavares & Araújo (2012) in their study on 278 continental Portuguese 
municipalities found that political stability favours in-house service delivery, whilst 
instability leads to public managers looking to externalise services (Rodrigues, Tavares & 
Araújo 2012). The ideological orientation of policy makers does not appear to play a major 
role in outsourcing decision making (Bel & Fageda 2007).  
A Bisman (2008) Australian study based on data of 131 mostly New South Wales (NSW) 
public service organisations, which included 64 local authorities, found that legislative 
imperatives rather than cost factors are the driving force in deciding to outsource (Bisman 
2008). A survey of councillors and management teams at six Victorian local authorities found 
                                                 
6
 Inter-local contracting refers to the contracting between different local authorities. 
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that legislative directives related to procurement practices, such as compulsory competitive 
tendering and best-value procurement, had a critical effect on the shape of the modern 
Victorian LGA (Kloot & Martin 2007). Some UK studies came to a similar conclusion that 
legislative imperatives play a major role in the outsourcing practices of local authorities by 
finding that the waste management practices of local councils, which included outsourcing 
practices, are closely linked to meeting the European Community (EC) landfill directives 
(Ball 2005; Walker 2008).  
Outsourcing decisions are often taken based on hearsay and media reports of successful 
outsourcing initiatives in order to enhance corporate citizenship or to eliminate a troublesome 
service function (Lacity, Hirschheim & Willcocks 1994). In a study on Portuguese local 
authorities, it was found that managers keep visible human services functions where 
deliverables are difficult to measure and credit can be claimed in-house, whilst outsourcing 
more troublesome and easily measurable services such as waste disposal to municipal 
corporations (Tavares & Camöes 2007).  
Negative community reaction to resource recovery technology, such as incineration, leads to 
LGAs being hesitant to invest in such new waste treatment technologies, resulting in LGAs 
engaging in external contracting in circumstances where negative community perceptions are 
anticipated (EPHC 2010b, p. 287; Robertson, Lamin & Livanis 2010).  
A fear of forced amalgamations and consolidation of LGAs may also influence inter-local 
outsourcing decisions to protect public managers’ and councillors’ tenure.7 A number of 
Australian commissions and inquires have focused on the perceived benefits to be derived 
from amalgamation and consolidation of local government (Aulich, Sansom & McKinlay 
2013).  
Studies have found limited evidence of the amalgamation and consolidation model being 
successful in improving service delivery and reducing costs of public service delivery in the 
Netherlands and Switzerland. These studies concluded that an outsourcing of services model 
is more likely to result in improved service delivery rather than purely geographical 
consolidation of the service (Bel et al. 2010; Bel, Fageda & Mur 2014).  
                                                 
7
 In the case of Tasmania, the governor, in terms of section 16 by order and on the recommendation of the 
minister, may adjust a boundary of a municipal area on the recommendation of the local government board 
(Local Government Act 1993). 
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From the above, it becomes clear that the outsourcing practices of waste management 
services by LGAs are influenced by managerial, legal, quasi-legal and moral aspects. The 
differing contexts of these outsourcing practices in the public sector may have different 
implications for accountability in different geographical contexts. These possible 
consequences are accordingly explored as follows.  
2.5 How does the outsourcing of waste management services by LGAs impact on 
their accountability obligations? 
The reasons for the outsourcing of different types of waste management services, as 
discussed in the previous section, influence the types of service delivery arrangements
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chosen, which in turn have different implications for corporate governance and accountability 
(Bel et al. 2010; Bel & Fageda 2008; Bel & Warner 2013; Dijkgraaf & Gradus 2008a; 
Melenberg, Gradus & Dijkgraaf 2003; Mohr, Deller & Halstead 2010; Zafra-GÓmez et al. 
2013).  
Burritt (2012) suggests that a study of accounting systems benefits from developing an 
understanding of the boundaries of accountability where data flow across organisations. 
Potential accountability problems that LGAs may experience when outsourcing waste 
management services are identified from the literature.  
2.5.1 The impact of privately held information by agents 
Information held by the private sector/agent is protected by proprietary laws, whilst 
information held by government/principals is in the public domain. For accountability 
relationships to exist in these circumstances; a contractual right to the information held by the 
agent must be present, that is, there must be a clear and transparent agreement to facilitate the 
flow of information between agent and principal. The right to information by the principal in 
such circumstances must be enforceable through punitive measures to ensure the agent 
complies with the demand for information; that is, enforcement measures are crucial to direct 
the behaviour of agents in accountability relationships (Burritt & Welch 1997; Flack & Ryan 
2005; Forrer et al. 2010; Gray, Brennan & Malpas 2013; Mosher & Mainquist 2011; Perlman 
2013; Shaoul, Stafford & Stapleton 2012).  
                                                 
8
 Service delivery arrangement refers to the type of contracting; for example, arm’s-length contracting with a 
private contractor may be contrasted with contracting with a service-specific incorporated LGA. 
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Corporate governance principles in the public and private sectors are fundamentally different. 
For example, whilst secrecy clauses in contracts and governance structures are totally 
acceptable in commerce, the use thereof in the public sector is incompatible with the 
requirements of transparency, a cornerstone of democratic accountability. In this regard, a 
number of studies have found the use of commercial in confidence (CIC) contractual clauses 
to detract from the accountability relationship in the public sector. For example, Barton (2006) 
observes that the Bruce stadium contract entered into by the ACT government during the 
1990s, which contained secrecy clauses in respect of price, quality and terms of delivery, 
resulted in a backlash from the electorate. Quiggan (1996), like others, is of the strong 
opinion that CIC clauses are designed to prevent public scrutiny of public sector projects and 
that transparency should always be favoured against claims of confidentiality in the case of 
public contracting (Andon 2012; Ball 2012; Barton 2006; Brown 2013; Kluvers & Tippett 
2010; Purse 2009; Quiggin 1996; Shaoul, Stafford & Stapleton 2012). 
Thus, whilst the proprietary interests of contracting parties’ interest in knowledge are 
protected in the commercial environment, this should not be at the expense of public benefits 
in outsourcing regimes of public organisations. Outsourcing often presents an ethical 
dilemma to local government managers insofar as government-citizen relationships evolve 
into customer-vendor relationships, with information previously publicly held now being 
privately held (Andrews & Brewer 2013; Andrews & Entwistle 2013; Aulich 2011; Perlman 
2013; Quinn 2000).  
Keeler (2013) reviewed five municipal waste collection service contracts over five regional 
jurisdictions in Florida, USA, in detail. She found that the administrative discretion provided 
by local government managers to service providers in these contracts often provided 
opportunities for contractors to frustrate the public interest. She observed that the contracts do 
not require contractors to comply with public administration ethical norms and standards, nor 
were transparent public interest processes prescribed. She suggests that the ethical and 
transparency provisions in service agreements should be elevated from general legal 
requirements to be included in the scope of the service (Keeler 2013).  
2.5.2 Accountability for service delivery performance  
LGAs remain accountable for public services even if these services are outsourced. Under 
their statutory mandate flowing from the various local government acts to account to the 
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public, they are entitled to high-quality information from their private service providers (Ball 
2012; Barton 2006).  
Saliterer & Korac (2013) observe that performance measurement in local government has 
changed fundamentally since the introduction of new public management (NPM) inspired 
reforms and that fragmented local public service delivery creates external accountability 
challenges. These external accountability challenges are the result of NPM reforms 
embracing the notion of privatisation and outsourcing to improve on public service delivery 
but in the process creating multiple layers of accountability. The accountability challenges 
arise primarily due to performance measurement problems inherent in the outsourcing 
process, a principal-agent relationship with ill-defined performance indicators (Ball 2005; 
Ball & Bebbington 2008; Ball, Broadbent & Moore 2002; Dollery & Manley 2007; Purse 
2009; Saliterer & Korac 2013).  
Outsourcing of complex and large transactions requires trust in the competence of a supplier 
(Dekker, Sakaguchi & Kawai 2013), a supplier that can get the job done (Das & Teng 2001). 
The customer or principal has very little or no control over the service providers’ internal 
processes, resulting in increased reputational and customer relations risks, especially when 
these outsourced functions relate to critical business operations such as waste collection 
services. Differing interpretations of supplier contribution and performance as well as lack of 
performance measures for newly developed processes create strain in the relationships 
between sourcing organisations and suppliers. Jensen & Stonecash (2005) observe that the 
public sector experiences difficulties in identifying measurable efficiency outputs, which 
leads to difficulty in implementing performance measures (Bisman 2008; Jensen & Stonecash 
2005; McIvor et al. 2009). 
2.5.3 Accountability associated with the outsourcing of waste management services  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, to improve services to citizens and reduce costs LGAs 
undertake outsourcing initiatives. Recent studies on outsourcing of public services question 
some older findings (Domberger & Piggott 1986; Quinn & Hilmer 1994) which promoted 
outsourcing of public services as being preferable to direct service delivery (Bel & Fageda 
2007, 2008, 2009; Bel & Warner 2009; Hefetz & Warner 2007, 2012; Warner & Hefetz 
2012).  
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Scholars have found that managers often underestimate the costs associated with the sourcing, 
monitoring and mentoring of multiple external service providers. Islands of hidden costs are 
created due to management accounting systems of local authorities not being able to 
adequately track these costs. Bisman (2008) found that Australian public service 
organisations generally do not measure the financial consequences of outsourcing decisions, 
most not considering the increased transactional costs associated with outsourcing. Lacity et 
al. (1994) are of the opinion that outsourcers often fail to understand the consequences of 
long-term, fixed-fee contracts, resulting in their not sharing in the benefits of price and 
performance improvements. Core competencies, such as strategic planning and development 
in critical service areas like waste collection and disposal, may be outsourced due to political 
pressure, and external service providers may not be able to deliver on strategic outsourcing 
expectations, for example, the supply of critical waste data. In these circumstances, it is 
conceivable that conflicts of interest may lead to a lack of willingness to account for critical 
waste data by both public managers and service providers to LGAs (Johnstone 2002; Lacity, 
Hirschheim & Willcocks 1994; Quinn & Hilmer 1994; Tarn & Chien-Chih 2012).  
Merickova & Nemec (2013) conducted a number of studies over a decade on the outsourcing 
of waste collection and disposal services by Slovakian municipalities. Their 2010 survey 
comprised a sample of 141 municipalities. They found that the outsourcing of these services 
did not result in increased efficiency and that in-house service delivery appears to deliver 
superior results. They concluded that too few bidders tender for waste management contracts 
at the local level and that dramatically improved accountability measures are required to 
improve the socio-economic environment through developing competition in the waste 
management industry (Merickova & Nemec 2013). 
In 2010, 54% of the Australian waste and recycling market was dominated by less than one 
percent of the companies’ active in the industry. In contrast with the findings of Merickova & 
Nemec (2013), the Australian National Waste report (2010) argues that whilst this 
concentration may limit competition, the large companies are better suited to collate data as 
part of their informed investment decision processes, which in turn will result in improved 
national waste data reporting (EPHC 2010b, p. 229). 
The continuing demand for new and improved public services requires new investment in 
technologies, such as advanced waste transfer stations and resource recovery facilities. As old 
landfill sites are increasingly closed due to air and space constraints and constraining 
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licensing conditions, an increasing number of LGAs are forced to outsource their disposal 
services to neighbouring councils or private operators. This creates new and expanded 
demands on public managers to measure the performance of these initiatives. Where 
outsourcing initiatives fail to live up to performance expectations, it may be tempting for 
public managers to divest themselves from the responsibility to account for the failed or 
under-performing initiatives (Ball 2012; Barton 2006; Brown 2013; Greve 2001; Laking & 
Norman 2007).  
2.5.4 Accountability to a wide array of stakeholders  
Gray’s (1992, p. 401) ‘right to receive information’ when considering waste management 
services provided by an LGA becomes problematic due to conflicting demands from a wide 
range of stakeholders, such as environmental activists on the one hand demanding 
environmental accountability through environmentally friendly waste management services 
and local government customers demanding proof of cheap garbage removal, whilst the 
Australian federal government requires accountability in respect of waste types and volumes 
recycled and disposed of. The environmental management systems (EMS) of LGAs must 
accordingly facilitate reporting to a diverse group of stakeholders, both in monetary and 
narrative terms, against predetermined benchmarks by collating both internally generated and 
externally sourced waste data (Ball, Broadbent & Moore 2002; Beach 2009; Bebbington, 
Brown & Frame 2007; Bebbington et al. 2007; Bebbington & Gray 1993; Bebbington & 
Larrinaga-Gonzalez 2008; Bellringer, Ball & Russell 2011; Gibson 2012; Kluvers & Tippett 
2010, 2011; Lourdes, Vicente & Caridad 2012; Qian & Burritt 2007, 2009; Qian, Burritt & 
Monroe 2011; Sciulli 2011; Zaman 2012).  
The scope and nature of waste data required by LGAs from multiple external service 
providers are comprehensive, complex and may change rapidly, resulting from stakeholders 
such as the Australian federal government’s expanded expectations due to policy changes. 
Service providers may also feel that their accountability obligation with respect to the 
reporting of waste data is adequately met through reporting to the EPA.  
2.5.5 The consequences of collaborative outsourcing and relational contracting on 
accountability relationships  
Local government reforms in Australia include a wide range of new service delivery 
arrangements, such as the merging of municipalities, substantially redrawing municipal 
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boundaries, private contracting and shared service models (Aulich, Sansom & McKinlay 
2013; Dollery & Akimov 2008b; Dollery, Akimov & Byrnes 2009; Dollery, Grant & Akimov 
2010; Dollery, Hallam & Wallis 2008; Dollery, Kortt & Grant 2012).  
Shared waste management service models are based on collaborative arrangements, resulting 
in incomplete and complex contracts with the right to information often not adequately 
entrenched in such contracts. Qian, Burritt & Monroe (2011) found that some service 
providers to local government do not have the capabilities to deliver on expectations to 
supply waste data. In such circumstances, local authorities may rely on relational contracting 
to improve the situation. In relational contracting, trust plays a more important role than in 
command and control governance systems. Relational contracting may also be considered 
more suitable than a transactional approach in projects where volatility and uncertainty is 
anticipated (Arranz & Fdez de Arroyabe 2012; Bertelli & Smith 2010; Brown, Potoski & Van 
Slyke 2006; Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2007, 2010; Cruz & Marques 2012; Girth 2014; 
Kluvers & Tippett 2010, 2011, 2012; Longo & Barbieri 2013; Qian, Burritt & Monroe 2011). 
Verner & Abdullah (2012) suggest that the credibility of service providers must be 
considered at the outset of trust-based outsourcing relationships to avoid those service 
providers that do not prescribe to the principal’s moral values: 
It is difﬁcult for a client project manager to anticipate and deal with ‘vendor’s moral 
hazard’. Fraud and lies can be difﬁcult to detect. Good client project management 
practices can help detect some fraudulent misrepresentations. It is imperative that the 
client does their homework on the vendor and the members of the vendor team, and 
having begun with good requirements [sic], monitors progress carefully (Verner & 
Abdullah 2012, p. 876). 
Albrecht et al. (2014) state that how to measure and manage moral hazard between the 
participants in a network of actors is a complex issue They argue that it is often difficult to 
distinguish between functions within networks and individuals in the network. They 
concluded from the results of two European case studies on the impact assessment of regional 
governance networks that if the functioning of a regional network is reliant on individuals in 
that network, a method must somehow be developed to measure the credibility of the 
relationships. They suggest that an interview-based assessment may be appropriate but 
caution that the impact assessment approach of regional governance networks is still in its 
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infancy and remains a costly undertaking due to the limited availability of grounded theory 
and proven methods.  
This view is shared by Doberstein (2013). The results of his study on 15 Canadian public 
sector networks indicated that these networks are mostly prescribed by higher levels of 
government. The study found that networks governed by professional managers rather than 
elected officials function more effectively. Financial incentives to adopt meta-governance 
mechanisms were found to be strong incentives to strengthen accountability. The study 
recommended that higher levels of government must show a genuine interest in the opinions 
of local administrators in crafting meta-governance mechanisms for regional networks. The 
study concluded 
Accountability and legitimacy of network governance requires a complementary 
framework of vertical, horizontal and social accountability mechanisms (Doberstein 
2013b, p. 605). 
A relational approach to contracting may lead to a lack of information flowing between 
closely connected business partners. Close connections between public managers and service 
providers may be the result of social network affiliations, membership in collaborative 
initiatives, partnership arrangements or varying degrees of investment in such service 
providers. Yang, Hsieh & Li (2010) found that Taiwanese local authority managers are more 
likely to have a close connection with their service providers than public managers in general. 
Girth (2014), as well as others, found evidence that even where contractual sanction measures 
exist, US public managers often do not enforce these sanctions, in some cases rewarding 
service providers although performance problems exist. Where public managers are thus 
closely connected to their service providers, they are hesitant to hold them accountable for 
their actions (Forrer et al. 2010; Heinrich, Lynn & Milward 2010; Kluvers & Tippett 2010, 
2011, 2012; LeRoux, Brandenburger & Pandey 2010; LeRoux & Carr 2010; Longo & 
Barbieri 2013; Perlman 2013; Shaoul, Stafford & Stapleton 2012). 
Zeemering (2012), in his 2005 study based on 47 semi-structured interviews conducted with 
city council members and mayors in Michigan, USA, concluded that the assessment of the 
performance of inter-local agreements will be a critical task for public administration 
researchers in the years ahead. His narrative analysis of the interview data revealed 12 
distinct concerns that city council members expressed with regard to public accountability 
when entering into inter-local agreements. He concluded that consideration of the 
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performance of inter-local agreements should include the assessment of what he coins the 
‘democratic anchorage’ of these agreements. He suggests that public managers are well 
advised 
...to consider how elected officials might provide a link of democratic accountability 
between the citizens within their city and the service provided through the ILA [inter-
local agreement] (Zeemering 2012a, p. 98). 
2.5.6 The impact of labour relations on accountability relationships 
Outsourcing in the Australian public sector resulted in a change in the employment model to 
shorter and more temporary forms of employment. Some scholars argue that training, career 
development opportunities and conditions of employment are negatively impacted by 
outsourcing. McKinlay (2011) found that UK public managers have become concerned about 
staff resistance during the last decade when deciding between direct service delivery and 
outsourcing. Some studies found that redundancies and transfer of staff from the principal to 
agent negatively affects the moral of the workforce and anticipated improvement of technical 
expertise through outsourcing is often not realised due to inappropriate and incomplete 
contracts in respect of labour requirements, sharing resources with the service providers’ 
other customers and overworked service provider staff. Disgruntled employees may therefore 
negatively affect the flow of information from primary service providers to the ultimate 
stakeholders, such as the Australian federal government (Benson & Littler 2002; Bisman 
2008; Lacity, Hirschheim & Willcocks 1994; McKinlay 2011; Purse 2009; Teicher, Van 
Gramberg & Holland 2006). 
2.6 Best practises derived from outsourcing frameworks in the literature 
The move away from direct delivery of public services to increasingly outsourcing waste 
management services to the private sector, other public entities, municipal corporations or 
non-profit entities requires substantial redesign of management models and controls. 
Promoting best practises
9
 requires better scholarship to understand how exemplary systems 
work (Cristofoli et al. 2010; Purse 2009; Sanger 2008). 
                                                 
9
 Refer to Chapter 1 for a discussion on best-practise waste management networks as contemplated by The 
Tasmanian Waste Strategy. 
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McIvor (2008) suggests that theoretical frameworks for successful outsourcing derived from 
the literature can be used to develop best-practise management systems. Vagadia (2012) 
proposes the most recent comprehensive framework for successful outsourcing developed by 
consolidating his findings with concepts derived from earlier scholarly works, such as 
McIvor (2008), Kakabadse & Kakabadse (2005), Lacity and Willcocks (1994), Quinn & 
Hilmer (1994) and others.  
Vagadia (2012) proposes eight key factors that are required for successful outsourcing. These 
success factors are presented in the table on page 46. Where other frameworks for successful 
outsourcing are in support of his individual success factors, such support is indicated on the 
table, with a brief discussion of the accountability provisions of these frameworks following 
the table. 
Quinn (1999, 2000) developed a broad framework for strategic outsourcing from what is 
considered as best practise in large multi-national commercial organisations (e.g. Dell). He 
suggests that strategic outsourcing is a top management function, especially when 
outsourcing new-product innovation and business processes. His framework suggests that the 
principal-agent relationship must be managed in such a way that both parties benefit equally 
from the relationship; that is, goal congruence becomes a governance mechanism. 
Accountability for strategic outsourcing is achieved through managing the relationship rather 
than the contract and through the transparent communication of knowledge and information 
through open, mutual databases. 
Zhu, Hsu & Lillie (2001) take a process view of the outsourcing initiative and suggest 
extensive codification of the process through the use of business plans, transition plans, 
employee separation plans, communication plans and a transition checklist. Their framework 
is relevant to this study in so far as the development of action plans is prescribed by The 
Tasmanian Waste Strategy (Environmental Protection Authority 2009, pp. 5, 6, 8, 10, 14 & 
18).  
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Table 1: Vagadia’s (2012) success factors for outsourcing 
and support from other frameworks for successful outsourcing 
Success factors for outsourcing  Support from other frameworks for successful 
outsourcing  
1. Develop strong, yet flexible contracts that aid 
in building trust. 
(Ali, Ali Asghar Anvary & Ali 2008; Hassanain 
& Al-Saadi 2005; Lacity & Khan 2009; McIvor 
2008; Verner & Abdullah 2012; Zhu, Hsu & 
Lillie 2001) 
2. Develop a governance framework for control, 
monitoring, dispute resolution and relationship 
building at all levels. 
(Ali, Ali Asghar Anvary & Ali 2008; Hassanain 
& Al-Saadi 2005; Lacity & Khan 2009; McIvor 
2008; Verner & Abdullah 2012) 
3. Implement effective controls to enable 
monitoring of performance, guide vendor 
behaviour and develop trust. 
(Ali, Ali Asghar Anvary & Ali 2008; Hassanain 
& Al-Saadi 2005; Lacity & Khan 2009; McIvor 
2008; Quinn 1999; Verner & Abdullah 2012) 
4. Build commitment and mutual dependence, 
which drive both parties to perform contracted 
tasks to a high level of performance. Motivate 
performance beyond the contract. 
(Lacity & Khan 2009; McIvor 2008; Mohr, 
Sengupta & Slater 2011; Quinn 2000; Verner & 
Abdullah 2012; Zhu, Hsu & Lillie 2001) 
5. Align the goals and objectives both within the 
client organisation and between the client and 
vendor, using the concept of consensus building, 
based on an understanding of the unique personal 
drivers within each organisation. 
(Ali, Ali Asghar Anvary & Ali 2008; Hassanain 
& Al-Saadi 2005; Lacity & Khan 2009; McIvor 
2008; Mohr, Sengupta & Slater 2011; Quinn 
1999, 2000; Verner & Abdullah 2012; Zhu, Hsu 
& Lillie 2001) 
6. Build individual and institutional trust to 
enable parties to perform services as prescribed in 
the contract.  
(Lacity & Khan 2009; Mohr, Sengupta & Slater 
2011; Verner & Abdullah 2012) 
7. Manage effective collaboration and knowledge 
sharing between the parties through individual 
and group interaction. 
(Mohr, Sengupta & Slater 2011; Quinn 1999, 
2000; Verner & Abdullah 2012; Zhu, Hsu & 
Lillie 2001) 
8. Use communication as a key linking tool to 
manage change and to mitigate risks. 
(Ali, Ali Asghar Anvary & Ali 2008; Lacity & 
Khan 2009; McIvor 2008; Mohr, Sengupta & 
Slater 2011; Quinn 1999, 2000; Verner & 
Abdullah 2012; Zhu, Hsu & Lillie 2001) 
 
Hassanain & Al-Saadi (2005) propose a framework for the outsourcing of asset management 
services for municipalities derived from a survey of Saudi Arabian municipalities. They 
found that successful outsourcing of asset management services in the local government 
sector are preceded by the determination of the principal’s own goals, risks and benefits 
related to the function to be outsourced. Their framework focuses strongly on the process 
management of outsourcing contracts to monitor and improve the agent’s performance. They 
suggest the implementation of formalised controls supporting procurement processes, for 
example, evaluation of contractors. Their process governance framework for implementing 
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and reviewing the outsourcing initiatives is codified in action plans, such as transition and 
improvement plans. 
Ali et al. (2008) expanded on the framework proposed by Hassanain & Al-Saadi (2005) and 
derived a conceptual framework for outsourcing in the public sector from their findings of a 
survey of Iranian public entities. They found that an understanding of both strategic long-
term and operational short-term goals regarding core activities by the principal, prior to 
developing selection criteria, is required to achieve successful outsourcing. They found a 
sound communication process, top management support and a fully structured contract to be 
essential for successful outsourcing. Their framework provides an empirical foundation for 
the Vagadia (2012) application of achieving accountability through formal contracts in the 
public sector. Clear contractual performance measures (e.g. the requirement to supply data 
contained in contracts) strengthen the accountability of agents in outsourcing relationships 
both in the public sector and the private sector.  
McIvor (2008) established a framework for the successful implementation of outsourcing 
strategies. He proposes his framework by integrating TCE concepts with a resource-based 
view (RBV)
10
 of the organisation and by building on lessons learnt from real case interviews 
with managers of for-profit entities engaging in outsourcing strategies. His framework 
specifies that the underlying causes of poor performance and how these processes link with 
other processes in the organisation should be understood prior to embarking on an 
outsourcing initiative. Managers must also understand the potential for opportunism prior to 
outsourcing the process by asking questions such as: Will it be difficult to establish 
performance measures and what happens if the supplier fails? 
The McIvor (2008) framework is relevant to this thesis due to the fact that waste management 
services are often difficult to measure and suffer from high asset specificity. His framework 
suggests that processes such as the demand for information should be codified so that the 
associated tasks, specifications and performance levels can be communicated clearly to 
suppliers. He suggests that the contract and relationship strategy should be used as 
complements. The management of the relationship with the supplier becomes an essential 
complement for dealing with gaps in the contract, particularly in the case of complex 
outsourced processes. 
                                                 
10
 These concepts are elaborated upon later in this chapter. 
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Lacity & Kahn (2009) reviewed 86 outsourcing studies and concluded that successful 
outsourcing is dependent on a sound decision to outsource as well as sound contractual and 
relational governance measures. They found that the involvement of senior managers and 
rigorous evaluation processes are associated with higher levels of successful outsourcing. 
More contract detail, shorter-term contracts and higher-dollar-valued contracts are positively 
related to successful outsourcing. Trust, norms, open communication, open sharing of 
information, mutual dependency and cooperation are always associated with higher levels of 
outsourcing success. Their findings provide extensive empirical support for the Vagadia 
(2012) framework. 
Mohr et al. (2011) proposed a generic framework for information technology outsourcing and 
business process outsourcing to assist managers to decide whether a function should be 
outsourced and, if so, which type of outsourcing makes the most sense. Their framework 
directs the structure and management of business functions, including outsourcing, to be 
aligned to the underlying needs, resources and desired outcomes to maximize benefits and 
minimize risks. 
Mohr et al. (2011) found that when economies of scale exist and when the transfer of explicit, 
codified knowledge is involved, straight-forward transactional ‘lift and shift’ outsourcing 
arrangements yield cost savings and efficiency. In contrast, when the transfer of know-how is 
more tacit, longer-term strategic outsourcing brings the client and service provider closer 
together to deliver knowledge transfer and associated value enhancements. In terms of their 
framework, waste management services, such as garbage collection services, are more likely 
to be outsourced in terms of arm’s-length contracts than waste disposal services that are more 
likely to be outsourced to trust-based partnerships due to the extent of investment required 
and critical nature of the capital asset. Accountability requirements for the different service 
types are accordingly markedly different. 
Verner & Abdullah (2012) expanded on earlier research of risk factors underlying outsourced 
information technology (IT) project failure. They used the findings from a case study of a 
large, failed outsourced project and the results of prior research to develop a conceptual risk-
based framework for effective outsourcing of IT projects. Their risk-based, project-orientated 
framework differentiates between risks related to the outsourcing parties and the project.  
The changing waste management environment is characterised by new and improved 
recycling and disposal facilities. Verner & Abdullah’s (2012) framework is relevant, as it 
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provides guidance where high technological risks are associated with such projects and 
parties to the projects.  
2.7 Governance mechanisms and accountability relationships 
Feiock (2013) suggests that a study of policy interventions from higher levels of government 
that impacts on the operations of LGAs benefits from an understanding of what mechanisms 
are available to LGAs to respond to such policy interventions (Feiock 2013). To examine this, 
the following dimensions from the Vagadia (2012) framework are identified as best-practise 
mechanisms by which principals can hold agents accountable in contractual environments: 
alignment of goals and objectives, communication and knowledge sharing, contract 
management and managing and monitoring of relationships.  
2.7.1   Alignment of goals and objectives 
All role players must fully understand the complexities and constraints associated with data 
collection related to specific aspects of the particular waste management service to be 
outsourced to prevent unclear instructions issued to and accepted by the suppliers, especially 
when inter-local contracting or collaborative initiatives are contemplated (McIvor 2008). The 
Vagadia (2012) best-practise outsourcing framework expands the notion of goal congruence 
between principal and agent to include alignment within both firms’ strategic objectives with 
their respective internal stakeholders (Vagadia 2012). 
Alignment of accountability goals between principals, agents and stakeholders are 
accordingly considered from the literature.  
2.7.1.1 Alignment between principal and service provider 
According to Quinn (2000), organisational boundaries are an impediment to knowledge 
sharing. The underlying assumption to a successful outsourcing relationship is that the parties 
to the relationship are indeed willing to share such knowledge. The contracting parties often 
do not want to share information with each other because they have different goals and 
objectives. The Quinn (2000) framework acknowledges that contracting parties may have 
different goals but suggests that this limitation can be overcome by developing a shared 
identity through joint development of innovative products and services. The McIvor (2008) 
framework refers to anecdotal evidence of a Dell case study and suggests that an extreme 
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approach of virtual integration must be followed where this shared identity is critical to the 
strategic objectives of both organisations (McIvor 2008; Mohr, Sengupta & Slater 2011; 
Quinn 2000).  
Warner (2011), in a study on outsourcing arrangements of 1,747 US municipalities, warns 
that these cooperative arrangements require new governance tools due to the lack of private 
sector competition in such complex networks. Feiock, In Won & Hyung (2012) conducted a 
survey based study on 38 city and county governments in Florida, USA, with regard to 
outsourcing and collaborative economic development arrangements. They observed that 
service collaboration administrative networks naturally develop along the same lines as 
political networks, and collaboration between jurisdictions develop between a small number 
of jurisdictions, some with resources and some without. They posited that this may be the 
result of politically vulnerable administrators seeking to protect their tenure. They concluded 
that this is consistent with a resource dependency view of public sector networks and will 
result in information sharing inefficiencies. It would accordingly be dangerous to assume that 
collaborative arrangements necessarily imply that actors in the network share the same goals 
and objectives when giving and demanding waste data and that the establishment of such 
networks will necessarily result in improved data collection systems (Feiock, In Won & 
Hyung Jun 2012; Goliday 2012; Warner 2011; Zeemering & Delabbio 2013). 
2.7.1.2 Alignment with stakeholder values 
Stakeholder management dictates that organisations must acknowledge the moral values of 
organisations and individuals that are in a position to influence their activities, and it 
accordingly places an obligation on the organisations to respond to such stakeholders. 
Stakeholder identification and engagement becomes a managerial necessity because public 
managers in charge of contracting must balance competing stakeholder values in politically 
charged environments whilst remaining accountable to the public (Burritt, Hahn & 
Schaltegger 2002; Deegan 2013; Dollery & Manley 2007; Donaldson & Preston 1995; 
Farneti & Guthrie 2009; Feldman & Perez 2012; Frooman 1999; Michels 2011; Reed et al. 
2009; Ryan, Stanley & Nelson 2002; Yang & Kathe 2005). 
Heinrich, Lynn & Milward (2010) express the concern that formal government institutions 
may not be able to retain control and uphold obligations to citizens in complex governance 
arrangements involving multiple, third-party actors. Lengthening chains of delegation and an 
increasing divide between the origins of government activity and the point of service delivery 
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may result in the public interest not being adequately served. Calabro & Torchia (2011) hold 
a similar view of outsourcing arrangements in the local public sector. They found that 
outsourcing in local government is complicated by the presence of dynamic relationships 
between multiple principles and agents (Calabro & Torchia 2011; Heinrich, Lynn & Milward 
2010). 
Collaborative arrangements such as municipal corporations or other mixed firms may, 
however, lead to contradictory pressures within the LGAs in a shared jurisdiction. Balancing 
efficiencies such as commercial gain with the public interest leads to a high degree of 
managerial conflict between these polarised goals. Strongly held personal beliefs and self-
serving interests often influence decision making in such agency relationships. Political 
interference may result in the appointment of local government managers, or managers of 
their special-purpose vehicle service providers that are more sympathetic to political 
stakeholders’ goals than the public interest (Andrews, Boyne & Walker 2006; Garrone, Grilli 
& Rousseau 2013; Girth et al. 2012; Jensen & Meckling 1976; LeRoux & Pandey 2011; 
Lubell, Feiock & de la Cruz 2009; Niskanen 1971).  
Bryson (2004) suggests the adoption of a formal process to identify stakeholders and their 
expectations. He argues that the resulting stakeholder value mapping greatly assists in 
providing information on conflicting values and preferences. Environmental interest groups’ 
expectations of improved environmental reporting stand in contrast to customers’ 
expectations of improved and affordable service delivery. A stakeholder value-mapping 
approach allows public managers to identify contrasting views and facilitates moral and 
ethically sound decisions that contribute to the public good (Berner, Amos & Morse 2011; 
Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2006; Bryson 2004; Mitchell, Agle & Wood 1997; Nassreddine 
& Anis 2012). 
2.7.2  Communication 
Communication is considered a key success factor in governing successful outsourcing 
relationships. A properly functioning working relationship enables coordination of activities 
between the client and service provider. Accountability is strengthened by properly 
functioning communication channels to facilitate the flow of information. Communication is 
therefore the most fundamental process to establish and maintain such working relationships 
(Burritt & Welch 1997; Reid 2012; Wüllenweber et al. 2008).  
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Feiock (2013) argues that uncertainties limit rational actors’ options and prevent authorities 
from reaching coordinated decisions. A cornerstone of innovative government is the 
development of communicative tools to improve control over service providers whilst 
improving responsiveness to citizens. Quinn (2000) suggests that innovation in the 
outsourcing environment must be supported by an open-information capability that places all 
participants on the same footing to prevent actors from taking strong positions on their own 
ideas. All ideas become everybody’s ideas (Feiock 2013; Hefetz & Warner 2007; Quinn 
2000). 
The sharing of information is reliant on close collaboration between principals and agents. 
Dekker, Sakaguchi & Kawai (2013) observe that collaboration between firms stems from the 
need to coordinate tasks, solve problems, share knowledge and in general to influence 
behaviour. Coordination or goal congruence through reciprocity and mutual dependency can 
only be established through clear formal communication between the seller and the buyer. 
The Lacity & Khan (2009) framework identified 44 studies that found that trust, norms, open 
communication, open sharing of information, mutual dependency and cooperation are always 
associated with higher levels of outsourcing success (Dekker, Sakaguchi & Kawai 2013; 
Lacity & Khan 2009; Zhu, Hsu & Lillie 2001). 
Quinn & Hilmer (1994) observed that successful outsourcers such as Nike find it absolutely 
essential to have close contact and rapport at both the floor level and the top management 
level. Face-to-face meetings at the top management level are important at the problem 
definition stage, and ongoing interaction reinforces commitment and shared identity. Rai et al. 
(2012), in their study of 335 business process outsourcing ventures, found that an up-front 
information exchange between decision makers and staff reduces the need for detailed 
contractual obligations. They concluded that information exchange through relational 
contracting such as meetings may be preferable to enforcing information exchange by means 
of contractual conflict resolution (Quinn & Hilmer 1994; Rai et al. 2012; Vagadia 2012). 
The outsourcing frameworks stress the importance of effective communication and 
knowledge sharing as a prerequisite for successful outsourcing. Zhu, Hsu & Lillie (2001) 
summarise the problem succinctly and suggest a solution as follows:  
The best way to counter and potentially eliminate misinformation from spreading 
within an organization is to develop and implement an aggressive communication 
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plan. The communication plan should be designed to provide timely, detailed and 
accurate information on a planned basis (Zhu, Hsu & Lillie 2001, p. 376). 
Communication and knowledge sharing in regional networks are reliant on top managements’ 
active commitment to these networks. Minkoff (2013) concluded from his study on 92 US 
cities that municipalities outside of these informal network centres may find it difficult to 
cooperate effectively with municipalities in the network. LeRoux, Brandenburger & Pandey 
(2010) found that public managers who attend meetings and serve on committees in regional 
associations find it beneficial in terms of building relationships with cooperation partners. 
Delabbio & Zeemering (2013), in a survey study of local authority managers in five US states, 
found that managers that show an aversion to risk taking are less inclined to actively 
cooperate and contribute to inter-local service delivery innovation (Carr & Hawkins 2013; 
Delabbio & Zeemering 2013; LeRoux, Brandenburger & Pandey 2010; Minkoff 2013).  
Bigdeli, Kamal & de Cesare (2013) conducted structured and semi-structured interviews with 
six participants in two different LGAs in England with regard to inter-organisational 
electronic information sharing. Their findings highlighted that the LGAs experienced grave 
pressures related to legislative changes and resulting requirements for information sharing 
across organisations. Whilst they do not claim generalizability of their findings to other 
LGAs, they concluded that the findings from the two cases were so similar that the lessons 
they learned may be helpful to other LGAs, practitioners and researchers. They provide the 
following recommendations: 
1. Central governments should assist LGAs by providing adequate funding, 
improve IT infrastructure and enhance the level of IT skills and knowledge of 
employees. 
 2. The expectation of public organisations to reduce costs through inter-agency 
collaboration necessitates strong leadership to implement these changes. 
3. Corporate IT application systems are currently disintegrated and information 
across databases is duplicated. Information sharing is impossible, and new IT systems 
and business processes that cross organisational boundaries are required to facilitate 
secure and effective sharing of information. 
4. Most managers do not understand the value of information and do not consider 
the quality of information as important. The lack of information sharing across 
54 
 
organisations is widespread, and inadequate attention is given to security and 
confidentiality. It is suggested that a more professional approach to information 
sharing and management should be adopted. 
Bigdeli, Kamal & de Ceasare (2013) suggest that the state and central governments can play 
an important role in strengthening inter-organisational IT systems through funding and 
training of employees, which will facilitate a more professional approach to secure and 
confidential information sharing across agencies (Bigdeli, Kamal & de Cesare 2013). 
2.7.3  Managing contracts 
 In the absence of arrangements solely built on trust, an unlikely scenario in the public sector, 
a viable, risk-sharing contract is essential (Chalos & Sung 1998). The outsourcing 
frameworks suggest that organisations that sign strong contracts are generally more satisfied 
with their outsourcing ventures than those that do not.  
The formal contract binds actors legally to mutual action and provides a formal mechanism to 
resolve external issues of concern to all parties (Feiock 2013). Feiock (2013) argues that a 
formal contract becomes an enabling tool that may limit transaction costs associated with 
developing, negotiating and enforcing agreements. A counter-argument is that formal 
contracting for specific public services characterised by high asset specificity and which are 
difficult to manage greatly increase the transaction costs associated with the contract
11
 (Bel & 
Fageda 2007, 2008, 2009; Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2006; Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 
2010).  
 Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke (2007) argue that government contracts involving highly asset-
specific services; for example, waste disposal requires more contract detail in response to 
risks associated with early termination of the contract. They propose that more complete 
contracts are advisable when the cost of renegotiation is high, such as when the parties are 
experiencing cooperation problems. In contrast, a less complete contract may be suitable 
when the cost of renegotiation is low, such as when the parties trust each other. The risks 
associated with inadequate provision of data determine the extent of contract detail and 
contractual obligation required to hold the service provider accountable. The costs related to 
managing contracts and the costs to monitor and manage relationships are difficult to identify 
and measure in order to decide on the most suitable approach to hold waste management 
                                                 
11
 Refer to a discussion on TCE later in this chapter. 
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suppliers accountable for data (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2007; Carr & Hawkins 2013; 
Cruz & Marques 2012; Girth 2014; Heiskanen, Newman & Eklin 2008; Verner & Abdullah 
2012). 
The outsourcing frameworks generally associate long-term contracts with a greater measure 
of success. Lacity, Hirschheim & Willcocks (1994) hold a contradicting view that shorter 
term contracts are more positively associated with outsourcing success. This view is 
supported by Mohr, Sengupta & Slater (2011), who argue that principals are better suited by 
a shorter-term contract until such time as trust develops. The appropriate term of a contract 
depends not just on the type of service that is outsourced but also managerial skills in 
outsourcing and positive results from managers’ past experiences. Outsourcing of highly 
specified assets and difficult-to-measure service is a specialised managerial skill that takes 
time to develop. It may be argued that public managers should avoid entering into longer-
term agreements. Where a combined approach of transactional and relational contracting 
based on trust is contemplated, managers must avoid entering into agreements which last 
longer than their anticipated tenure (Carr & Hawkins 2013; Lacity, Hirschheim & Willcocks 
1994; Lacity & Khan 2009; Lamothe, M & Lamothe 2012; Mohr, Sengupta & Slater 2011). 
2.7.4 Monitoring and managing relationships 
Kakabadse & Kakabadse (2003) conclude that the difference between high-performance and 
average-performance companies can be found in the manner in which they establish 
constructive relationships with suppliers. Bertelli & Smith (2010) argue that contract 
management and relationship management are both important dimensions in a governance 
framework: 
The key to governance in a contracting state, therefore, is to effectively manage both 
the formal contracts and the relationships with contractors. The government (as 
principal in these contracts) maintains credibility with the pool of potential and 
existing contractors as well as the citizens on whose behalf the contracted tasks are 
performed by fostering relationships with contractors who meet public goals while 
ending relationships with those who do not. This simple insight, we contend, is a core 
principal in understanding modern public management and the drive for efﬁcient 
service provision embodied in NPM (Bertelli & Smith 2010, p. 128). 
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Relational contracting arrangements move beyond a transactional mindset towards a mutually 
beneficial, trust-based relationship. A contract management capacity in local government is 
often lacking, with a relational approach being the only viable option. In these circumstances, 
relational governance can facilitate knowledge sharing. In explaining to a service provider 
why data are needed, more commitment to the supply of such data may be forthcoming. 
Although some studies on outsourcing in the private sector find a positive correlation 
between relational attributes and successful outsourcing, public managers should be wary of 
relying only on this approach. Whilst there is an anticipation of a long-term relational 
contracting arrangement at the outset, the risk of a breakdown of trust in relationships always 
exists and, in such an event, the only recourse may be a strong viable contract. Although 
mediation and arbitration may be a viable option to resolve conflict, the threat of sanction in 
terms of the contract should be present to allow public managers leverage when engaging in 
informal means of dispute resolution (Bertelli & Smith 2010; Girth 2014; Girth et al. 2012; 
Heiskanen, Newman & Eklin 2008; Lacity & Khan 2009; Lamothe, M & Lamothe 2012; 
Poppo & Zenger 2002; Yang, Hsieh & Li 2010).  
Collective problems such as regional waste management are often responded to through 
outsourcing arrangements based on collaboration and partnerships. In this environment, 
contracting is often built on relational aspects, such as trust and reciprocity, rather than 
written contracts. The differing juridical and legal environments in regional networks 
necessitate several rounds of negotiation and dispute resolution to arrive at effective inter-
local contractual and working partnership arrangements (Cruz & Marques 2012; Feiock 2013; 
Lamothe, S, Lamothe & Feiock 2008; LeRoux, Brandenburger & Pandey 2010; LeRoux & 
Carr 2010; Minkoff 2013; Mohr, Deller & Halstead 2010). 
The evaluation of the effectiveness of these networks requires new and different performance 
management techniques (Albrecht et al. 2014; Amirkhanyan 2010; Andrews & Entwistle 
2010; Bae & Feiock 2012; Benton 2013; Mandell & Keast 2007; Zeemering & Delabbio 
2013).  
Existing fragmented systems require enhanced coordination and strengthening of centralised 
political and administrative abilities (Zafra-GÓmez et al. 2013). How to coordinate and 
strengthen political and administrative abilities becomes problematic due to the existence of 
multiple networks in the same jurisdiction, often with overlapping and contradictory policy 
positions. Lester & Reckhow (2013) argue that advocacy networks within civil society 
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suffers from an imbalance due to local business-led associations being in direct conflict with 
community-based organisations attempting to influence global governance. They conclude 
that these networks are on a ‘collision course’ (p. 134) to find each other and, even if 
common interest can be established, institutions at a local level lack the capacity and 
authority to develop and enhance regional equity policies (Lester & Reckhow 2013).  
A US study by Zeemering (2012b) on sustainability collaborative initiatives between city 
councils found that the success of regional sustainability initiatives are more dependent on 
relationships between government agencies at a local level rather than vertical interactions 
with state, national and international actors. The content analysis of 20 cities’ policy 
documents retrieved from their websites found that the policy documents reflect that local 
government administrators engage with federal administrators in respect of policy, resources 
and regulation. The cities’ policy documents also revealed an understanding by local 
government administrators of their inter-dependence within local networks. The study 
observed that the cities’ policy documents reflected the existence of multi-level governance 
relationships. The author recommended that city managers should fully document the 
management of the governance of relationships within local networks. 
Effective waste management service delivery is enhanced by contracting with a service 
provider that shares similar public values. This requires the establishment of credibility in 
long-term relationships. On the one hand, it is argued that credibility develops from 
incentives and an interaction, whilst others would argue it is derived from trust (Bertelli & 
Smith 2010; Lamothe, M & Lamothe 2012).  
The decision with regard to inter-local collaboration or inter-local contracting depends on a 
number of practical considerations (Durugbo & Riedel 2013). Durugbo & Riedel (2013) 
argue that a holistic view of the collaborative network should be taken. They developed a 
theoretical model from prior literature to measure the impact of admitting or rejecting 
collaborators on the functioning of the network as a whole. They tested their model on six 
case studies of delivery networks, which included a network in the utility industry. Their 
findings suggest that outsourcing initiatives based on inter-local collaboration and inter-local 
contracting should be informed by a transparent assessment of which service providers 
should be omitted or rejected. Inter-local networks resulting from such initiatives should be 
developed on clear, objective performance measures to ensure collaborators omitted or 
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accepted will ultimately result in an optimum mass for the network, in which a win-win 
situation for customers and service providers is created.  
2.8 Limitations of commercially driven outsourcing frameworks in the public sector 
Close inspection of the outsourcing frameworks suggest that they have mostly clear 
commercial and managerial objectives in common; for example, the common success factors 
in Quinn (1999) are derived from success stories related to large multi-national corporations. 
The global public services sector developed a herd mentality that resulted from the popularity 
of outsourcing by these major international corporations without consideration of the fact that 
the public sector, and more specifically local authorities, may have objectives wider than 
purely commercial gain (Bisman 2008; Farneti & Guthrie 2009; Gray, Dillard & Spence 2009; 
Kettl 2000; Kloot & Martin 2001; Kluvers & Tippett 2010, 2011, 2012; Quinn 1999, 2000). 
Scholars, for example Quiggin (1994) and Aulich (2011), argue convincingly that even 
though governments have been urged to adopt external contracting as a measure to improve 
efficiency, outsourcing may in fact create more problems and may not result in improved 
public service delivery. Heinrich, Lynn & Milward (2010) hold a similar view and explain 
that NPM initiatives resulted in a trade-off between flexibility and innovation associated with 
these initiatives and transparency and accountability associated with traditional bureaucratic 
structures characterised by central control systems. Hukkinen (1995) observes that the 
conflicting political and economic interests of waste reduction, recycling, recovery and 
disposal result in accountability problems in the public sector. The pursuance of sustainability 
principles and environmental targets in the public sector means that commercial and 
managerial outsourcing frameworks cannot be blindly adopted due to the limitations inherent 
in these frameworks (Andrews & Brewer 2013; Aulich 2011; Burritt & Welch 1997; 
Heinrich, Lynn & Milward 2010; Hukkinen 1995; Quiggin 1994). 
Outsourcing affects the giving and demanding of information (Broadbent & Laughlin 2009; 
Roberts & Scapens 1985) and as such impacts on accountability.
12
 Bel, Fageda & Warner 
(2010) argue that we do not fully understand the impact of initiatives such as outsourcing and 
privatisation by remarking:  
                                                 
12
 Refer to the definition and discussion of accountability in Chapter 2. 
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Public choice, property rights, transaction costs, and industrial organization 
approaches all contribute to our understanding of privatization, but individually each 
one only captures part of the costs and service delivery equation. Competition, market 
dynamics, transaction costs, and service quality are also important, but the existing 
empirical evidence does not allow us to understand their impact fully (p. 573). 
Outsourcing is considered a complex environment (Ruzzier et al. 2008). Lacity & Willcocks 
(2011) came to a similar conclusion than Bel, Fegada & Warner (2010) with reference to IT 
outsourcing by finding that one single theory alone cannot capture the variety of empirical 
phenomena. They argue that multiple theories should be utilised to improve the explanatory 
and predictive power (Lacity & Willcocks 2011).  
McIvor et al. (2009) suggest that frameworks for successful outsourcing should not only be 
developed by analysing outsourcing experiences of companies, but theoretical frameworks 
should also be developed and tested in a practical setting (McIvor et al. 2009). 
Whilst the general outsourcing frameworks may provide a sound managerial basis for holding 
service providers in outsourcing relationships accountable for their performance, an 
understanding must be developed of the reasons why best-practise outsourcing relationships 
may not result in improved public service accountability.  
Hukkinen (1995) argues that commercial outsourcing of waste management services result in 
political and social tensions between actors in regional waste management networks. 
Frameworks for the outsourcing of waste management services need to consider aspects 
beyond the economic and efficiency principles underlying outsourcing frameworks in general 
and should include aspects such as social choice and prevention of managerial opportunism. 
Theories interpreting the actions and behaviour of actors in the context of local governments’ 
outsourcing of waste management or similar services are accordingly considered.  
2.9 Theories relevant to outsourcing relationships in the public sector 
Rosenberg Hansen, Mols & Villadsen (2011), in a study of 98 Danish municipalities, 
considered why these public organisations outsource and whether they are satisfied with the 
results. The results of their study indicate that decision making and the perceived success of 
external service delivery versus internal service delivery in municipalities are explained by 
resource-based, neoclassical economic and institutional models when making sourcing 
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choices. They conclude that the study of local governments’ sourcing may benefit from 
integrating theories focusing on internal expertise and markets and by integrating economic 
theories, which assume rationality, with institutional theory, emphasising more unreflective 
and socially determined behaviour (Rosenberg Hansen, Mols & Villadsen 2011). 
A basic overview of core theories that may explain the actions and behaviours of parties to 
the outsourcing relationship in the public waste management environment are synthesised 
from the literature.  
2.9.1 Transaction cost economics and the resource-based view 
 A number of studies on inter-local cooperation and outsourcing in general rely on TCE 
(transaction cost economics) to explain organisations’ contracting decisions (Carr & Hawkins 
2013; Hefetz, Warner & Vigoda-Gadot 2012). 
Bertelli & Smith (2010) remark that TCE is founded on the work of Coase (1937), who 
concluded that transaction costs drive organisational structures (Bertelli & Smith 2010). TCE 
developed from the original Coase theorem (Coase 1937) into what is now known as classical 
TCE (Williamson 1976, 1979, 1981, 1987, 1993, 1999). 
Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke (2010) refer to (Coase 1937; Williamson 1981, 1991, 1996) 
when explaining that markets can fail because of high transaction costs, limited information, 
uncertainty about the future and the prospect that people or organizations behave 
opportunistically in their interactions. They explain that in these instances, win-win voluntary 
exchanges are replaced by lose-lose outcomes (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2006). 
Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke (2010) explain that Williamson’s (1999) asset specificity relates 
to asset-specific investments which are difficult or impossible to redeploy, which results in a 
hold-up problem for the purchaser, as the seller may engage in opportunistic behaviour to 
exploit unforseen events and contract ambiguities (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2010). 
Where local government outsources a highly specified service, such as development or 
management of a landfill site, it may not be in the seller’s best interest to disclose waste data 
regarding the inappropriate disposal of what may be considered hazardous waste (Brown & 
Benn 2009; Ji & Deegan 2011; Lloyd-Smith 2009; Rae & Brown 2009). 
RBV (resource-based view) focuses on how an organisation utilises its resources to develop 
and maintain a competitive advantage (McIvor 2008; Minkoff 2013; Sundell & Lapuente 
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2012; Warner & Hefetz 2012). In the context of the public sector, the relevance of RBV can 
be found in the decision to source expertise externally. Empirical evidence suggests that RBV 
in some cases offers clearer support for outsourcing decisions than TCE (Ali, Ali Asghar 
Anvary & Ali 2008; Lacity & Willcocks 2011; Rosenberg Hansen, Mols & Villadsen 2011). 
In the context of outsourcing waste management services, the technical expertise required to 
recover resources from waste streams may not be available internally and has to be obtained 
elsewhere. In what may be considered thin markets, the risk of opportunistic behaviour 
among service providers increases, with a corresponding lack of willingness to account for 
critical waste data (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2006; Girth et al. 2012; Godfrey, Scott & 
Trois 2013; Lamothe, S & Lamothe 2013; Loughlin & Barlaz 2006; Warner 2009).  
2.9.2 Theory of incomplete contracts 
The parties to a contract cannot fully predict all future possible scenarios and, as such, all 
contracts will always be underspecified or incomplete (Bertelli & Smith 2010; Brown, 
Potoski & Van Slyke 2006; Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2010; Dekker, Sakaguchi & Kawai 
2013).  
The theory of incomplete contracts (TIC) provides a useful analytical framework for studying 
situations in which contracting is a complex operation (Grossman & Hart 1986; Hart & 
Moore 1999). The theory predicts that privatisation or outsourcing may result in cost 
decreases but may also lead to deterioration in the quality of the service (Bel & Fageda 2007, 
2008) due to opportunistic behaviour by the vendor. In responding to the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour, contracting governments must necessarily incur transaction costs by writing more 
detailed contracts and monitoring the behaviour of the vendor (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 
2006).  
More relational contracting over time may reduce the transaction costs associated with 
reduced bidding, monitoring and legal costs (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2006; Hart & 
Moore 1999). The aim of contract management should be to motivate the vendor to go 
beyond what the letter of the contract says towards more consummate behaviour, and in the 
process creating a win-win situation (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2010; Hart & Moore 
2008). 
For example, the outsourcing of development, ongoing management and rehabilitation of 
landfill sites are considered examples of complex contracting. In the absence of clear 
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frameworks or governmental directives, TIC may prove useful as a point of departure to 
explore outsourcing relationships and the accountability implications thereof. 
2.9.3 Public choice and social choice theories 
Public choice theory considers public service delivery choices and concludes that 
overproduction and inefficiencies are the result of politicians and bureaucrats monopolising 
public service delivery (Niskanen 1971, 1972). Building on this theory, privatisation and 
outsourcing models were developed to remedy the political rents and political power the 
politicians and bureaucrats extracted from public service delivery (Ostrom 1972; Savas & 
Schubert 1987). These initiatives developed into what later became known as NPM (new 
public management) (Osborne & Gaebler 1993) as a counter-movement to politicians and 
bureaucrats acting in their own rather than the public interest (Simões, Da Cruz & Marques 
2012). 
Social choice theory developed from the public interests’ desire to express their wishes 
collectively. Hefetz & Warner (2007) found a marked shift of privatization in US 
municipalities back to public service delivery. They argue that public managers adopt a 
pragmatic approach of balancing the benefits of competition as advocated by NPM with 
market efficiencies contemplated by TCE whilst ensuring the citizens’ voice is heard (Hefetz 
& Warner 2007; Sager 1999). 
The impact of political influence and the ideological predisposition of managers on 
outsourcing decision making are the focus of much scholarly debate. Some studies suggest 
that political influence plays a more important role in local government managers’ decision to 
outsource than personal ideologies (Ball, Broadbent & Moore 2002; Bel & Fageda 2007, 
2009, 2010; Bisman 2008; Hefetz, Warner & Vigoda-Gadot 2012; Kloot & Martin 2002, 
2007; Kluvers & Tippett 2010; Warner & Hefetz 2012).  
2.9.4 Agency theory 
Agency relationships between principals and vendors arise from contracts and other forms of 
social control. These agency arrangements may result in new agency costs and may create 
conflicts of interest. The principal-agency problem arises in that the seller may display 
opportunistic behaviour to the detriment of the buyer by sacrificing the goals of the principal 
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and not disclosing it to him or her (Bertelli & Smith 2010; Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2010; 
Calabro & Torchia 2011; Jensen & Meckling 1976).  
The outsourcing frameworks discussed earlier in this chapter share a common understanding 
that managerial skill and management support are a prerequisite for managing the agency 
relationships resulting from outsourcing. Public managers must respond to additional 
challenges compared with the private sector. These outsourcing challenges arise from the fact 
that  
Public management is supremely taxed by decentralization trends as it must respond 
to the challenges presented by a contracting state within a democracy. It is public 
managers who must keep policy making from devolving into a set of contracts with 
disconnected interests—the slippery slope of the state of agents (Bertelli & Smith 
2010, p. 122). 
Public managers may also be self-interested agents motivated by a longer-term of office and 
larger budgets. The citizen is the primary democratic principal in the local government setting, 
but due to the degree of separation, the risk of opportunistic behaviour by public managers or 
local government external service providers is very high. Heinrich, Lynn & Milward (2010) 
express concern that public management capacity is compromised by extensive contracting, 
and the extensive deferral of responsibilities means it may no longer be able to reclaim full 
authority as the statutory agent of constitutional authority (Calabro & Torchia 2011; Cruz & 
Marques 2012; Heinrich, Lynn & Milward 2010; Niskanen 1971). 
Principal-agency theory is a useful framework in which to study the structure and 
management of complex product contracts. When the principal manager manages uncertainty 
by outsourcing complex products such as resource recovery or landfill development to an 
expert agent, their goals are unlikely to be perfectly aligned (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 
2010).   
In the event of multiple principles and agents in a complex network of actors such as the 
SWSA waste management network, conflicts of interest may arise that could potentially 
result in accountability problems (multiple agency theory). The agency and multiple agency 
theories offer an understanding as to how such relationships can be best managed to avoid 
exploitation by either party. Frameworks designed to manage complex public outsourcing 
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must give due consideration to governance and accountability measures to adequately 
respond to potential conflicts of interest (Calabro & Torchia 2011). 
2.9.5 Institutional theory 
Institutional theory focuses on the normative, regulative and cultural characteristics of the 
environment (Rosenberg Hansen, Mols & Villadsen 2011; Scott 2010). It examines the 
processes and mechanisms by which structures, schemas, rules and routines become 
established as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour (Scott 1987, 2005, 2010).  
The regulative environment is clearly completely different in the public sector compared with 
the private sector, limiting institutions in how freely they can operate (Hukkinen 1995; North 
1990). Institutional arguments have been used to explain sourcing decisions in public 
organisations and local government (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2006), but according to 
Rosenberg Hansen, Mols & Villadsen (2011), the theory should be more extensively 
considered in exploring local governments’ satisfaction with sourcing arrangements 
(Rosenberg Hansen, Mols & Villadsen 2011). 
Simoes & Marques (2012), in their extensive literature review on economic considerations 
regarding waste management, lament that they could not find studies on economic regulation 
in the waste sector. They suggest that this may be a consequence of the very limited number 
of regulators dedicated to the waste sector (Simões & Marques 2012).  
2.9.6 Institutional collective action 
As a framework to study and understand policy and governance, ICA (institutional collective 
action) focuses explicitly on the externalities of choice in fragmented systems. The ICA 
framework considers how alternative mechanisms to mitigate these collective action 
problems evolve, are selected or are imposed (Feiock 2013). The relevance to accountability 
for outsourcing of waste management services can be found in that these services have 
different economies of scale and are demanded by citizens at different levels of quantity and 
quality (Feiock 2013) across inter-local jurisdictions. Where waste services of low quality 
and quantity are demanded by citizens the resulting waste data are likely to be of a similar 
low quality.  
 ICA dilemmas occur when officials responding to policy interventions which require high 
quality waste data seek to negotiate the maximum net benefit by either cooperating in a 
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regional structure or choosing not to cooperate (Dollery, Hallam & Wallis 2008; Dollery, 
Kortt & Grant 2012; Feiock 2013; Gruber & Bank 2009).  
Feiock (2013) suggests that the ICA framework assists in diagnosing three sources of 
collaboration risk: (i) the specific nature of the underlying ICA dilemma; (ii) the distribution 
of preferences within and across the jurisdictions or organization affected by the dilemma; 
and (iii) the higher-level rules, local political institutions and existing ICA mitigation 
mechanism in place (Feiock 2013). 
When outsourcing waste management services in the SWSA jurisdiction, a number of ICA 
dilemmas arise. Considerations regarding the level of participation in regional waste planning 
structures, collaborative partnerships to recover resources from waste streams and use of 
inter-council outsourcing to dispose of waste in landfills in neighbouring jurisdictions result 
in accountability problems. 
Whilst the theories above are by no means the only theories that could potentially explain the 
behaviour of actors in the SWSA waste management network, they do serve the purpose of 
highlighting potential accountability problems when implementing outsourcing frameworks. 
2.10 Constraints on LGAs implementing governmental policy directives 
Measham et al. (2011) argue that LGAs are highly constrained in terms of resources and lack 
of information They found that this impacts negatively on long-term planning anticipated by 
policy directives from higher levels of government, with local government managers often 
responding with short-term reactive responses to policy interventions (Measham et al. 2011). 
A study on the accountability consequences for LGAs resulting from federal waste policy 
interventions accordingly benefits from an understanding of constraints to implementing such 
policy directives. In considering the Measham et al. (2012) suggestions, possible constraints 
to implementation of public policy directives are considered to be strategic planning; 
procurement; performance management and performance reporting; and environmental, 
waste and sustainability data collection and reporting. 
 2.10.1 Strategic planning 
In exploring the accountability aspects of planning for future outsourcing of waste 
management services, it is noted that a number of Australian studies reflect on poor planning 
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practices in the Australian public sector (Aulich, Sansom & McKinlay 2013; Dollery & 
Akimov 2008b; Grant, Dollery & van der Westhuizen 2012; Gruber & Bank 2009; Kloot 
2001; Kornberger & Clegg 2011; Measham et al. 2011; Potts 2009).  
Kornberger & Clegg (2011) conducted a mixed method study on the strategic planning 
processes underlying the Sustainable Sydney 2030 project. They concluded rather critically 
that the silo mentality of the city administration made the implementation of new ideas 
difficult and that even though extensive consultation took place, no new meaningful insights 
were formed. They observed that the project was made up of big-picture thinking and grand 
gestures with questionable value, and the communication forms resulted in stale debates, with 
no mutual learning taking place (Kornberger & Clegg 2011). 
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Reform Council reviewed the Tasmanian 
Government strategic planning system for Hobart. Although they noted that planning 
processes are under reform, they observed the following (COAG 2012, p. 187): 
The Tasmanian Government appears to have a close relationship and good 
consultation with local government. 
The Tasmanian Government could improve stakeholder consultation arrangements 
both at an early stage of the planning process as well as throughout the process. 
Using infrastructure to achieve the strategic economic, environmental and social goals 
of government and to manage national policy issues was not strongly demonstrated by 
the Tasmanian Government. 
Although it is noted as a key challenge, no specific policies, initiatives or actions to 
address demographic change were set out by the Tasmanian Government.  
The COAG (2012) findings make reference to policy instruments and infrastructure 
development. The development of modern, licensed landfill sites necessitates large 
investments in developing new and improving existing infrastructure as well as the 
acquisition of scarce urban land. This results in increased per-unit garbage charges which 
must be recovered by LGAs from their customers. Rising costs of per-unit garbage collection 
costs also include the cost of new, technologically advanced resource recovery and recycling 
centres. The external or indirect cost of recycling and managing waste as a resource often 
includes waste disposal levies in accordance with the ‘polluter pays’ principle to fund 
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development and improve reporting on these initiatives (Environmental Protection Authority 
2009; EPHC 2010b; Fukushima et al. 2010; Knussen et al. 2004; Lane 2011; May & Knight 
1999; Parsons & Kriwoken 2010; Salhofer et al. 2008; SCEW 2012; Scott et al. 2005; Shaw 
et al. 2007; Wilson 1996; Young, Ni & Fan 2010). 
2.10.2 Procurement 
Rural and smaller municipalities often find it difficult to outsource services due to an 
insufficient number of qualified contractors and insufficient managerial capacity (Bel & 
Fageda 2011; Bel & Warner 2013; Hefetz & Warner 2012; Mohr, Deller & Halstead 2010; 
Wassenaar, Groot & Gradus 2013).  
These sub-optimal or thin markets, resulting from a limited number of service providers or 
collusion between service providers may increase transactional outsourcing costs, which 
include external costs such as reduced accountability, to the extent that the costs exceed 
potential outsourcing benefits (Dijkgraaf & Gradus 2007a, 2007b, 2008a; Girth et al. 2012; 
Merickova & Nemec 2013).  
Small and rural municipalities often respond to these challenges through strategic alliances 
with other LGAs or contracting with neighbouring councils, which may result in 
accountability problems
13
(Bae 2009; Carr & Hawkins 2013; Dollery, Akimov & Byrnes 2009; 
Dollery, Grant & Akimov 2010; LeRoux, Brandenburger & Pandey 2010; LeRoux & Carr 
2010).  
Kloot & Martin (2007), in their study on Victorian LGAs, found that compulsory competitive 
tendering processes had a major impact on Victorian local authorities, more so than 
compulsory corporate and strategic planning processes. They concluded that no evidence of a 
culture of embracing modern procurement processes could be observed. Smaller LGAs do 
not have adequate resources to underpin sophisticated contract management governance 
systems (Kloot & Martin 2007).  
2.10.3 Performance management and performance reporting 
Strategic planning is enhanced through the adoption of publicised corporate or strategic plans, 
but implementation may suffer if these plans do not include appropriate performance targets 
(Kloot 2001). 
                                                 
13
 Refer to the discussion on agency theory and the ICA framework. 
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The COAG Reform Council found (COAG 2012, pp. 4–9) that in general the Australian 
cities’ planning processes do not contain clear measurable outcomes or clear descriptions of 
the actions required to pursue strategic goals. Both accountability for and performance 
monitoring of outcomes and implementation are limited. The report found only partial 
compliance with timelines and performance measures in their review of the Tasmanian 
government’s planning processes for Hobart city (COAG 2012, p. 199): 
An integrated method of performance assessment for plans and policies is not in place, 
noting that the capital city plan is still in development. 
Kloot’s (2001) study of 78 Victorian LGA authorities through textual analysis of their 
corporate plans established that only 40% of the plans made reference to waste management 
as a key performance area, surprising in so far as waste management is a core function of 
Australian LGAs. The primary finding of the study is that performance measures are largely 
descriptive and no clear targets or specific outcomes were noted. The study concluded that 
that there is a clear need for the development of suitable performance indicators in Australian 
local governments. 
Lee & Fisher’s (2007) survey of 100 federal, state and territory public entities which provide 
services directly to the public concluded that although performance information related to 
output and quality of service is considered useful, it is not extensively used. They remark that 
earlier findings which concluded that the implementation of perceived useful performance 
measures is problematic remain valid. The challenges they identified, in line with earlier 
studies, are that of limited staff motivation and skills shortages as well as difficulty in 
obtaining quality data for benchmarking purposes (Lee & Fisher 2007). Dollery & Manley 
(2007) concluded that most LGAs, with the partial exception of Tasmania, only consider the 
supply side of municipal activities, with strategic direction mostly not reflecting political 
imperatives and feedback from service stakeholders. A number of other Australian studies 
found similar constraints in performance measurement and reporting in LGAs (Brackertz 
2006; Carnegie & Baxter 2006; Kloot 2006; Moynihan 2006; Pickin 2008; Sharma 2005; 
Umashev & Willett 2008; Woodbury, Dollery & Rao 2003; Worthington & Dollery 2001). 
Bel & Warner (2009) conducted a case study on the restructuring of the city of Barcelona, 
Spain’s street cleaning and garbage collection services through accessing data from websites 
and in-depth interviews with public and private waste managers. A marked improvement in 
service quality was observed after the restructuring of these services was completed. They 
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concluded that by benchmarking competition and consolidating the two services, monitoring 
of the new contracting system became easier and the scale of economics in monitoring 
resulted in an improvement in the ratio of cost to service quality (Bel & Warner 2009). 
Care should be taken in interpreting some of the older studies due to the amendments in 
legislation related to planning practices referred to earlier. The recent COAG (2012) report on 
city planning processes suggests that performance management and reporting in the public 
sector remain a challenge. A recent Austrian study on the use of performance information by 
public managers and politicians in new forms of public governance structures found that 
performance information is used for internal decision making rather than external 
accountability purposes. The study found it noteworthy that although some respondents had a 
pro-NPM stance, they do not consider the use of performance information for external 
accountability information in the same light (Saliterer & Korac 2013). 
2.10.4 Reporting on the environment, waste management and sustainability  
Zutshi, Sohal & Adams (2008), in their study on constraints to the implementation of EMS 
(environmental management systems) in Australian organisations, identified a lack of 
commitment by top management and shortages of financial and human resources to be major 
impediments to improving EMS in public entities. They strongly recommend that knowledge-
sharing networks be created across all government departments to improve EMS (Zutshi, 
Sohal & Adams 2008).  
A 2003–2006 research project explored the environmental accounting for waste and waste 
recycling services in the 152 NSW authorities by surveying 140 local authorities and by 
interviewing 12 managers directly involved in waste management (Qian & Burritt 2007; Qian, 
Burritt & Monroe 2011). Qian et al. (2011) concluded that environmental management 
accounting information is only moderately used in waste management services but that these 
applications were becoming more widespread. They observed that in three local authorities, 
recycling services are outsourced and in some instances the service providers do not have the 
capacity to adequately capture and report on the different types of recyclables. They 
concluded that in only a few of the case studies, the local authorities accounted for the full 
cost of waste, mostly disregarding externalities such as hidden future costs, costs associated 
with recycling and loss of land capacity. A number of Australian studies express concern and 
identify constraints to accountability and sustainability reporting in LGAs (Dollery & Kelly 
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2012; Miley & Read 2000; Stanley, Jennings & Mack 2008; Williams 2011; Williams, 
Wilmshurst & Clift 2011). 
2.11 Summary 
This literature shows that different LGAs outsource different waste management services for 
different reasons and also in different ways. The 2010 Australian National Waste Report 
remarks that government policy has a major bearing on investment in new and improved 
waste and recycling technology. The expectation of government for LGAs to collaborate in 
unproven outsourcing initiatives requires considerable commitment and investment (EPHC 
2010b, p. 287).  
There is an expectation by the waste management public policy directives that regional waste 
management networks can respond to improve waste data collection and collection systems 
by adopting best-practise principles. The collection of waste data across organisational 
boundaries is constrained by inappropriate contracts in a dynamic regulatory environment 
and funding constraints. Improvement in waste data collection and collection systems must 
be achieved through adoption of best-practise principles and by developing suitable tools 
(Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis 2006). Application of the Vagadia (2012) best-practise framework 
suggests that data collection and collection systems may be improved by aligning the 
strategic objectives of principal, agent and stakeholders. Communication, contract 
management and management and monitoring of relationships may serve as governance 
mechanisms to strengthen accountability between actors in networks (Vagadia 2012). 
In determining whether the waste data accountability expectations of the Australian federal 
government are being met through outsourcing practices of LGAs, consideration must also be 
given to Quinn’s (2000) fundamental question whether actors in the SWSA jurisdiction 
network are willing or may become willing to share waste data.  
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Chapter 3: Theoretical framework 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter synthesises an appropriate theoretical approach to investigate the research 
question by considering suitable theoretical approaches and their limitations taken from the 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2. 
The accountability expectations of the Australian federal government in respect of the 
provision of waste data are embodied in the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan. 
There is an expectation that waste data collection and supporting data collection systems will 
be improved to facilitate the three-yearly national ‘current and future trends waste and 
resource recovery report’ (EPHC 2010a, p. 19).  
In Chapter 1, it is established that the accountability expectations of the Australian federal 
government for improved waste data collection and collection systems extend to LGAs’ 
outsourcing practices through the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan. This 
recommends that state governments outsource waste management services through the 
establishment of ‘multi-agency management arrangements’ and ‘active partnerships’ between 
governments and industry (EPHC 2010a, p. 9). 
This prompts the research question stated earlier:  
Are the accountability expectations of the Australian federal government 
satisfied in the outsourcing of waste management services by Local Government 
Authorities? 
The collaborative nature of the outsourcing arrangements between local government agencies, 
with some agencies acting as waste service providers, results in complicated regional waste 
management networks (Lester & Reckhow 2013). Accountability problems between actors in 
these ‘multi-agency management arrangements’ and ‘active partnerships’ in respect of the 
supply of waste data (Carr & Hawkins 2013) arise for a number of reasons. A suitable 
theoretical approach must take account of the fact that different regional waste networks may 
have different unique circumstances giving rise to accountability problems that are specific to 
that jurisdiction.  
3.2 Relevance of prior research to this study 
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In Chapter 2, it is evident that poor national waste data provided by local governments and 
their service providers may be a result of either fundamental problems in the accountability 
relationship between higher and lower levels of government (Ball, Broadbent & Moore 2002), 
inappropriate or inadequate responses by LGAs and their service providers to national policy 
interventions (Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis 2006) or an inability by lower-level agencies to 
respond adequately due to resource constraints (Qian, Burritt & Monroe 2011).  
Due to the complex nature of the outsourcing practices of LGAs and the complicated regional 
waste management networks that flow from these practices, an exploratory and interpretative 
research approach is required to develop an understanding of the complexities associated with 
such cases (Berg 2004). This exploratory approach entails viewing each individual case 
through the lens of a combination of theoretical approaches (Smith & Cheng 2006) rather 
than developing new theories or testing existing theories designed to explain the phenomena 
(McIvor et al. 2009).  
3.3 The ICA Framework 
This study broadly follows the ICA framework (Feiock 2013) to explore the Australian 
federal government’s accountability expectations due to the collective action required by 
multiple LGAs and their service providers in different jurisdictions to provide national waste 
data (Bel, Fageda & Mur 2014). 
The ICA framework is underpinned by a number of research traditions and theoretical 
approaches that may explain the behaviour of parties to the outsourcing relationships which 
result in collective action networks (Feiock 2013). TCE, as one of these theoretical 
foundations, is often used in research approaches designed to explain the behaviour of public 
organisations. TCE is specifically relevant to the outsourcing of waste management services 
due to the high asset specificity and measurement problems related to waste management 
services, which increase supplier hold-up risk and transaction costs (Williamson 1981, 1987, 
1993, 1999).  
LGAs and their service providers’ responses to policy interventions are not just informed by 
market pricing principles (Farneti & Guthrie 2009; Ghoshal & Moran 1996). The principles 
underlining TCE are only used in this study to assist in developing an understanding of how 
the outsourcing of difficult-to-measure waste management services which require highly 
specified assets lead to collaborative outsourcing practices, which can impact negatively on 
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the federal government’s accountability expectations, rather than providing the main 
theoretical framework for the thesis. 
The ICA framework also incorporates agency theory, which is often used in studies of 
accounting and accountability (Brennan & Solomon 2008). Agency theory is specifically 
relevant to this study because potential accountability problems may arise in those instances 
where service providers to LGAs act in their own commercial best interests and do not 
disclose sufficient information to establish adequate accountability relationships. Senior and 
middle managers of LGAs may similarly be conflicted in providing waste data that may 
impact on their job security, status or social standing (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2010; 
Jensen & Meckling 1976; LeRoux & Pandey 2011). Agency theory is used in this study to 
develop an understanding of how incongruent goals of principals and agents may impact on 
government’s accountability expectations, rather than serving as the main theoretical 
approach. 
The ICA framework is considered the most suitable approach for this research as it provides a 
comprehensive means of (i) determining the scale and nature of the potential accountability 
problem of poor waste data flow between federal, state and local government; (ii) 
determining the response preferences to the accountability expectations of the federal 
government for improved waste data collection systems by LGAs and their service providers 
which impacts across jurisdictions and organisations; and (iii) determining what best-practice 
outsourcing mechanisms are available to LGAs to respond to the accountability expectations 
of the federal government when engaging in waste management outsourcing practices 
(Feiock 2013).  
3.3.1 Scale and nature of the accountability relationship  
Lindberg (2013) argues that an accountability relationship can only exist if there are clear and 
measurable criteria or standards of what is considered acceptable or accountable behaviour 
and the principal has a factual and enforceable right to information or a demand for 
explanation of actions and behaviours.  
This study follows Lindberg’s (2013) approach by exploring whether the federal 
government’s accountability expectation of more and improved waste data is factual and 
enforceable by offering a critique of the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan and the 
Tasmanian Waste Strategy in Chapter 5. It also considers Ball, Broadbent & Moore’s (2002) 
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arguments that a central-local government accountable relationship must be based on a clear 
understanding of what constitutes acceptable or accountable standards of management 
through application of appropriate performance measures.  
There is a further accountability expectation from the Australian federal government that the 
improvements in waste management systems which include data collection must take place 
through collaboration across jurisdictions, between governments at all levels and across 
organisational boundaries, such as between LGAs and their service providers (EPHC 2010a, 
p. 9). The critique of the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan and the Tasmanian 
Waste Strategy in Chapter 5 also considers whether appropriate performance measures are 
adequately communicated to LGAs and their service providers on how to improve on waste 
data collection and collection systems. Whether performance measures are adopted by LGAs 
is also explored by performing a textual analysis of LGA corporate plans to determine 
whether they may assist in delivering on the federal government’s accountability expectations. 
The findings in Chapter 5 are supplemented with interviews in respect of those areas of 
accountability concerns that warrant further investigation in Chapter 7. 
3.3.2 Response preferences by LGAs to the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan 
Ball, Broadbent & Moore (2002) note that local government managers have a spectrum of 
possible responses to centrally imposed policy interventions, that is, a narrow reactive 
approach to demonstrate improvement at the one end or adopting a longer-term systems 
approach by following a business excellence model at the other end.  
Policy interventions, such as directives to engage in collaborative outsourcing initiatives, can 
illicit different response preferences from different LGAs. For example, smaller LGAs may 
prefer to assign the collection of waste data to service providers through relational 
contracting, while metropolitan LGAs may prefer to collect the data by engaging in arm’s-
length contracting (Bertelli & Smith 2010; Desrieux, Chong & Saussier 2013). The theory of 
incomplete contracts discussed in Chapter 2 is used to develop an understanding of the 
natural response preferences to contracting in Chapter 6. 
To explore the different response preferences to the accountability expectations which impact 
across organisational boundaries, this study follows Burritt’s (2012) suggested research 
approach which posits that an improved understanding of the impact of pre-determined public 
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policy can be developed by exploring how information is managed across accountability 
boundaries (Burritt 2012). 
The reasons why LGAs outsource waste management services in the normal course of 
business is explored in Chapter 6 through a textual analysis of LGA corporate plans to 
develop an understanding of the possible effects existing outsourcing relationships might 
have for the accountability expectations of the federal government. 
The findings in Chapter 6 are supplemented with interviews in respect of those areas of 
accountability concerns that warrant further investigation in Chapter 7. 
3.3.3 Mechanisms available to LGAs to respond to the National Waste Policy 
Implementation Plan 
The National Waste Policy Implementation Plan directs the establishment of best-practise 
waste management networks for remote communities (EPHC 2010a, p. 19). The study 
accordingly explores best-practise mechanisms available to LGAs to guide the governance of 
outsourcing initiatives by considering the governance dimensions inherent in the best-practise 
outsourcing frameworks available in the management literature.  
The governance dimensions from the Vagadia (2012) framework discussed in Chapter 2 are 
identified as best-practise mechanisms by which principals can hold agents accountable in 
contractual environments, the mechanisms being (i) alignment of goals and objectives within 
organisations, between parties to the outsourcing arrangements and with stakeholder values; 
(ii) communication; (iii) contract management; and (iv) managing and monitoring of 
relationships (Vagadia 2012). 
The application by LGAs of these governance dimensions in their waste management 
outsourcing practices and possible constraints to application are considered by performing a 
textual analysis of corporate plans in Chapter 6, supplemented by interviews regarding areas 
of accountability concerns in Chapter 7. 
3.4 Extension to prior research 
The ICA framework has not previously been applied in studies of waste management in the 
local government sector. The ICA framework has been successfully applied in studies in 
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similar policy areas of water (Berardo & Scholz 2010), public safety (Andrew 2009) and 
regional planning (Gerber, Henry & Lubell 2013). 
To address the accountability and environmental policy issues related to waste management 
not previously considered in ICA framework studies, theoretical approaches from the 
management (Brennan & Solomon 2008), accountability (Smith & Cheng 2006) and 
sustainability (Gray 1992, 2002, 2005) literature are utilised. 
3.5 Summary 
This study follows the ICA framework (Feiock 2013).  The ICA framework is broad in that it 
combines prior research findings from policy studies of complex networks with studies of 
local government economics. The ICA theoretical framework is the most suitable theoretical 
approach to study the combination of phenomena inherent in the research question because it 
allows for the combined results of policy and local government economics studies to be 
complemented by the theoretical constructs from managerial best-practise outsourcing 
literature such as Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976) and Transaction Cost Economics 
(Williamson 1981, 1987, 1993, 1999).  
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Chapter 4: Methods and access to data 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter denotes the research subjects and discusses the methods utilised in this study. 
The subjects for this study are the LGAs and their service providers in the SWSA jurisdiction 
situated in the Hobart region, Southern Tasmania. The project takes a case study approach. 
The methods for data collection utilised in this study are textual analysis of the corporate 
plans of the research subjects and interviews with managers of the LGAs, their stakeholders 
and service providers. 
4.2 Case study 
Reporting on Australian national waste data is the result of a consolidation of waste data of 
various states and territories (Blue Environment 2013, pp. 80–92). Outsourcing of waste 
management services in turn influences the consolidation of data flows across different 
organisational boundaries and different jurisdictions within the various states and territories 
(Ball 2005; Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis 2006; Burritt 2012).  
A study of the accountability expectations of the Australian federal government against the 
outsourcing practices in a specific region produces context-dependent knowledge derived 
from the interpretation of stories of individual actors, social identities, group identities and 
collective actions in that region (Berg 2004, p. 207; Hyder Consulting 2011, pp. 1 & 5; 
Riessman 2008). 
A case study is the preferred research strategy when the boundaries between the phenomenon 
and the context are not clearly evident (Yin 2014). The influences of, for example, the impact 
of landfill facilities situated in other jurisdictions and resulting constraints in collecting waste 
data by LGAs and their service providers are not fully understood (Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis 
2006; Hyder Consulting 2011, p. 5). 
This study is an empirical enquiry focusing on understanding and describing processes and 
organizations within their real-life context (Yin 2014). The use of evidence derived from 
cases has proven to be a dependable way for social scientists to substantiate their arguments 
(Ragin 1992) because of the variety of evidence that can be obtained from a case study, such 
as documents, artefacts, interviews and observations (Yin 2014). 
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This case-centred approach endeavours to keep the wealth of information intact through 
narrative analysis, and findings are presented in a narrative format to keep the story intact 
(Riessman 2008).  
The research project undertakes a study of the SWSA, a duly constituted LGA in Southern 
Tasmania, Australia. It includes the 12 current and past member councils of the SWSA 
comprising Brighton, Central Highlands, Clarence, Derwent Valley, Glamorgan Spring Bay, 
Glenorchy, Hobart, Huon Valley, Kingborough, Sorell, Southern Midlands and the Tasman 
Council, with their important waste management service providers. 
4.3 Methods for data collection 
The study adopts a multi-method approach to collecting and analysing data. The benefit of 
such a multi-method approach is that an important factor that may be overlooked by a single-
method approach is prevented (Denzin 1970; Jick 1979; Smith 1975; Webb et al. 1966). 
This approach combines textual narrative analysis of documents, archival records and direct 
observation supplemented by semi-structured interviews (Yin 2014). The data extracted from 
the information sources are presented in tables of data designed to build an in-depth picture 
of persons, processes and settings to convey the full range of contexts of the study (Charmaz 
2006, p. 18; Creswell 1998).  
A textual analysis of strategic and corporate plans forms the basis of the document analysis 
(Cornut, Giroux & Langley 2012; Kloot 2001; Kornberger & Clegg 2011). Textual analysis 
of strategic and corporate documents allows one to examine the processes in and through 
which organizational and managerial phenomena are reproduced and transformed and how 
specific organizations and management practices are constructed (Vaara 2010). 
Other publicly available documents, such as governmental and consultants’ reports, are 
utilised to develop an understanding of the phenomena and to place the findings derived from 
the textual analysis of the corporate plans in the context of the federal government’s 
accountability expectations. The data extracted from the corporate documents also form the 
basis of the questions asked during interviews (Patton 2002). 
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The matrix of information sources (Creswell 1998), which include corporate plans, 
consultants’ reports, statutes and other public policy documents of the governments, SWSA 
and all the LGAs, are readily available due to these being in the public domain. 
A narrative textual analysis of accountability provisions in the National Waste Policy 
Implementation Plan and Tasmanian Waste Strategy is conducted. The accountability 
provisions are considered against the findings of the literature review to construct the initial 
codebook of key concepts (Neuman 2000) to guide data collection and analysis (Yin 2014). 
Textual analysis was performed by using NVivo textual analysis tools to establish the 
presence of the categories of themes and concepts identified during the construction of the 
initial codebook in the corporate plans under investigation (Carley 1993). Sub-themes and 
concepts arising from the inquiry were added as sub-categories to the codebook to guide 
analysis of specific phrases and passages (Riessman 2008).  
The document analysis is supplemented by semi-structured interviews. The interviews consist 
of open-ended questions. Open-ended questions offer the flexibility to explore certain areas 
in greater depth and also to pose questions about new areas of enquiry that were not 
originally anticipated in the interview instruments’ development (Patton 2002).  
The interviews were conducted with senior and middle managers of the Tasmanian state 
government, LGAs and their service providers and community representatives. Multiple 
sources of information were sought to provide a comprehensive perspective on the differing 
views and attitudes of actors in the SWSA jurisdiction (Patton 2002). 
Open-ended questions are aimed at evaluating interviewees’ perceptions of the Australian 
federal government’s accountability expectations with regard to the collection of waste data 
for national reporting purposes and the improvement of related data collection systems and 
how actors in the SWSA jurisdiction respond to these expectations. The interview questions 
underpinned by the study’s theoretical framework (Feiock 2013) are also aimed at evaluating 
how LGAs apply best-practise outsourcing governance concepts and what the constraints to 
applying these principles may be.  
Interviews were undertaken with the permission of the University Ethics Committee under 
reference H0014947. 
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4.4 Interview response rate 
The invitation e-mail (Annexure I) requesting an interview was sent to 22 potential 
respondents in the period May to August 2015, followed up by a telephone call confirming 
receipt of the e-mail. The population of potential respondents in the SWSA jurisdiction is as 
follows; 12 general managers of LGAs, 3 general managers of joint-LGAs, 12 senior LGA 
managers overseeing the waste function, 15 councillors serving as chairpersons of LGA 
waste management committees, 4 general managers of private waste service providers, 2 
chairpersons of community organisations and 2 state government waste managers.  A total of 
50 potential respondents were identified.   
A senior LGA manager, active in the waste management industry was firstly interviewed. 
The manager supplied the names of 24 key actors in the waste industry in the SWSA 
jurisdiction that would be able to provide evidence directly related to the case study topic 
(Verner & Abdullah 2012).  Two of the identified potential respondents were not in office 
during the interview time frame.  Letters were sent to the remaining 22 potential interviewees. 
The contact details were publically available.   
Twelve affirmative responses were received. The sample size is therefore 12 interviewees out 
of a possible 48 respondents being 25%.  Four affirmative responses were received from 
LGA senior managers and one from an LGA general manager. One response was received 
from a senior manager of a waste management service provider and two from general 
managers of waste management service providers. Two responses were received from 
representatives of environmental community interest groups and one from an LGA councillor 
actively involved in waste management affairs. A positive response rate of 55% of invitations 
send was accordingly achieved.  
Due to the relatively close-knit network, at the request of some interviewees more specific 
details on the sampling process, relevant Australian LGA classifications, types of waste 
services, number of years’ service and job titles are withheld. To protect anonymity, only 
broad descriptions of seniority and organisational types are included in the relevant 
interviewees’ bibliography.  Although the sampling process remains subjective, the sample of 
interviews is considered representative of the population. The following table depicts, in 
broad terms, the spread of interviewees across the population. 
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4.5 Pilot testing 
Prior to conducting the interviews, the proposed interview questions were posed to a senior 
LGA manager from a large LGA in South Africa to ascertain its understandability and 
practicality. This review did not result in major changes to the interview questions or their 
format.  
4.6 Conduct of interviews 
All interviews were conducted face-to-face at the participants’ choice of premises during the 
months of May to August 2015. Interviews varied in length between 40 and 70 minutes. 
Details of the interview dates are included in the relevant interviewees’ bibliography. 
Interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed by an independent source. All 
transcripts were checked against the original recording and forwarded to the interviewees to 
ensure that they agreed that the transcripts were an accurate record of the interview. A small 
number of minor changes were noted and made on the transcripts. 
4.7 Analysis of interview data 
The same coding system was used in both the textual analysis of the corporate documents and 
transcribed interviews by using NVivo software tools. The interviews were analysed during 
June, July and August 2015. In addition to existing key concepts, categories and sub-
categories (Carley 1993) derived from the document analysis phase in Chapters 5 and 6, the 
12 interview questions are captured as NVivo nodes (Bazeley 2007) and responses coded in a 
manner designed to keep the narrative text intact (Riessman 2008) to obtain a more detailed, 
qualitative understanding (Verner & Abdullah 2012) of how those being interviewed view 
their world and to capture the complexities of their individual judgements, perceptions and 
experiences (Patton 2002). Manifest textual coding was undertaken in a manner which aims 
to keep the message, its purpose, participants and setting intact (Spee & Jarzabkowski 2011). 
Recording units consisted of phrases, sentences and paragraphs (Weber 1985) related to the 
key concepts. The units coded were identified by using NVivo text search and coding tools 
(Bazeley 2007; Edhlund 2011; Gibbs 2002; Richards 1999).  
Units of data are sampled in accordance with the Charmaz (2006) prescripts where she 
contends that data must be rich, substantial and relevant in order to be suitable and sufficient 
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to depict empirical events. Charmaz (2006 p. 19) provides guidance on what constitutes rich 
and sufficient data by providing a list of key characteristics–the data should 
1. provide enough background data about persons, processes and settings to 
understand and portray the full range of contexts of the study; 
2. provide detailed descriptions of a range of participants’ views and actions; 
3. reveal what lies beneath the surface; 
4. reveal any changes occurring over time; 
5. provide multiple views of the participants’ range of actions; 
6. enable the development of analytical categories; and  
7. facilitate comparisons between different data. 
4.8 Validity and trustworthiness of methods for data collection 
There are no formal rules for presenting interpretations and conclusions that result from an 
analysis of textual narrative data (Riessman 2008). The data and interpretations derived from 
the textual analysis of the corporate reports and analysis of transcriptions of interviews are 
presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The primary data are presented in enough detail to allow 
other investigators to consider alternative interpretations (Riessman 2008). The presentation 
of data, combined with a detailed discussion on how interpretations were made, is transparent 
enough to compel others to act on it (Mishler 1990).  
A summary of the number of narrative references coded from the transcribed interviews to 
each NVivo case node is presented in Annexure II. The ranking of the top three references for 
each category of participant is shown on the table. The ranking of the narrative references 
offer assistance to other investigators to interpret the level of importance interviewees attach 
to the various interview themes.  
The transparent disclosures ensure the pragmatic validity and trustworthiness of the study.  
4.9 Summary 
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The project takes a case study approach. The methods for data collection utilised in the study 
are textual analysis of the corporate plans of the research subjects and transcribed interviews 
with managers of the Tasmanian government, LGAs, community representatives and service 
providers.   
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Chapter 5: The Australian federal government’s accountability expectations of the 
SWSA waste management network and the response preferences of the member 
councils  
5.1 Introduction 
The scope of what the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan, Tasmanian Waste 
Strategy, the Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act, 1994 and the Local 
Government Act, 1993 expect of local government with regard to the supply of waste data is 
explored in this chapter. The nature of the accountability relationships between actors in the 
SWSA jurisdiction is investigated, followed by a critique of the federal government’s 
accountability expectations. A number of interview questions are developed.  
5.2 The member councils of SWSA 
The SWSA was established in 2001 to facilitate the coordination of the regional strategic 
planning of waste management services of its 12 member councils at the time
14
 (Blue 
Environment 2011). SWSA provides a suite of waste management planning and facilitation 
services against a levy payable by its member councils. The rules of the SWSA states 
...the purpose of SWSA is to ‘facilitate integrated regional strategic planning and 
implementation of the Southern Waste Management Strategy’. Its function is ‘to 
provide the most cost effective management and facilitation of municipal waste 
minimisation programs, waste stream control and performance monitoring, 
establishment of a non- municipal waste minimisation program, monitoring of 
residual waste treatment technologies, infrastructure developments, implementation of 
the landfill development strategy, education and marketing programs... (Blue 
Environment 2011, p. 2).  
The SWSA is one of three regional waste bodies in Tasmania: Cradle Coast Authority, 
consisting of six member councils in north-western and western Tasmania; Northern 
Tasmanian Waste Management Group, representing eight member councils; and SWSA 
                                                 
14
 Details of membership are provided in Appendix 1. 
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(Southern Waste Strategy Authority), representing its 11 member councils
15
 in and around 
Hobart.  
Twenty-six out of 29 LGAs in Tasmania are represented on these regional waste bodies, 
which cover 96% of the population. SWSA represents a population of 254,639 people and 
covers an area of 25,925 square kilometres (Hyder Consulting 2011, p. 72).  
The SWSA has been highly critical of the inadequate recycling services offered by its 
member councils,
16
 by remarking that recovery rates across the region are generally low, with 
industry practice and trends implemented elsewhere showing that there are opportunities for 
improvement. The SWSA observes that recycling collection services are not uniform across 
the region and remarks that one municipality provides no service, other municipalities do not 
collect the full range of materials of possible recyclables with some municipalities using 
recycling crates, which is not the optimum method for maximising diversion of waste from 
landfill disposal (Blue Environment 2011, p. ES (iii)). 
Based on the Australian LGA classification system, the 12 member councils can be described 
as ranging from very-large-agricultural on the one hand to urban-medium on the other (Local 
Government Board 2012, pp. 83–85). A review of these attributes and related data in 
Appendix 1 indicates that large disparities of population density per kilometre exist between 
the LGAs. For example, Hobart City Council has 154,09 people per kilometre of road that 
must be provided with kerbside waste collection and recycling services, while Huon Valley 
Council must provide 7,65 people per kilometre of road with similar services. 
These large disparities make it more costly on a per-capita basis for outlying councils with 
large road networks and relatively small populations to supply comprehensive kerbside waste 
collection and recycling services at the same standard as their counterparts (Hyder Consulting 
2011, p. 76). From a cost perspective, this leads to an increase in the outsourcing of these 
services (BDA Group 2009; Lavee 2007; Okuda & Thomson 2007; Wagner 2011). This in 
part explains why waste management services are provided by some member councils of the 
SWSA to their constituencies through direct service delivery, while other councils prefer the 
outsourcing of this service (Blue Environment 2011, pp. 13–33). 
                                                 
15
 Hobart City Council resigned its membership in the SWSA effective from 30 June 2014 (Alderman Damon 
Thomas 2014). 
16
 Refer to Appendix 1 for a description of the range of recycling services offered by the LGAs. 
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The literature review in Chapter 2.4 revealed that the outsourcing of waste management 
services impacts on the ability of LGAs to collect waste data and to improve on data 
collection systems primarily because some critical waste data may be privately held, with 
some service providers not willing to disclose aspects of what they consider to be confidential 
trade information (Barton 2006). This is exacerbated when only a few waste management 
service providers are active in the marketplace because these service providers are in a 
position to dictate what information they are willing to disclose due to a lack of alternative 
bidders (Dijkgraaf & Gradus 2007a, 2007b; Merickova & Nemec 2013). The demand for 
waste data from the service providers may also be inadequate due to the increased costs and 
competency constraints associated with the monitoring and managing of the performance of 
waste management service providers by LGAs (Bisman 2008). 
The waste management service providers and the possible accountability consequences of 
their actions in the SWSA jurisdiction are considered next.  
5.3 The service providers in SWSA 
Some LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction provide their customers with direct waste management 
services, for example, the fortnightly kerbside waste collection service provided by Hobart 
City Council (Blue Environment 2011, p. 17). In contrast, Sorrell Council outsources its 
kerbside waste collection to Veolia, whilst Kingborough outsources its kerbside waste 
collection to Aussie Waste (Blue Environment 2011, p. 19).  
The SWSA reflects on the limitations of existing waste management outsourcing 
arrangements and advocates for regional centralisation of waste management services by 
remarking that many of the waste contracts servicing their member councils are not 
adequately written to ensure appropriate service standards and data provision. They argue 
that greater cooperation in contracts facilitates better sharing of infrastructure (e.g. sharing 
resource recovery centres) could result in cost savings and in greater diversion of waste from 
landfill. They advocate for higher levels of coordination between member councils by 
allowing SWSA to represent them as a contract principal (Blue Environment 2011, p. 80). 
Large multi-national waste management companies, such as Veolia Environmental Services 
(Australia), may benefit from such regional consolidation. Veolia has a number of collection 
and transport contracts with councils across Tasmania, and operates material recovery 
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facilities in Derwent Park and Invermay and a paper/cardboard recycling facility in 
Spreyton
17
 (Blue Environment 2011, pp. 12, 26 & 31).  
Merickova & Nemec (2013) argue that large multi-national companies become less willing to 
disclose waste data when they develop an overly dominant position in the waste and waste 
recycling market to protect their market. In contrast, the Australian National Waste Report 
2010 argues that whilst this type of concentration may limit competition, large companies 
have stronger internal resource capabilities which result in improved waste data collection for 
the purposes of public reporting (EPHC 2010b, p. 229).  
Smaller private companies that service LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction include Aussie Waste, 
Enee, Jones Waste Management, Spectran, Thorpe Waste, Recovery Tasmania, SBBM 
Enterprises and Soil First. In contrast with the large multi-national companies, smaller 
companies may not be able to adequately collect and supply waste data due to a lack of 
internal resources (Qian, Burritt & Monroe 2011).  
The SWSA is highly critical of the collection and reporting of waste data attended to by 
private contractors in the SWSA jurisdiction, remarking that it 
...is understood that some waste generated in Central Highlands is disposed of in 
Launceston but no further information is available…..Additional C&I waste/self-haul 
believed to be deposited at Hamilton landfill but figures not known . . . and  
SWSA members reported rates of municipal waste generation…..large regional 
differences in the quantities of waste presented at the kerbside even for councils 
providing similar services. It seems likely that some of the data are incorrect…… 
there is some overlap and anomalies in these figures as Copping landfill receives 
MSW from…..councils…. It is likely some of the MSW from these councils is 
transported by commercial contractors to Copping landfill and is recorded as C&I 
waste…… (Blue Environment 2011, pp. 27,28 & 31) 
In order to improve profitability, private contractors may dispose of waste intended for 
recycling more cheaply in landfill sites, thereby maximising profits (Lavee 2007). The cost of 
shipping is a major consideration in the commercial viability of Tasmanian recycling. For 
                                                 
17
 Veolia processed approximately 55,000–60,000 tons of recyclable products in Tasmania during 2013, of 
which 41,558 tons or 1,731 containers were shipped northbound. Interstate or domestic shipments accounted for 
45%, whilst the remaining 55% was shipped to Malaysia, Hong Kong, China, Philippines, Singapore, Korea and 
India (Veolia Environmental Services 2014, p. 5).  
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example, the loss of a direct shipping service and amendments to the Tasmanian Freight 
Equalisation Scheme have a major bearing on Veolia’s decisions regarding which products to 
recover from waste streams (Blue Environment 2014, p. 26; Brooks 2013; Miller 2015; 
Smiley 2014). Similarly, hazardous waste may be inappropriately disposed of in council-
managed landfill sites to avoid higher disposal charges and thus maximise profits (Lloyd-
Smith 2009). Waste disposal levies payable may also be avoided if waste is misclassified as 
clean-fill, when in fact it may have been generated as MSW
18
 (MRA Consulting Group 2015, 
p. 12 & 23; Wagner 2011).  
Some service providers in the SWSA jurisdiction may be unwilling to disclose 
comprehensive waste data for some of the reasons stated above:  
Some stakeholders (especially commercial recyclers) express reservations about 
providing data without assurances about the data repository, provisions of access and 
use to which it would be put. This can especially be the case where data vests with the 
EPA, as there may be concern information provided could be used against them by 
the environmental regulators. (Blue Environment 2014, p. 33)  
Outsourcing of public services by LGAs is not limited to common arm’s-length contracting 
with the private sector. Public entities may also contract with other public entities, and public 
entities may contract with not-for-profit entities (Dollery, Akimov & Byrnes 2009). For 
example, SWS (Southern Waste Solutions) is a collaborative partnership between four LGAs 
incorporated as a joint LGA (Blue Environment 2011, pp. 19–26) which provides waste 
disposal and waste-handling services to its members, other government agencies such as 
LGAs and private customers (Southern Waste Solutions 1998, 2012a).  
When contracting in a public network, uncertainty may arise as to who is accountable for 
collection and reporting of public waste data; for example, SWS receives waste for disposal 
to landfill directly from LGAs and indirectly through private kerbside collection service 
providers. The LGAs require waste data from SWS to comprehensively report on their 
performance to their stakeholders through their annual reports (Local Government Act 1993, 
sec 36A). LGAs disposing either directly or indirectly of MSW at the Copping regional 
authority landfill facility will not be able to report on waste diverted from landfill as 
                                                 
18
 A voluntary waste disposal levy of $2/ton is currently payable by the member councils of the SWSA. Waste 
disposed of at the Copping regional authority does not attract the current voluntary levy (Blue Environment 
2011, pp. 71–77). 
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contemplated by waste public policy prescripts without input from SWS (Blue Environment 
2011, p. 58). 
The SWS also has a statutory reporting duty to other stakeholders, which places additional 
strain on internal resources. For example, an annual report is made to the Environmental 
Protection Authority (EPA) to show compliance with environmental legislation: 
Provision to the Authority of annual reports showing monitoring results at the landfill 
and transfer station sites within acceptable parameters…...Provision to the Authority 
and to the EPA of annual reports showing full compliance. (Southern Waste Solutions 
2012b, pp. 1–5) 
Most of the member councils of SWSA are also members of the LGAT (Local Government 
Association of Tasmania) and the STCA (Southern Tasmanian Councils Authority) (Blue 
Environment 2011, pp. 9 & 12). In response to the public waste policies, the LGAT and 
STCA have made policy representations to the Tasmanian government that directly influence 
the collection of waste data. These aspects are explored in Chapter 6. 
The management of emerging pluralistic models of public services production/provision 
through networked forms of governance to improve public service delivery requires public 
managers to have a clear understanding of how service delivery arrangements should be 
configured and how the outcomes should be monitored (Calabro & Torchia 2011; Cuadrado-
Ballesteros, GarcaÍa-SÁnchez & Prado-Lorenzo 2013; Keast, Mandell & Brown 2006). 
Whether managers of LGAs, waste management service providers and regional networks 
have a clear understanding of their role in the complex ‘value chain information management’ 
system (Burritt 2012, p. 392) related to the collection and national public reporting of 
regional waste data is not fully known. The following questions are therefore included in the 
interview protocol: 
Interview Question 1: In compiling the 3-yearly national waste report what is 
your organisation’s role in the collection of waste data? 
Interview Question 2: In compiling the 3-yearly national waste report what is 
your organisation’s role in the improvement of regional waste data collection 
systems? 
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5.4 The role of LGAs in accounting for national waste data 
Environmental performance accountability requires an understanding of who is demanding 
information, exactly what data must be reported and who is responsible for delivering the 
account (Miller 2005). Lindberg (2013) argues that for accountability relationships to exist 
the principal must either be able to sanction the agent or the agent must perceive some 
measure of threat. The sanction, perceived or real, ensures that the agent accepts 
responsibility for the domain of delivery, that is, provision of waste data. The following 
public policy prescripts and statutory provisions have bearing. 
5.4.1 National Waste Policy Implementation Plan 
The National Waste Policy Implementation Plan was jointly developed by all Australian 
governments and adopted by the Environment Protection and Heritage Council (EPHC) in 
July 2010. The National Waste Policy Implementation Plan identified 16 priority strategies 
across six key directions to be implemented over a 10-year period leading up to 2010.  
LGAs attend directly or through outsourcing to the collection and treatment of the great 
majority of municipal solid waste (MSW) (Blue Environment 2013, p. 79). The reporting of 
national waste data and improvement of data collection systems are to a large extent 
dependent on LGAs and their service providers contributing relevant waste data and assisting 
in the improvement of waste data collection systems.  
The National Waste Policy Implementation Plan does not assign responsibility to LGAs to 
provide waste management data directly to the Commonwealth Government (EPHC 2010a, p. 
19). While constitutionally unable to enforce particular methods of waste data collection on 
the states and LGAs,
19
 the Accounting and Accountability Act (2013) imposes general 
requirements on state governments and their departments with regard to the provision of data 
to the Australian federal government (Public Governance, Performance and Accountability 
Act 2013).  
Key direction 6 of the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan (EPHC 2010a, p. 19) with 
the corresponding strategy 16 considers the provision of national waste data to be the primary 
responsibility of the federal government, with support from the state and territory 
governments with no reference made to the role of LGAs, as follows: 
                                                 
19
 Refer to the definition of LGAs in Chapter 2. 
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Providing the evidence: Decision makers have access to meaningful, accurate and 
current national waste and resource recovery data and information.  
Strategy 16: To develop and publish a three-yearly current and future trends waste 
and resource recovery report. This will be underpinned by a system that provides 
access to integrated national core data on waste and resource recovery that is accurate, 
meaningful and up-to-date and available online. 
In terms of the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan, the Australian and state 
governments are responsible for improving existing data collection and reporting 
arrangements against a pre-determined timeline, with no reference to the role of LGAs in the 
information chain: 
Needs and purpose of data agreed by jurisdictions by 2011,  
Diagnostic of existing data collection and reporting arrangements against agreed 
national data needs completed and gaps identified by 2012,  
Short term improvements to data and collection arrangements identified and 
implementation commenced by 2013. (EPHC 2010a, p. 19) 
The National Waste Policy Implementation Plan directs state and territory governments to 
advocate for the outsourcing of waste management services by advising on the establishment 
of ‘multi-agency management arrangements’ and ‘active partnerships’ between governments 
and industry (EPHC 2010a, p. 9). The roles and responsibilities of LGAs or groupings in 
which LGAs are represented vary depending on the jurisdiction in which they are situated 
(Hyder Consulting 2011, p. 1).  
Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke (2006) explain that legal mandates that emanate from the legal 
architecture that frames a specific public service delivery will determine the boundaries 
within which public managers can operate. Public managers must therefore have a clear 
understanding of the laws and regulations that govern their organisational and service 
delivery environment. The obligations of the Tasmanian LGAs in this study are accordingly 
considered against the backdrop of the Tasmanian Waste Strategy and other relevant state 
legislation.  
5.4.2 Tasmanian waste and resources management strategy 
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The Tasmanian Waste Strategy directs Tasmanian LGAs and the state government together 
with multiple agencies, such as industry associations, industry, community organisations and 
the public, to ‘Participate in and support national data collection systems and utilise results 
for waste and resource management planning’ (Environmental Protection Authority 2009, p. 
15). 
The Tasmanian Waste Strategy directs the development of action plans to deliver on its 
strategic objectives, which include support for the national data collection systems, as follows: 
It is expected that, at a minimum, State Government and Local Government, either as 
individual authorities or through their regions, will develop and deliver Action Plans 
as appropriate for their area of responsibility in order to effectively achieve the 
objectives of Strategy. (Environmental Protection Authority 2009, p. 6)  
The directive to ‘develop and deliver’ action plans is enforceable through the Tasmanian 
Local Government Act, 1993.
20
 The Act does not prescribe the nature or format of these 
corporate plans or reporting thereon, which may lead to LGAs choosing not to include 
aspects of public reporting of waste management data. This begs the question as to what 
punitive measures the state government can implement to demand waste data (Ball, 
Broadbent & Jarvis 2006; Ball, Broadbent & Moore 2002).  
The minimum duty of accountability is that of compliance with the law and reporting on the 
extent of compliance (Bebbington & Gray 1993). Even if the statutory provisions do not 
expressly indicate how public managers must comply with policy prescripts, the responses of 
LGAs to public policy interventions are often influenced by fear of sanction from higher 
levels of government (Ball, Broadbent & Moore 2002), thus establishing the accountability 
relationship (Lindberg 2013).
21
  
A Sorrell Council remark: ‘Government pressuring the sector to facilitate mergers that are 
politically motivated at the expense of community collaboration’ (Appendix 5, para. 6) 
indicates that political pressures may be in existence that may lead to a move away from in-
house service delivery to outsourcing of waste management services, or may lead to a 
redesign of existing outsourcing practices that may impact on public service delivery decision 
                                                 
20
 The act stipulates that single and joint LGAs are required to develop 10-year strategic (sec. 66), long-term 
financial management (sec. 70) and annual plans (sec. 71) (Local Government Act 1993). 
21
 Sec. 16 of the Local Government Act, 1993 allows the governor at request of the minister, on advice of the 
local government board, to adjust the boundary of a municipal area (Local Government Act 1993, sec. 16). 
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making (Bel & Fageda 2007, 2008; Levin & Tadelis 2010; Rodrigues, Tavares & Araújo 
2012; Warner 2011).  
5.4.3 Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act, 1994 
Single and joint LGAs (and any other person) involved in waste activities
22
 are held 
accountable for the provision of waste data through the Environmental Management and 
Pollution Control Act, 1994 and the related Waste Management Regulations, 2010.  
In practise, the demand for waste data from municipal landfill operators is made through the 
issue of an environmental practise notice,
23
 with a spreadsheet made available by the EPA to 
facilitate data collection (Hyder Consulting 2011, p. 73). It may be argued that a stronger, 
legal accountability relationship exists between the state government and the agents directly 
involved in managing waste
24
 and that output waste data should be obtained through 
application of this act and its regulations rather than through application of the Local 
Government Act, 1993. 
Interviews conducted by Blue Environment Pty Ltd with stakeholders in the SWSA 
jurisdiction revealed that some of the participants are of the opinion that waste regulations are 
not always enforced in the region and that legal requirements are not uniformly applied 
‘…..some stakeholders indicated a level of dissatisfaction with DPIPWE’s lack of 
enforcement of waste regulations; there was a view that a lack of resources led to different 
application of legal requirements in some circumstances’ (Appendix 11, para. 8). In a 2014 
report to the Tasmanian Waste Advisory Council (WAC), the same consultants remark that 
stakeholder factionalism in the SWSA jurisdiction detracts from the enactment of waste 
regulations ‘…a lengthy process of negotiation, preparation and enactment of regulations, 
and system development still needs to be undertaken. This process may raise a number of 
barriers including stakeholder factionalism.’ (Blue Environment 2014, p. 32).  
                                                 
22
 Any person involved in general waste activities must obtain environmental approval (reg. 12) for management 
methods used in the activity (reg. 10) (Environmental Management and Pollution Control (Waste Management) 
Regulations 2010).  
23
 The board of Environmental Management and Pollution Control can demand mandatory environmental audits 
relating to any waste handling activity (sec. 30) and the Director of Environmental Management (sec. 18) can 
reasonably demand any information considered necessary in the interest of the environment (sec. 43) 
(Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994). 
24
 Seven councils own a landfill or a share in a landfill (excluding Kingborough which has a share in Copping 
landfill operations but does not share landfill ownership). Nine councils own lease or operate a total of 26 
facilities for waste transfer and resource recovery (Blue Environment 2011, p. 31). 
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From the above, it seems as if there may be dissatisfaction with both the design and 
enforcement of waste regulations. The following questions are included in the interview 
protocol to corroborate the data from the corporate documents and to determine the extent of 
dissatisfaction with poor design and unequal application of existing waste regulations, as 
these pertain to waste data collection and the public reporting thereof: 
Interview Question 3: With respect to national reporting, is the demand for 
waste data adequately guided by the Tasmanian government? 
Interview Question 4: Are existing regulations in respect of the supply of waste 
data adequately enforced?  
5.5 Is the domain of account-giving clear and measurable?  
For an accountability relationship to exist, exactly what must be accounted for must be clear 
and measurable (Lindberg 2013; Miller 2005). 
Complex outsourcing initiatives based on coordination and collaboration require a stable 
political environment, clear legal authority and clear direction with regard to performance 
targets and measurement (Feiock 2013; Godfrey, Scott & Trois 2013; Heinrich, Lynn & 
Milward 2010; Lamothe, S, Lamothe & Feiock 2008; Rodrigues, Tavares & Araújo 2012; 
Smith & Cheng 2006). 
Accountability challenges for LGAs arise from a state-local government relationship 
characterised by the lack of or ill-defined performance indicators (Ball 2005; Ball & 
Bebbington 2008; Ball, Broadbent & Moore 2002; Dollery & Manley 2007; Purse 2009; 
Saliterer & Korac 2013).  
The SWSA reflects on the lack of performance measurement and considers gaps in waste 
data to be the result of poor recordkeeping and poor coordination of waste data flows 
between LGAs, their service providers and the state government by remarking: ‘There are 
gaps in recorded data in southern Tasmania, both on the amount and source of generation of 
waste and on the amount and type of materials recovered’ and ‘The lack of good 
recordkeeping often means there is a lack of knowledge of the types of waste that may have 
been deposited in the landfill in the past’ (Appendix 9, para. 5 & 9). 
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In response to the performance measurement problems apparent in the Tasmanian waste 
management networks, the Tasmanian Waste Strategy directed the establishment of the WAC 
which provides recommendations regarding the implementation of systems for data collection 
and management. These recommendations include the setting and measuring of performance 
targets and public reporting thereon. A timeline for the systems development must be 
established in consultation with stakeholders (Environmental Protection Authority 2009, p. 
15). 
Hobart City Council remarks: ‘Monitor the progress of the Waste Advisory Committee 
(WAC), and its Local Government Representative(s), when put in place’, suggesting that it is 
unclear what is expected of them, thus awaiting guidance from the WAC (Appendix 11, para. 
2). In the absence of clear recommendations from the WAC as to how waste data collection 
and public reporting systems may be improved, the question arises whether the domain of 
account-giving is sufficiently clear (Lindberg 2013; Miller 2005).  
The following interview question is included to explore if the demand for an improvement in 
waste data collection systems is sufficiently clear in a possibly uncertain policy environment: 
Interview Question 5: To what extent must your organisation’s waste data 
collection system improve to meet the state government’s expectations? 
Dollery & Manly (2007) argue that accountability in local government primarily centres on 
the duty to provide services to people, establishing a means to evaluate these services and 
allowing citizens to compare expected and delivered services. 
The Tasmanian Waste Strategy reflects on the evaluation and comparison of Tasmanian 
waste data by remarking that other jurisdictions have more complete datasets compared with 
Tasmania for waste diversion and resource recovery. The Tasmanian Waste Strategy suggests 
that in order for Tasmania to benchmark resource recovery and recycling rates with other 
states, it is crucial to improve the coordination and extent of data collection systems 
(Environmental Protection Authority 2009, p. 1). 
If LGAs believe they are accountable to higher levels of government, it could be reasonably 
expected that they should have clearly defined key performance areas (KPAs) of improving 
the accounting for waste data and key performance indicators (KPIs) related to compliance 
with public policy prescripts, that is, improved data collection and collection systems. A 
review of the data in Appendix 2 indicates that a number of the LGAs in the SWSA 
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jurisdiction do not have KPIs related to waste management contained in their corporate 
planning documents.
25
 This is a similar finding to those of an Australian study of LGA 
corporate planning documents that concluded that Victorian LGAs give relatively little 
attention to planning and measuring performance of the waste management services they 
provide to their constituencies (Kloot 2001).  
No evidence could be found of any LGA having included improvement of waste data 
collection and collection systems as a specific key performance area in their corporate 
planning documents, with only Hobart City Council and Glamorgan Spring Bay Council 
making reference to regulatory waste management prescripts, albeit not specifically for the 
purposes of complying with the public reporting expectations of the National Waste Policy 
Implementation Plan or the Tasmania Waste Strategy; for example: ‘Monitor the progress of 
the Waste Advisory Committee (WAC), and its Local Government Representative(s), when 
put in place.’ and ‘Compliance with environmental licence conditions’ (Appendix 2, para, 3 
& 9). 
These observations bring into question whether the domain of account-giving with respect to 
waste data collection and improvement of collection systems is sufficiently measurable 
(Lindberg 2013; Miller 2005). The fact that the corporate planning documents do not make 
reference to the collection of waste data and the improvement of collection systems for 
national reporting purposes does not necessarily mean it is not considered a key performance 
area for the various LGAs. In order to establish, firstly, the relative operational importance 
the participants to the study attach to the federal government’s demand for waste data and 
improvement of data collection systems and, secondly, whether they consider it someone 
else’s responsibility and, thirdly, whether actors are waiting for guidance from the state 
government, the following interview question is included: 
Interview Question 6: In compiling the 3-yearly national waste report does your 
organisation consider the collection of waste data and the improvement of waste 
data collection systems a Key Performance Area?  
If the LGAs in this study are indeed willing to demand and supply waste data and willing to 
improve waste data collection systems, and if they are clear on what is expected from them, 
                                                 
25
 A ‘review of the Measuring Council Performance in Tasmania (KPI) project’ was announced in September 
2009 to improve on existing publicly reported performance indicators. Existing state-driven publicly reported 
KPIs on Tasmanian LGAs’ waste management performance are outdated and limited to cost of service 
indicators (Hyder Consulting 2011, p. 74).  
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but the waste datasets for public reporting purposes remain incomplete, the question arises if 
the LGAs in this study are not constrained to collect outsourced waste data and improve on 
waste data collection systems.  
5.6  A critique of the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan and the Tasmanian 
Waste Strategy against possible constraints to implementation  
Numerous Australian studies, as previously considered in Chapter 2, have found constraints 
in strategic planning, procurement practices and sustainability and performance reporting in 
Australian LGAs. These constraints result in challenges for LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction. 
For example, SWSA states that it ‘faces increasing waste challenges arising from 
implementation of the Tasmanian Government’s Tasmanian Waste and Resources 
Management Strategy and the Commonwealth Government’s National Waste Policy’ (Blue 
Environment 2011, p. E5(i)). 
The Tasmanian Waste Strategy (p. iii) also identified some unique constraints to meeting the 
strategic objectives of the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan, for example, 
geographical distance to recycling markets and waste treatment facilities. The Tasmanian 
Waste Strategy concludes that there is currently little economic incentive to recycle or 
recover resources in Tasmania, which may imply that there is very little incentive to account 
for such underperformance.
26
 The Tasmanian Waste Strategy suggests that amongst other 
incentives, the development of economic and legislated instruments to reduce waste 
generation and divert waste from landfill should be considered, which may also facilitate 
improved waste data collection and improvement in data collection systems through the 
availability of increased funding becoming available (Environmental Protection Authority 
2009, pp. 6, 8 & 12).  
The Tasmanian Waste Advisory Committee recommended the establishment of a levy on all 
waste disposed of to landfill in April 2011, with the LGAT that previously advocated against 
waste disposal levies deciding in July 2012 to support the introduction of a waste disposal 
levy at $10/ton (MRA Consulting Group 2015, p. 1).  
                                                 
26
 The 2013 National Waste Report estimates the Tasmanian waste recycling rate at approximately 22% in 
2006/2007,whist the 2010/2011 rate is estimated at 33%, substantially lower than the national average of 60% 
(Blue Environment 2013, pp. vii & 45). The authors remarked that the improvement may be the consequence of 
a changed basis of accounting for agricultural waste rather than a factual improvement.   
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In reflecting on constraints to its own performance measurement resulting from funding 
constraints, the SWSA remarks that the current low revenue base of SWSA allows for current 
staffing costs but provides little additional funding for major projects. They observed that 
increased waste reduction and recovery achievements would require increased funding (Blue 
Environment 2011, p. 33 & 66).  
Improving waste data collection systems which span jurisdictions and organisational 
boundaries also require competent, well-trained staff (Lacity, Hirschheim & Willcocks 1994; 
McIvor et al. 2009; Vagadia 2012; Verner & Abdullah 2012). The SWSA suggests that the 
training of staff of its member councils in aspects of waste management is advisable, 
implying that enhancement of competencies is required by remarking: ‘…..encouraging the 
training of staff involved in municipal waste management…..’ (Blue Environment 2011, p. 
67). 
In considering the SWSA observation that waste data is being omitted, duplicated or 
misclassified by the member councils and their service providers (Blue Environment 2011, 
pp. 28,30,31, 57–60 & 71), it is apparent that the flow of waste data is difficult to integrate 
across, in and between these networks (Ball & Bebbington 2008; Ball, Broadbent & Moore 
2002), which may be the result of funding and competency constraints.  
Consultants to the WAC confirm earlier findings that these funding constraints exist: 
‘However delivery of the strategy has been hampered by a lack of resources (both financial 
and human resources) and gaps in data collection systems (which in turn hampers monitoring 
of performance)’ (Blue Environment 2014, p. 31), but caution that revenue raised from the 
introduction of waste disposal levies may not necessarily be solely applied in pursuing waste 
reduction and related strategic objectives by remarking: 
Levy revenues from current schemes [landfill levies] often offer a source of funding 
to state governments and are therefore distributed at the discretion of state 
governments. In such conditions, income for state treasuries and funding for waste 
diversion incentives become competing priorities for the funds raised through landfill 
levies. (MRA Consulting Group 2015, p. 9) 
To corroborate and expand on the findings of the consultants to the SWSA and the WAC, the 
following interview question is included: 
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Interview Question 7: To what extent will the introduction of a waste disposal 
landfill levy assist you to overcome constraints in your waste data collection 
system?  
5.7 Summary 
The accountability obligations of LGAs with regard to the supply of waste data is considered 
against the stipulations of the National Policy on Waste: Implementation Plan, Tasmanian 
Waste and Resources Management Strategy, the Environmental Management and Pollution 
Control Act, 1994 and the Local Government Act, 1993. The response preferences of LGAs 
and their service providers are explored by considering the domain of account-giving through 
a critique of the federal government’s accountability expectations against possible limitations 
of LGAs to implement the public policies. 
A number of questions are included in the interview protocol to develop a deeper 
understanding of (i) the accountability relationship between actors in the SWSA jurisdiction 
and (ii) the response preferences of LGAs and their service providers to policy directives to 
collect and supply waste data and to improve waste data collection systems.  
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Chapter 6: Responding to the accountability expectations of the Australian federal 
government: Governance structures in the SWSA jurisdiction 
6.1 Introduction 
Governance structures and controls in the SWSA jurisdiction evolved from the interplay 
between the regulatory frameworks and institutional dynamics. The National Waste Policy 
Implementation Plan and the Tasmanian Waste Strategy as regulatory frameworks direct 
collective action such as outsourcing to joint authorities, while the institutional dynamics 
relate to the application or lack thereof of best-practise outsourcing governance mechanisms. 
These governance mechanisms are identified as goal congruence, communication and 
knowledge sharing, contract management and monitoring and management of relationships. 
The interaction between the application of the regulatory frameworks and institutional 
dynamics in the SWSA jurisdiction is explored in this chapter.  
6.2 The best-practise outsourcing frameworks’ governance mechanisms  
Accountability in the outsourcing environment encapsulates both the giving and demanding 
of information, with the client (principal) having a right to demand information and the 
service provider (agent) having a duty to provide the information (Broadbent & Laughlin 
2009; Gray 1992; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Roberts & Scapens 1985). A strong accountable 
relationship between principal and agent requires the management of data demand and supply, 
which is essentially a communicative process (Wüllenweber et al. 2008).  
Best-practise outsourcing frameworks suggest that the communicative process should be 
governed by implementing controls to track, monitor and provide feedback on the adequacy 
of data supplied by the service provider (Das & Teng 2001; Kakabadse & Kakabadse 2003; 
Verner & Abdullah 2012). Efficiency-seeking outsourcing designed to save costs can be 
managed through formal process and output controls which refer to the monitoring and 
management of a contractually agreed quantifiable process or objective outcome, whilst 
innovation-seeking outsourcing to improve service delivery present challenges and is thus 
best managed through social controls which refer to the distribution of shared beliefs through 
corporate governance communication channels such as meetings (Das & Teng 2001; Kang et 
al. 2012).  
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The governance tools which underpin the accountability relationships between the state 
government, individual LGAs and their service providers, or alternatively between LGAs in a 
multi-agency arrangement and the state government, can either be contract based, 
relationship based or a combined approach, depending on the nature of the outsourcing 
arrangement (Rai et al. 2012).  
In relationship-based outsourcing arrangements, social controls based on a shared belief that 
the collection and supply of waste data and improvement of data collection systems for the 
purposes of national reporting is required and desirable should be aligned between LGAs as 
principals and their waste management service providers as agents against the federal 
government’s expectations as stakeholder (Das & Teng 2001; Kluvers & Tippett 2011; 
Manetti 2011; Manetti & Toccafondi 2012).  
Das & Teng (2001) observe that process, output and social controls are not limited to contract 
specification and managerial arrangements but could also take the form of new governance 
structures or even informal mechanisms. The question arises if and how LGAs in the SWSA 
jurisdiction govern best-practise outsourcing mechanisms in the context of ‘multi-agency 
management arrangements’ and ‘active partnerships between governments and industry’ 
(EPHC 2010a, p. 9).  
Alignment of goals and objectives between principals and agents against the mutual 
stakeholder values of improved waste data collection and improvement of data collection 
systems is considered against the corporate plans of the LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction. 
Communication and knowledge sharing, contract management and monitoring and 
management of relationships as outsourcing best-practise governance mechanisms are 
similarly considered.  
6.2.1   Alignment of goals and objectives between principals and agents 
The National Waste Policy Implementation Plan (p. 9) states that  
Effective implementation of the National Waste Policy relies on active partnerships, 
multi-agency management arrangements and multi-disciplinary initiatives by a range 
of players including governments of all levels, industry and the community. (EPHC 
2010a)  
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‘Active partnerships’ and ‘multi-agency management arrangements’ may result in new 
governance structures and informal arrangements (Das & Teng 2001) which require an 
alignment of waste data collection and reporting objectives of multiple parties across various 
jurisdictions (Carr & Hawkins 2013; Doberstein 2013a; Goliday 2012). The Tasmanian 
Waste Strategy directs the alignment between principals and agents by referring to a ‘greater 
integration of effort’ (Environmental Protection Authority 2009, p. 5 & 15).  
The Tasmanian Waste Strategy does not give guidance on how such ‘greater integration of 
effort’ must be achieved other than referring to the pursuance of best-practise guidelines 
(Environmental Protection Authority 2009, pp. 14 & 18). The Vagadia (2012) best-practise 
outsourcing framework, comprehensively supported by other best-practise outsourcing 
frameworks, for example Quinn (1999, 2000), recommends the pursuance of goal congruence 
or alignment of values as a governance mechanism in relationship-based outsourcing 
arrangements. Relationship-based outsourcing arrangements are characterised by reduced 
formal contract management arrangements and goal congruence and may facilitate such 
‘greater integration of effort’.  
The SWSA and SWS are both examples of what can be considered ‘partnerships’ and ’multi-
agency management arrangements’ in the SWSA jurisdiction, as explained in Chapter 5. 
SWS, the primary waste disposal service provider to the majority of councils in the SWSA 
jurisdiction, has as a primary goal the maximisation of financial benefits to its members; for 
example:  
Maximising the net worth of the Authority’s assets; and…..operating and managing 
both to maximise benefits to Participating Councils. (Appendix 7, para. 4)  
It also appears as if financial consideration plays a role in SWS’s complying with 
environmental best-practise. SWS alludes to the fact that compliance with environmental 
practise may be restrained by commercial motives by remarking on its strategic objective 
being  
To receive, contain and, where possible [the author’s accentuation], utilise waste in 
accordance with best environmental and commercial practise [the author’s 
accentuation]. (Appendix 7, para. 2)  
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In contrast, one of the primary objectives of the SWSA is the facilitation of waste 
management related to sustainability targets. For example, SWSA alludes to performance 
monitoring of waste minimisation programs and waste stream control:  
...... to provide the most cost effective management and facilitation of municipal waste 
minimisation programs, waste stream control and performance monitoring. (Appendix 
7, para. 6)  
In contrasting the sustainability aims of the SWSA with the commercial aims of SWS above, 
some scholars argue that corporatism is an impediment to pursuing and reporting on long-
term sustainability goals because organisations with commercial intent are focused on short-
term profits rather than long-term ecological sustenance (Burritt 2012; Dijkgraaf & Gradus 
2007a, 2008a; Gray 1992, 2002, 2005, 2010; Gray, Brennan & Malpas 2013; Hukkinen 1995).  
Agency theory dictates that goal congruence between principals and agents in the SWSA 
regional network will thus be constrained by the contrasting objectives of the different actors 
in the SWSA regional network, with those agents primarily serving their own commercial 
self-interests not aligning themselves with the sustainability objectives of their principals 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). This interpretation is supported by SWSA remarking that  
The Copping landfill authority has a financial interest in maximising revenue by 
maximising waste disposed to landfill. This is in opposition to the waste minimisation 
responsibilities of SWSA. (Appendix 7, para. 8)  
The contrasting objectives have implications for the collection and public reporting of waste 
data. Consultants to the SWSA and WAC remark that waste reduction and recycling in the 
region has met with limited success but that the introduction of a waste disposal levy may 
improve the situation: 
…..waste deposited at Copping landfill…..is not part of SWSA arrangements. The 
graph shows that SWSA initiatives to date have had limited success and the overall 
trend is increasing waste generation in southern Tasmania. (Blue Environment 2011, 
p. ES(i)) 
However as the specialised recycling industry grows, landfills begin to lose their 
competitive edge and it is projected that unless they start investing in dedicated 
recovery facilities the recycling industry’s revenue and profitability will start 
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decreasing from 2023/24 onwards. It is expected that there will be marked differences 
between individual landfills as some are better placed than others to take advantage of 
the levy. It is expected that some facilities will continue growing their resource 
recovery infrastructure and increase their profitability whilst others might incur net 
losses. (MRA Consulting Group 2015, p. 23) 
It may be tempting for the SWSA member councils’ management to avoid responsibility and 
distance them from accountability for the lack of performance in recycling, for example, 
under-reporting waste disposed to landfill by categorising it as clean-fill. Actors in the SWSA 
jurisdiction that own and operate landfills may also be tempted to engage in unsavoury 
business practices to protect profit margins by purposefully misreporting waste data, for 
example, accepting hazardous waste as MSW (MRA Consulting Group 2015, pp. 12 & 23). It 
can be conceived that where waste is not received or contained in accordance with best 
environmental practise, the parties involved in such practices will be loath to account for 
waste data due to community dissatisfaction with such practices (Brown & Benn 2009; 
Hillier et al. 2009). 
SWS states that commercially sensitive information will be withheld from public scrutiny, for 
example: 
Subject to any commercially sensitive aspects being separated into a separate section, 
the Plan shall be made fully accessible to stakeholders and to the public. (Appendix 7, 
para. 5)  
Unscrupulous operators may abuse the lack of public disclosure to avoid accounting for 
waste data flowing from waste practices not compliant with best environmental practise (Rae 
& Brown 2009). Unscrupulous operators may well be active in the SWSA jurisdiction, for 
example:  
....... generators opting for cheap disposal options that undercut the financial viability 
of reputable operators in the industry. (Appendix 11, para. 8) 
Although the proprietary interests of contracting parties’ interest in knowledge are protected 
in the commercial environment characterised by customer-vendor relationships, this should 
not be at the expense of government-citizen relationships in outsourcing regimes of public 
organisations (Andrews & Brewer 2013; Andrews & Entwistle 2013; Aulich 2011; Perlman 
2013; Quinn 2000). Scholars argue that whilst the withholding of proprietary information 
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privately held is common practise in the private sector, it is incompatible with the principles 
of accountability and transparency in public sector contracting, which should always be 
favoured against claims of confidentiality (Andon 2012; Ball 2012; Barton 2006; Brown 
2013; Kluvers & Tippett 2010; Purse 2009; Quiggin 1996; Shaoul, Stafford & Stapleton 
2012).  
From the above, it may be argued that the withholding of commercially sensitive information 
negatively impacts on the collection and public reporting of waste data and that goal 
congruence with regard to collection and public reporting of waste data is constrained by 
commercial intent. The responses by participants to the interview questions in general 
facilitates a deeper and richer understanding of the contemporary issues related to the 
withholding of commercially sensitive information and regional waste business practices. 
Due to ethical considerations no specific interview question is posed. 
6.2.2 Alignment with stakeholder values 
Stakeholder management can be used as a tool to govern outsourcing arrangements such as 
inter-local partnerships or municipal corporations. Common goals that align stakeholder 
values should be adopted around the strategic objectives of these organisations (Bae 2009; 
Beach 2009; Beach, Keast & Pickernell 2012; Carr & Hawkins 2013; Keskitalo & Liljenfeldt 
2012). 
Outsourcing practices in the SWSA jurisdiction may have contributed to the misclassification 
of data disposed at landfill facilities, for example:  
anomalies……in recording municipal waste deposited at Copping and the lack of 
information available on C&I and C&D waste being deposited at SWSA member 
landfills, does not allow for meaningful sector-based analysis. (Appendix 8, para. 3)  
To overcome the anomalies in waste data, SWSA potentially considers its own role as that of 
a regional authority leading the alignment of stakeholder values around waste planning 
practices and alignment of policies and programmes, which include outsourcing, to improve 
on waste data collection and collection systems, for example: 
Establishing SWSA as a referral authority for all such facilities in the region. 
(Appendix 8, para. 7)  
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SWSA as a regional coordinator might not be able to resolve all the region’s waste data 
collection and waste data collection system problems if accountability problems rest with 
service providers’ collection systems rather than outsourcing practices, for example: 
There is not enough detailed information to determine the generation by 
sector…..Copping landfill figures would indicate a high percentage generation by the 
C&I sector. (Appendix 8, para. 3) 
It may be argued that only a strong commitment to national reporting on critical waste data as 
a common stakeholder value that includes environmental sustainability targets, such as 
measurable reduction of waste to landfill, shared by all councils and their service providers in 
regional waste management networks will facilitate future adequate collection and public 
reporting of waste data. 
6.2.3 Communication and knowledge sharing  
Accountability is strengthened by properly functioning communication channels to facilitate 
the flow of information, thus making it the most fundamental process to establish and 
maintain accountability relationships (Wüllenweber et al. 2008).  
Communication as a governance tool is given consideration in the corporate plans of LGAs 
albeit to a limited extent; for example, Derwent Valley Council states 
 We are committed to openness, communication…,  
whilst Hobart City Council states that they 
Liaise with other Councils in information sharing. (Appendix 9, para. 1 & 2)  
The SWSA identifies communication problems between LGAs and their service providers in 
vertical principal-agent relationships, for example: 
A number of councils do not collect data on the amount of kerbside recyclables 
collected and/or do not require their contractors to provide such information to them. 
(Appendix 9, para. 7)  
These communication problems appear to extend to horizontal relationships in the SWSA 
jurisdiction setting, for example: 
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……gaps in communication between SWSA and its member councils. (Appendix 9, 
para. 4)  
Communication problems appear to be directly related to poor collection of waste data; for 
example: 
The lack of good recordkeeping often means there is a lack of knowledge of the types 
of waste that may have been deposited in the landfill in the past. (Appendix 9, para. 5)  
The poor collection of waste data in turn derives from a lack of data collection tools such as 
weighbridges and waste audits, for example: 
A regime of regular volumetric surveys of landfills will improve on current data at 
small landfills where installation of weighbridges is not economically feasible at 
present. Additional data on the composition of domestic garbage could be gathered by 
a series of regional waste and recycling audits. (Appendix 9, para. 9)  
A consultant’s report to the WAC extends the data collection problem to transfer stations by 
remarking: 
...many transfer stations do not record data at all or do not collect data on recovered 
material. (Blue Environment 2014, p. 33)  
With regard to the flow of waste data between the LGAs and the Tasmanian government, it is 
noted that Kingborough Council commits to a partnership agreement between the state and 
local government which should serve to strengthen the accountability relationship between 
the two levels of government: 
…… [show] commitment to the Statewide [sic] Partnership Agreement on 
Communication and Consultation with the State Government. (Appendix 9, para. 3)  
Agreement between individual LGAs and the state government will not necessarily improve 
on waste data and waste data collection systems if such information is to be reported upon 
collectively. The SWSA suggests that such an approach should be focused on building the 
capacity of regional networks to collectively collect and publicly report on waste data; for 
example: 
Information-sharing networks which build waste/recovery knowledge and capacity 
within member councils….. (Appendix 9, para. 8)  
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The provision of waste data to facilitate national reporting thus presents itself as an 
institutional collective action dilemma between all the actors in the SWSA network, which 
may require a changed approach from historical command-and-control governance structures 
(Bertelli & Smith 2010; Feiock 2013; Girth 2014; Girth et al. 2012). The SWSA observes 
that the network relationships resulting from inter-local waste contracting and cooperation 
present new governance challenges by remarking:  
….. dissatisfaction with SWSA in its current operational guise…. deficiencies in the 
current strategic plan and delivery against planned objectives. (Appendix 9, para. 4)  
Moll & Hoque (2008) suggest that the development of new information-sharing networks 
may result in a lack of clear responsibilities and poor internal communication flow. They 
suggest the introduction of a service-level agreement as a communication device to clearly 
identify roles and responsibilities when new organisational structures are adopted in the 
public sector (Moll & Hoque 2008).   
In considering all of the above, the most critical aspects to improving communication in the 
SWSA network appear to revolve around poor recordkeeping and a lack of waste data 
collection tools. The adequacy of the partnership agreement in supporting waste data 
collection and reporting is explored by including the following questions in the interview 
protocol: 
Interview Question 8: Has the Partnership Agreement on Communication and 
Consultation with the State Government improved the collection and public 
reporting of waste data in your organisation? 
Interview Question 9: Has the Partnership Agreement on Communication and 
Consultation with the State Government lead to an improvement in regional 
data collection systems such as weighbridges and waste audits? 
6.2.4 Contract management 
Due to the incomplete nature of all contracts and the risk of opportunistic behaviour by the 
contracting agent, contractual governance requires that the right agent for the specific 
circumstances should be selected in such a manner that the agent can still be disciplined in a 
long-term contractual situation (Bertelli & Smith 2010; Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2010; 
Hart & Moore 1988; Jensen & Meckling 1976).  
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The LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction generally do enter into formal contracts for waste 
management services. For example, Clarence City Council, Derwent Valley Council, 
Glamorgan Spring Bay Council, Kingborough Council and Tasman Council make reference 
to waste management contracts, as follows:  
Implement new 7 year contract, enter into contracts, Administer external contracts, 
Manage relevant leases and contracts and Manage refuse services in accordance with 
contracted requirements (Appendix 10, para. 1, 3, 10, 12 & 13) 
Kingborough Council remarks that formal contract management functions are required to 
support outsourcing initiatives: 
Compile a contract register to ensure a more streamlined approach to contract 
management across the organisation. (Appendix 10, para. 12) 
Public services which require highly specified assets are normally governed by longer-term, 
more relational contracts (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2006; Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 
2007; Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2008; Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2010; Williamson 
1979, 1981, 1987, 1993). These contracts are often based on trust, reciprocity and joint 
involvement in developing and implementing the contract by envisaging a long-term 
relationship at the outset (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2006; Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 
2007; Heiskanen, Newman & Eklin 2008; McIvor 2008; McIvor et al. 2009; Vagadia 2012).  
Contracts entered into by the LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction are of a longer-term nature, 
with especially waste disposal agreements favoured to be 20 years. For example, the SWSA 
remarks that; 
Discussions with the Copping authority indicated that they have a number of long 
term (20 year) contracts with users (especially councils and waste management 
contractors)’ and ‘Waste from the kerbside garbage collection and transfer station 
skips is deposited at Copping landfill under a 20 year contract (expiring in 2020). 
(Appendix 10, para. 6 & 7)  
A Derwent Valley Council observation provides evidence that relational and collaborative 
outsourcing specific to waste management services is contemplated between actors in the 
SWSA jurisdiction:  
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Arrange a long-term waste disposal and waste transfer system for the municipality in 
conjunction with other southern councils. (Appendix 10, para. 2)  
The base rates in ‘commercially attractive’ waste disposal contracts are 
…..only reviewed every 10 years. (Appendix 10, para. 5 & 7)  
Collection of accurate waste data requires weighbridges and waste audits, and with these 
techniques being expensive, if the contract does not allow for regular renegotiation, it may 
not be possible to negotiate contract amendments to facilitate new and improved data 
collection techniques (Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis 2006). The following interview question is 
included in the protocol: 
Interview Question 10: In contrasting external contracts for kerbside waste 
collection and waste recycling with those of waste disposal to landfill; what are 
the major constraints with regard to managing and monitoring the collection of 
waste data in terms of the contracted requirements? 
6.2.5 Monitoring and managing relationships 
Verner & Abdullah (2012) and Dekker, Sakaguchi & Kawai (2013) argue that the risk of 
failed outsourcing is reduced by combining formal contract management techniques with a 
relational approach through monitoring and managing of supplier relationships. Combining 
formal contract techniques with a relational approach allows managers of LGAs to demand 
information either by means of enforcing contract stipulations or by demanding such 
information through trust in the relationship (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2007; Das & Teng 
2001). Different approaches can be followed at different times, depending on the strength of 
trust in the accountability relationship (Huber et al. 2013). Whether to rely on relational or 
formal contracting depends on both the nature of the relationship and the nature and extent of 
sanctions the principal wants to enforce at a specific moment in time (Girth 2014; Poppo & 
Zenger 2002). 
In addition to formal contracting as determined in the previous section, LGAs in the SWSA 
jurisdiction also engage in relational contracting or integrate a relational approach in their 
contracting. For example, Hobart City Council, Kingborough Council and Tasman Council 
remark as follows:  
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Provide representation on regional waste authority [sic] Management Committees and 
Board;  
Actively participate in the Southern Tasmanian Councils Authority and support the 
development and implementation of regional strategies; and  
Continue to be an active participant in the Southern Waste Management [sic] 
Authority. (Appendix 11, para. 1, 4 & 9)  
The STCA (Southern Tasmanian Councils Authority), a regional network with the same 
member councils as SWSA except for Hobart City Council, provides a range of facilitation 
services to its member councils. The LGAT, which represents a number of councils across 
Tasmania, has taken a number of policy positions on aspects regarding waste management 
practices on behalf of its members. These policy positions appear to be overlapped and 
conflicted. For example, contrast pronouncements on landfill requirements between SWSA 
(sustainability objective of reduction of waste disposed at landfill) with the LGAT (cost 
considerations resulting in resistance to improved landfill standards) and STCA (enhanced 
service delivery through improved infrastructure and environmental performance): 
SWSA…… provide the most cost effective management and facilitation of municipal 
waste minimisation programs, waste stream control and performance 
monitoring…..infrastructure developments, implementation of the landfill 
development strategy……; 
LGAT…… state government should provide adequate resources for waste 
management…..supports the removal of regulatory barriers to sustainable recycling 
favours phased implementation of improved standards of landfill management….;  
and  
STCA outlines its priorities as…..improved physical infrastructure….. enhanced 
economic development…..improved environmental performance…. improved inter-
regional cooperation. (Blue Environment 2011, pp. 2, 9 & 12)  
Strong resistance against improved standards of landfill management may detract from 
improved data collection techniques, such as the introduction of waste audits and 
weighbridges. The question thus arises if the collaborative outsourcing practices, which 
appear to satisfy the waste public policy prescripts of establishment of ‘multi-agency 
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management arrangements’ and ‘active partnerships’ between governments (EPHC 2010a, p. 
9), have improved on waste data collection and collection systems. The following interview 
question is included in the protocol: 
Interview Question 11: Have or will (your perception) your organisations’ 
involvement with the SWSA, SWS, STCA and LGAT regional networks result in 
improved waste data collection systems?  
It is also apparent that LGAs contemplate a spectrum of involvement with regional networks. 
Some LGAs refer to ‘participate’ or ‘cooperate’, others refer to ‘actively participate’, whilst 
others ‘lead’ or ‘facilitate’ in these networks (Appendix 11, para. 1–10). It could be 
conceived that different levels of participation in these structures may well lead to different 
views on accountability for regional waste data; for example, a leading role in the LGAT may 
imply an active lack of support for new or improved data collection techniques due to their 
advocacy for a phased approach to more stringent landfill regulation.  
Different levels of participation exist for different regional management networks, which may 
lead to tensions between networks and actors within a network (Bertelli & Smith 2010; Carr 
& Hawkins 2013). For example, compare Hobart City Council’s observation, 
Work in conjunction with the STCA and SWSA in regard to the development of 
waste management structures within Tasmania,  
with a remark by the SWSA, 
 …..there were seen to be some advantages for incorporation of waste under the 
umbrella of the STCA. (Appendix 11, para. 2 & 6)  
The question arises if the relationships between actors across different networks are 
constrained by the overlapping and contrasting objectives of the various networks (Lester & 
Reckhow 2013). Glamorgan Spring Bay Council observes in this regard that 
Geography separates our communities, and in the past we have tended to be inward 
looking and parochial in our attitude to one another. Progress will only come if these 
past divisions can be broken down….. (Glamorgan Spring Bay Council 2013b, p. 14) 
Divisions can be broken down by engaging in face-to-face forums to resolve conflicts, with 
the use of neutral facilitators improving the flow of information by assisting in resolving 
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tensions between partners in collaborative network settings (Feiock 2013; Huber et al. 2013; 
LeRoux, Brandenburger & Pandey 2010; LeRoux & Carr 2010; Rai et al. 2012). Support for 
such facilitation service can be found in the SWSA remarking that ‘a process for addressing 
disputes and providing mediation’ should be included in its future charter of corporate 
governance (Blue Environment 2011, p. 67).  
Improved relational contracting in the SWSA may be critical to the improvement of waste 
data collection and data collection systems: ‘There are also issues of negotiation and 
consensus around the re-structure necessary to align the governance arrangements’ (Blue 
Environment 2014, p. 33). The following interview question regarding the governance of 
relationships is therefore included: 
Interview Question 12: How can the monitoring and managing of regional 
relationships regarding the supply of waste data for the purposes of national 
reporting be formalised and improved? 
6.3 Summary 
The governance dimensions of goal congruence, communication and knowledge sharing, 
contract management and monitoring and management of relationships are possible 
mechanisms to LGAs for responding to the accountability expectations of the Australian 
federal government with regard to waste data collection systems. These areas are researched 
in the interview protocol. 
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Chapter 7: Interviews: Data analysis and results 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the interviews that were undertaken with participants in the SWSA 
waste management network. The interview questions were developed from an analysis of the 
corporate plans of the LGAs within the SWSA waste management network. The case study 
embraces current and past member councils of the SWSA waste management network (12 in 
total) and their waste management service providers as well as selected community and other 
public service representatives.  
An analysis of the responses related to each interview question follows. The responses of the 
LGA managers are contrasted with those of the managers of their waste service providers, 
community leaders and the state government manager (Charmaz 2006).  
7.2 The three-yearly national waste report – data collection 
The Australian federal government expects state governments to be accountable for the 
improvement of waste data (EPHC 2010a, p. 19). The federal government suggests that the 
state governments discharge their accountability obligations by engaging in outsourcing 
initiatives such as ‘multi-agency management arrangements’ and ‘active partnerships’ (EPHC 
2010a, p. 9).  
The Tasmanian Waste Strategy in turn directs Tasmanian LGAs amongst a range of 
stakeholders to ‘Participate in and support national data collection systems…..’ 
(Environmental Protection Authority 2009, p. 15). LGAs are also directed to ‘develop and 
deliver Action Plans as appropriate for their area of responsibility in order to effectively 
achieve the objectives of Strategy’ (Environmental Protection Authority 2009, p. 6).  
The local regional waste data collection system ‘participates’ in the national data collection 
system which may be considered to be a ‘value chain information management’ system 
(Burritt 2012, p.  392). Waste data flow in the SWSA jurisdiction is poor and inadequate 
(Appendix 9), indicating that the outsourcing practices of LGAs do not meet the 
accountability expectations of the federal government. In considering the scope and nature of 
this problem, in line with this study’s theoretical approach (Feiock 2013), the concern 
whether managers of LGAs and their waste service providers have a clear understanding of 
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their role related to the collection of national waste data (Burritt. & Schaltegger 2012) is 
addressed by interview question 1:  
In compiling the three-yearly national waste report what is your organisation’s 
role in the collection of waste data? 
Interestingly, responses are varied and do not necessarily address the primary concern giving 
rise to the interview question; for example:  
…..the term three-yearly national waste report, to be fair and honest, I have not heard 
of where it's going to be used (Interviewee 5), and 
I've not even read it so it can't be that important (Interviewee 12). 
The fact that the latter interviewee considered the report as unimportant whilst the former 
showed a lack of awareness of the relevance of the report suggests shortcomings in the 
communication of the federal government’s intent. Communication is considered the most 
fundamental process to establish and maintain working agency relationships, thereby 
strengthening accountability (Bigdeli, Kamal & de Cesare 2013; Christ & Burritt 2013; 
Wüllenweber et al. 2008). If the federal government does not clearly explain the reasoning 
behind waste data collection, it impinges on the ability of the LGAs to meet accountability 
expectations (Reid 2012). 
Expectations of accountability in the public sector are based on the agents’ acceptance of 
responsibility, explaining and justifying their actions whilst taking responsibility for the 
outcomes (Barton 2006). A number of LGA managers indicated that reporting of waste data 
to higher levels of government is primarily in response to Tasmanian legislative requirements 
and other regulatory compliance demands, such as EPA legislation, rather than meeting the 
federal government’s expectations; for example:  
No, we're not particularly concerned about the federal government, if you like. Our 
main concern is satisfying the EPA…..we don't really care about that reporting to 
government; we care about that for our own internal purposes….. It’s really EPA 
requirements. Whatever they want us to submit it in, whatever format, we will do that. 
(Interviewee 11) 
Our organization just collects waste data as part of its annual reporting to the EPA. 
(Interviewee 5) 
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The above responses support the findings of earlier studies that Australian LGA managers’ 
views on accountability are to a large extent driven by regulatory prescripts (Kloot 2001; 
Kloot & Martin 2001). Managers of LGAs see their role in the collection of waste data as 
being closely aligned to legislative requirements. This view is reinforced by a manager 
remarking that a move to an outsourced service delivery environment reduces their 
responsibility for collection of waste data: 
In terms of our data, we [will] have few obligations once our landfill closes to report 
because our permit will be varied to show that we are no longer an operating 
landfill…... So data collection will be someone else's issue…..in terms of regulatory 
requirements for data, we will have limited requirements. (Interviewee 9) 
This observation suggests that an outsourcing environment may not necessarily improve 
waste data collection but just shift the responsibility to someone else. The outsourcing 
arrangements complicate the collection of waste data due to an increased number of dynamic 
relationships between multiple principles and agents, as discussed earlier in this thesis 
(Calabro & Torchia 2011; Heinrich, Lynn & Milward 2010). 
In line with the earlier responses from the LGA managers, some of the managers of waste 
service providers clearly state that they report to the Tasmanian authorities in terms of 
regulatory prescripts; for example:  
We report our data to the Tasmanian EPA. We're required to report annually, but we 
report monthly. (Interviewee 7) 
A manager of a service provider also showed a lack of awareness of the relevance of the 
three-yearly national report, reinforcing the notion that communication from the federal 
government with regard to its accountability expectations to all role players in the national 
waste data collection system is lacking: 
 I don't know anything about the three-yearly annual report. (Interviewee 7)  
In contrast with the views of managers of LGAs and their service providers, the Tasmanian 
government manager viewed the collection of national waste data as an ‘active partnership’ 
(EPHC 2010a, p. 9) between state and local government rather than a demand for waste data 
based on regulatory prescription: 
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So what our role is basically, we have a [sic] – we work with the councils to compile 
their data, which then becomes the Tasmanian profile of waste data that goes up to the 
Commonwealth for our contribution to the National Waste Report. (Interviewee 8) 
An analysis of the data suggests that local government managers and managers of their 
service providers do not share the same view as the state government manager with regard to 
responsibility for waste data reporting to the federal government. The Tasmanian state 
government manager’s reference to ‘their data’ supports the argument that the responsibility 
for providing waste data for national reporting remains that of LGAs, thus establishing an 
accountability relationship between LGAs and the federal government. In contrast, the LGA 
managers clearly state that they only collect waste data for internal purposes and to report to 
the EPA. 
The LGA managers subscribe to an accountability relationship based on minimum legal 
requirements (Bebbington & Gray 1993) to the EPA rather than a moral obligation or some 
other grounds (Gray 2005) to the federal government, whilst the state manager seems to 
suggest that the Tasmanian state and local governments stand in a partner accountability 
relationship (Albrecht et al. 2014) with the Australian federal government. 
Similar to the earlier observations of some LGA managers, the representative of a community 
interest group also calls into question if the supply of waste data for national reporting 
purposes is serving any meaningful purpose:  
…..so the data collection should be actually pushing for what it's supposed to do, and 
that is to show that there is more compliance with the waste strategy – the national 
waste strategy – which is more recycling but, of course, the data shows there isn't. So, 
in that respect, data collection, and actually the feedback from that data collection 
back down the chain should be pushing for better waste management, but it doesn't. 
Data being pushed up is not doing anything at the moment. (Interviewee 4) 
The federal government does not adequately communicate its express accountability 
expectations to agencies responsible for the supply of waste data and the benefits of 
supplying such data, thus preventing managers of the state government, LGAs and their 
service providers from clearly understanding their role in collecting waste data for the 
purposes of the three-yearly waste report (Burritt & Schaltegger 2012; Reid 2012; 
Wüllenweber et al. 2008). 
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7.3 The three-yearly national waste report – data collection systems 
In addition to supplying waste data, the federal government also expects state governments to 
improve regional data collection systems to facilitate the three-yearly national ‘current and 
future trends waste and resource recovery report’ (EPHC 2010a, p. 19). 
Similar to the demand for waste data, the Tasmanian Waste Strategy in turn directs 
Tasmanian LGAs amongst a range of stakeholders to ‘…support national data collection 
system…..’ (Environmental Protection Authority 2009, p. 15). Inadequate waste data flow 
(Appendix 9) may be the consequence of outsourcing practices of LGAs detracting from 
improvement in the national data collection system rather than enhancing it.  
The concern whether actors in the SWSA jurisdiction have a clear understanding of their role 
of ‘supporting’ or improving the regional waste data collection system is addressed through 
interview question 2: 
In compiling the three-yearly national waste report what is your organisation’s 
role in the improvement of regional waste data collection systems? 
In contrast with the responses in interview question 1, a number of managers reflected on 
active involvement with the improvement of the regional collection system, suggesting the 
acceptance of responsibility (Barton 2006) for this domain of accountability (Lindberg 2013); 
for example:  
Well, we worked really closely with the State Government back in '06, '07 to develop 
a reporting tool, which the State Government adopted and it's still on their website. 
(Interviewee 9) 
I actually helped set up that spreadsheet for the EPA, and just [sic] to try and get 
apples with apples across councils and facilities….. So that was an attempt to try and 
standardise the waste classifications, if you like. (Interviewee 11)  
Most of our activity has in fact been involved in trying to build and maintain support 
within local government for reform of the regional waste arrangements. (Interviewee 
1)  
An analysis of the data supports an argument that managers of LGAs and their waste service 
providers are indeed willing to accept responsibility and accountability (Gray 2005) for 
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improving the regional ‘value chain information management’ system (Burritt 2012, p. 392) 
through collaboration and partner actions (Bertelli & Smith 2010; Kluvers & Tippett 2010) as 
contemplated by the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan (EPHC 2010a, p. 9) and 
The Tasmanian Waste Strategy (Environmental Protection Authority 2009, pp. 3 & 9). 
Worthy of consideration by policy makers is the observation of Interviewee 5 that past 
improvement of regional collection systems was the result of the need for improved internal 
management accounting systems. This observation supports the recommendations of an 
earlier Australian study that waste management accounting systems of LGAs can be used as a 
foundation to improve on public environmental reporting systems (Qian & Burritt 2009; Qian, 
Burritt & Monroe 2011): 
…..we just tried to improve our own numbers because the numbers were very 
important for us….. So the waste data was as important to us as [the] EPA... But yeah, 
I will say that we contributed for the regional betterment [sic] of data collection. 
Some managers of waste service providers clearly state that they are not responsible for the 
improvement of regional collection systems, thus suggesting that the accountability 
expectations of the federal government that waste data collection systems are somehow 
naturally improved by outsourcing initiatives such as ‘multi-agency management 
arrangements’ and ‘active partnerships’ (EPHC 2010a, p. 9) is naïve. Stronger support is 
found for the notion that managers of LGA service providers primarily respond to minimum 
legal requirements in accountability relationships with the Tasmanian government 
(Bebbington & Gray 1993); for example:  
To my knowledge, we don't actively get out there to do that. (Interviewee 10)  
…..we don't have any direct contract with the Federal Government. We have a 
contract in effect with the State Government via the EPA and our permit, which says 
what type of data we're required to provide. (Interviewee 7) 
Support for the McIvor (2008) commercial outsourcing management framework being able to 
meet the outsourcing expectations of the federal government is found in the observations of a 
manager who argued that through outsourcing regional waste data collection systems, 
economies of scale can be achieved (Williamson 1979) and expertise can be obtained 
(Niskanen 1971, 1972). In line with the McIvor (2008) outsourcing framework, the manager 
suggested that the underlying causes of poor performance and how these processes link with 
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other processes in the SWSA jurisdiction should be understood prior to embarking on the 
federal government’s outsourcing suggestions: 
So every council is investing their own money in their investments but if you get 
these singular [sic] companies who are competent, they can do all of it together. So it 
becomes easier but then I still feel they need to first of all gather data because 
government – again [needs] to know what's happening. (Interviewee 6) 
It is interesting to note that environmental interest groups believe they have an important role 
to play in improving regional waste data collection systems and even without formal public 
participation processes, inadvertently contribute to meeting the accountability expectations of 
the federal government (Benn & Jones 2009; Brown & Benn 2009; Lloyd-Smith 2009) 
through applying community pressure in demanding waste data; for example:  
Very few people had really taken up the gauntlet of looking at waste management in 
Tasmania as a whole and trying to understand the state of play….. with [name 
withheld] getting on board and looking at waste management overall, and the local 
community group pushing hard, I think there has actually been finally [sic] some 
people starting to look at what's happening. (Interviewee 3) 
The Tasmanian state manager commented on the lack of communication from the federal 
government constraining the improvement of regional waste data collection, supporting a 
similar interpretation reached in interview question 1. The state government manager’s 
observations suggest that a lack of guidance from the federal government constrains the 
Tasmanian government’s efforts to supply national waste data.  This is especially apparent in 
aspects of defining and categorisation of waste.  For example:  
…..the way we classify waste is different. The way we define waste is different. So 
what that means for the Commonwealth Government…..they first of all have to 
develop a knowledge base of what it is that person's saying, or that jurisdiction's 
saying,  
……because there have been changes in the structure of senior officials groups at a 
Commonwealth level, with the change of government, they changed the structure of 
those [working] groups. And most of those – a lot of the work that was been done 
ceased. (Interviewee 8) 
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The actors in the network are willing to accept responsibility and accountability (Barton 2006) 
and that the natural development of individual environmental management systems should be 
considered when contemplating regional waste data collection systems (Qian & Burritt 2009; 
Qian, Burritt & Monroe 2011). It also appears as if a stronger legal mandate is required as to 
how these systems must be improved (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2006). Improved 
communication from the federal government to lower levels of government is again 
highlighted as an area that requires attention (Bigdeli, Kamal & de Cesare 2013; Reid 2012). 
7.4 The demand for waste data – guidance by the Tasmanian government 
The Tasmanian Waste Strategy directs Tasmanian LGAs to ‘Participate in and support 
national data collection systems…..’ (Environmental Protection Authority 2009, p. 15) and to 
‘develop and deliver Action Plans as appropriate for their area of responsibility in order to 
effectively achieve the objectives of the Strategy’ (Environmental Protection Authority 2009, 
p. 6).  
The outsourcing practices of LGAs may affect how such action plans are developed and 
delivered, which in turn may impact whether the accountability expectations of the federal 
government are met. In this regard, a consultant’s report to the Tasmanian WAC suggested 
that the state government’s guidance related to the above directives is lacking in Tasmania 
(Blue Environment 2014, p. 32). Interview question 3 addresses the concern that guidance by 
the Tasmanian government is not adequate to establish a clear accountability relationship 
(Lindberg 2013) between LGAs and their service providers on the one hand and the 
Tasmanian government on the other: 
With respect to national reporting is the demand for waste data adequately 
guided by the Tasmanian government?  
Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke (2010) argue that where a principal and agent’s objectives are 
not fully aligned, based on the theory of incomplete contracting (Hart & Moore 1999), parties 
to the agency relationship naturally migrate to an antagonistic, lose-lose situation unless they 
negotiate an amendment to the agreement. In this instance, the quality of waste data suffers if 
LGAs and service providers do not have a clear picture of what is acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour (Lindberg 2013). The responses of the LGA managers strongly 
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suggest that they do not have a clear picture of what is acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviour required to establish an accountability relationship; for example:  
A hard question, in the [time frame withheld] years I have been here, we haven't been 
given directions one way or the other to change. The only one I can think of is the 
inert waste….. Then we have got [sic] guidance in the past about some controlled 
wastes. (Interviewee 5)  
Yes and no. I mean, they're getting better at it. The past decade or so there's been a 
fair bit of inaction, I guess, by the EPA in relation to waste and guidelines…. I think 
waste data and waste classifications is one of their priority areas to look at and 
improve. I don't know that they've done an awful lot about actually making it happen. 
(Interviewee 11) 
I don't think so. No, I think the state government takes a very low-key 
approach ……State government doesn't seem to be in that area at all 
[sic], ……maybe it's lower down on their priority list. (Interviewee 12) 
This view is supported by the manager of a waste service provider:  
No, it could be better….. It's fairly non-prescriptive, if you like. (Interviewee 10) 
Managers of LGAs and their service providers evidently perceive the demand for waste data 
to be incomplete (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2010) and migrate to an accountability 
relationship based on providing the minimum data legally required (Bebbington & Gray 1993; 
Hart & Moore 1999). 
This interpretation is supported by Interviewee 6 arguing, as a self-interested agent in a 
classic principal-agency relationship (Jensen & Meckling 1976), that the data are available 
and that it is up to the state government to offer incentives (Miller 2005) to extract the data 
necessary for their purposes:  
I wouldn't say it's not guided …as the local government needs the data. They need the 
data and it’s up to the state government to use what there is to get the best and 
accurate [data].  
This information asymmetry between principal and agent is the result of an incomplete 
contract, with resulting moral hazard to the agent (Hart & Moore 1999), which leads to an 
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accountability relationship based on minimum legal requirements (Bebbington & Gray 1993). 
This detracts from high-quality waste data. An observation by the manager of a waste service 
provider that they are unsure of how to categorise certain types of waste lends support to this 
interpretation:  
I do know that the categories that we report to the EPA - they're a bit vague in 
guidance [sic] as to which category which type of waste belongs in. And we've had a 
bit of confusion about what's commercial and industrial. (Interviewee 7)  
The councillor argued that current waste policies are not adequately guided due to a lack of 
resources committed by the Tasmanian government in implementing the National Waste 
Policy:  
There are these aspirational values which are committed, but there's a huge policy 
disconnect in actually seeing that at [a] very [sic] localised level, how do we actually 
promote this? What we doing to facilitate some of these initiatives? ..... Victoria's 
invested a lot of money in their systems, and there's no other way to do it. You can't 
just do it on goodwill and hoping [sic] for a windfall somewhere along the way. 
(Interviewee 2) 
From the above data, it may be argued that the lack of resources committed by the Tasmanian 
government equates to a lack of incentives for the agents to reduce the information 
asymmetry with their principals, which can be interpreted to result in an antagonistic 
accountability relationship based on minimum legal requirements (Bebbington & Gray 1993; 
Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2010; Miller 2005); for example: 
We report to the national authorities as required. We don't over-report I suppose you 
could say. It's only as required as [sic] and when directed. (Interviewee 10) 
Miller (2015) explains that where a principal experiences moral hazard, such as unpopular 
closures of US military bases, an attractive option is to avoid such moral hazard by delegating 
responsibilities to lower levels of government. The lack of guidance with regard to waste data 
may be explained by the Tasmanian legislature not considering waste management as a 
priority (Interviewee 11; Interviewee 12) to avoid decisions being viewed unfavourably by 
the electorate.  
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Support for the argument that the Tasmanian government is delegating its responsibility for 
waste data collection to lower levels of government and their agents to avoid accountability 
to the electorate is found in the observations of the representative of a large environmental 
interest group:  
No. In fact everything to do with the waste management sector in Tasmania lacks 
government oversight. Basically as a sector and as a responsibility, it's been hand-
balled to municipal governance [sic] and to councils, and I believe this is one of the 
things that really needs to change to help reform the Tasmanian waste management 
sector …….is for government at the state level to become more involved. 
(Interviewee 3)  
The representative of a localised environmental group supported views of other participants 
that the Tasmanian government’s perceived lack of guidance with regard to the collection of 
waste data is the result of the lack of prioritisation of all aspects of waste management:  
I think from the little bit that I saw with reporting to the federal 
government ……through the reports on waste management, it was more or less 
nothing happening…… Because I think probably [sic] state government doesn't see it 
as a priority. Absolutely not, and they've obviously got their hands full with lots of 
other things, and I think until there's a push one way or the other through the data 
collection showing that Tasmania is falling further and further behind other states 
with waste management, it's just going to be more of the same, yeah. (Interviewee 4) 
The Tasmanian state manager argued that from a managerial perspective, the demand for 
waste data is adequately prescribed by the relevant waste regulations but conceded that some 
uncertainty exists as to how certain construction & demolition (C&D) wastes should be 
categorised. The manager’s observation that recently improved communication structures 
address the concerns of actors in the regional waste management network lends support to the 
earlier argument that communication is a critical element of governing a strong accountability 
relationship:  
Waste data is required under Environment Protection Notices, and we have classed 
how we expect it to be presented, but what we do is have ongoing conversations with 
the regional authorities and the big landfills – where there are questions. And so we 
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reconstituted a waste data working group recently, to just chase up clean fill [category 
of waste] in particular, and chasing some numbers around that.  
The state government manager contrasts managerial accountability (Ball & Bebbington 2008; 
Ball, Broadbent & Moore 2002) with accountability through the traditional convention of 
democratic oversights of parliaments by arguing that the relevant minister should be held 
accountable for implementing and reporting on policy implementation (Gains & Stoker 2009). 
The manager holds the view that a perceived lack of guidance may be the result of inadequate 
legislation defining categories of waste and also a lack of political drive by remarking:  
It's not from a legislative perspective…… so that is relying on a minister saying, 
‘Green light time. Let's just do this thing.’ So we haven't got that at this stage. But 
then what would happen then is there would be formulas, mechanisms, governance 
structures legislated. At the very least, a lot of that might end up in a policy, but even 
things like defining waste, defining what is a leviable waste and what is a non-
leviable waste is really, really significant because a number of people will look at 
what they can get away with. 
Lindberg (2013) concludes that an accountability relationship cannot be evaluated if there is 
no clear picture of what is acceptable and what is unacceptable. A perceived lack of guidance 
in relation to waste data collection for public reporting purposes may be closely linked to 
political and legislative shortcomings, thus lending support for the argument that the relevant 
state minister should ultimately be held accountable for implementing and reporting on 
federal policy implementation (Gains & Stoker 2009).   
As discussed in earlier chapters, Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke (2006) found that legal 
mandates that emanate from the legal architecture frames a specific public service delivery, 
which in turn determines the boundaries within which public managers can operate. If risk-
adverse public managers and managers of their waste service providers perceive the laws and 
regulations that govern their organisational and service delivery environment to be lacking or 
outdated, they are unlikely to meet the expectations of higher levels of government since their 
roles and responsibilities are not clear (Miller 2005; Verner & Abdullah 2012).  
7.5 Enforcement of existing regulations for the supply of waste data 
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Reference is made in an LGA corporate plan that waste regulations are not always enforced 
in the region and that legal requirements are not uniformly applied (Appendix 11, para. 8). 
Lindberg (2013) holds the opinion that accountability relationships can only exist if 
principals are willing and able to sanction agents. 
The theoretical framework (Feiock 2013) suggests that the scope and nature of the problem 
resulting in poor regional waste data should firstly be ascertained before policy response 
preferences and mechanisms available to LGAs, such as outsourcing practices, are considered. 
Interview question 4 addresses the concern that a lack of sanction of non-compliance with 
waste regulations by the Tasmanian government (principal) negatively impacts on LGAs and 
their service providers’ (agents) willingness to supply waste data (Lindberg 2013): 
 Are existing regulations in respect of the supply of waste data adequately 
enforced?  
Interviewee 5 confirmed that their supply of waste data is not subjected to any form of 
verification or validation, with limited policing of the accuracy of data taking place. The 
manager suggests that because their data are correct, a relational governance approach based 
on trust (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2006) rather than a traditional command-and-control 
approach is appropriate (Bertelli & Smith 2010);  
We give the right data. So, I don't know. I wouldn't say more than that……it's not like 
an examination where they are looking for the corrections [sic]….. It's more kind of a 
trust I would say between the state government and the local government.  
Interviewee 1 held a strong contradictory view by arguing a complete lack of sanction is 
apparent, with inadequate auditing of the waste data, which would suggest that in terms of the 
Lindberg (2013) accountability model the agents cannot be held accountable for inaccurate or 
incomplete waste data:  
….the data collection is obviously awry. There's something not right there. And I 
guess the issue there is, what audit process does the EPA actually submit this data 
collection to?.....there is no consistent methodology for recording that data, so I think 
the EPA just accepts whatever data is submitted.  
Interviewee 11 also held the opinion that some facilities are not reporting waste data, 
suggesting a lack of policing of the relevant regulations. The manager again made reference 
127 
 
to the inadequate categorisation of waste, supporting earlier comments from the state 
government manager that improved political accountability must precede managerial 
accountability (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2006); 
The data collection……in the last ten years, has certainly improved from what it was. 
But there are obviously still gaps and it all boils down to me to a waste classification, 
and the fact that there probably have been some facilities that aren't even reporting, so 
we're not capturing a lot of that stuff…..there's definitely a gap between the 
estimations of waste production, and the numbers that the EPA gets back for waste 
disposal. There's a gap there.  
Interviewee 1 reflected on capacity constraints of both the EPA and smaller councils to 
effectively enforce and administer waste data regulations, suggesting that funding and 
administrative solutions warrant stronger political guidance. This indicates that strengthening 
political accountability (Gains & Stoker 2009) rather than managerial accountability (Ball, 
Broadbent & Moore 2002) should be the focus of improving the regional waste data 
collection system: 
The EPA has very limited investigative powers because of budget cuts over the last 
few years. I don't know what's happened in recent times but a couple of years ago, I 
think they had one investigator looking after all of Tasmania… this is really where the 
EPA needs to – that really is a regulatory function. You need a consistent approach 
across the state, instead of relying on councils to police [waste regulations] 
themselves. Again, it all relates to the capacity. We've got councils with total budgets 
of less than $5 million a year and staff of 20. You just simply can't expect them to buy 
in, let alone have in-house expertise. 
The general managers of waste service providers supported the above argument that policing 
of data collection by the EPA is constrained by limited resources:  
No, I don't think so. EPA went down the path of waste tracking, and abandoned the 
waste tracking process. It became too big a job for them. They were under-resourced 
and they decided not to pursue – they thought they had more important things to do in 
the regulation and the policing of some of the regulations in environmental control. I 
think rightly so, that they said, okay, you guys have got pretty good systems there. 
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We're just – we're better off auditing your system rather than trying to create one of 
our own. (Interviewee 10) 
I think they're under resourced and totally inefficient, and it's the combination of those 
two that mean that they don't want to be communicated with. And if they are, they 
want to just file it and ignore it……. Because it's all downloaded into Excel databases, 
it's fairly easy to manipulate, in the best of sense of the word manipulate not fudge the 
figures. (Interviewee 7) 
The former interviewee hinted that a systems-based approach to auditing waste data may be 
the most appropriate methodology to verify and validate waste data, whilst the latter observed 
that existing data collection tools are fairly easy to manipulate. The latter manager also 
questioned the ability and willingness of the EPA to communicate with agencies responsible 
for supplying waste data, thus negatively impacting on the accountability relationship. These 
observations lend support to the earlier argument that the regional data collection system 
should be automated and integrated across agencies with built-in controls communicated to 
agencies to prevent duplication and manipulation of source data. 
The councillor from a small LGA draws attention to the fact that some waste regulations that 
may affect waste data are not adequately policed in small councils, which may be interpreted 
that unlike larger councils the waste data from smaller and rural LGAs are inaccurate and 
incomplete:  
…..for a number of small councils; they're very happy with the EPA that doesn't do 
much. And I know that for a fact from officers of [names withheld]. And look, we've 
got problems in our council. I'll give you an example; green wastes – huge volumes of 
green waste are brought into some of our waste transfer stations…..it is waste. It must 
be treated accordingly. But what happens is - somebody puts a match to it. Now every 
time that happens, that's a breach if it [sic] doesn't have approval of the EPA for the 
simple reason that you can't burn waste. It's against the law. You need a permit to do 
it. (Interviewee 2) 
The representative of a Tasmanian environmental interest group echoed the views of other 
participants that waste streams are not adequately audited, citing inadequate resourcing of the 
EPA and inadequate political guidance through the WAC:  
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I believe that there are a lot of particular waste streams in Tasmania that are not 
especially well-audited. Such things as [sic] tyres, construction and demolition and 
material, these sorts of things…… it was definitely their clear expression to me was 
[sic] that they didn't have the resourcing to enact that legislation [controlled waste]. 
Now whilst there is a specific branch within the EPA that deals with waste 
management, I would suspects it is deeply under resourced. Even the figures that the 
EPA supplies to national authorities appear to be largely speculative in many 
instances. So they're really just relying on, if you like the gate data in specific landfills, 
and it's not actually often correlating with, for instance projected generated waste 
from specific waste generators . So there is a lot that could be done. The Waste 
Advisory Council seems to be a very poorly run bunch in the whole waste 
management setup. (Interviewee 3) 
The state manager is of the opinion that the weighbridge-driven collection facilities are 
adequately overseen but confirmed that smaller councils do not always conform to existing 
waste regulations related to waste data:  
In the south, you've got [names withheld]. All weighbridged based now…… The 
bigger councils are fine because for them, with their weighbridges – it’s essentially 
entered, it's done. Send it in an email. It's not more than – work that they'd be doing 
for their own annual reporting anyway. And for the councils that have other councils 
as clients, they are billing them all the time anyway, so they know where their wastes 
are coming from. So for the bigger councils, we've not had problems, but with the 
smaller councils, it is, because the personnel change – turnover quite significantly in 
the engineering areas of smaller councils. A lot of the data is collected by consultants 
on behalf of the councils, so it's pretty low on the pecking order. They're the ones we 
have a – [problem with]. (Interviewee 8) 
Analysis of the data suggests that the EPA may be under-resourced with regard to the 
auditing of waste streams and enforcement of existing waste regulations as it pertains to 
waste data collection. As accountability is mostly framed in legal terms (Bebbington et al. 
2007) and the minimum duty of accountability is that of compliance with the law and 
reporting on the extent of compliance (Bebbington & Gray 1993), some improvement in the 
regulatory oversight function will improve the accountability relationships between local 
government and their service providers on the one hand and the Tasmanian state government 
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on the other (Gains & Stoker 2009; Lindberg 2013; Miller 2005). This in turn will contribute 
to meeting the Australian federal government’s expectation of improved regional waste data 
and data collection systems.  
7.6 Government’s expectation for waste data collection systems to improve 
In aiming to meet the strategic objectives of the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan, 
the Tasmanian Waste Strategy directs the WAC to give guidance as to how regional waste 
data collection systems should be improved (Environmental Protection Authority 2009, p. 18). 
An analysis of data from the corporate reports suggests that at least some LGAs in the 
regional network are anticipating guidance in this regard; for example: 
……Monitor the progress of the Waste Advisory Committee (WAC), and its Local 
Government Representative(s), when put in place. (Appendix 11, para. 2)  
Question 5 addresses the concern that the absence of clear guidance from the WAC detracts 
from a sufficiently clear domain of account-giving (Lindberg 2013; Miller 2005) for the 
purposes of establishing an accountability relationship: 
To what extent must your organisation’s waste data collection system improve to 
meet the state government’s expectations?  
Two LGA managers support the argument that they accept responsibility in principle, 
whether directly or indirectly, for the improvement of waste data collection systems (Barton 
2006). They responded in a reactive rather than a proactive fashion, lending support for the 
argument that the preference is given to account for improving on data collection systems 
based on legal minimum requirements (Bebbington & Gray 1993). 
The first LGA manager appeared very certain about what is required to improve their 
individual data collection systems by remarking:  
We definitely need improvement. But what I do know is the scale of improvement 
needed depends on what the demand is……I don't believe we need to change the 
system completely, overhaul, little tweaking of small, small things may be the 
solution to improvement. (Interviewee 5) 
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In contrast, the second manager was more uncertain, showing a preference for a regional 
structure to take responsibility for the improvement of the regional data collection systems 
through collective action (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2010; Delabbio & Zeemering 2013; 
Feiock 2013) by commenting:  
So the whole idea of all the data collection and so forth….., should be one of those 
ones that's considered by that more regional type body [sic] as compared to individual 
councils. (Interviewee 12) 
In responding to the question, a number of participants chose to focus on capacity constraints 
to supply waste data rather than the perceived lack of clarity about exactly how waste data 
collection systems should be improved. The improvement of waste classifications and 
communication across departments and jurisdictions were again highlighted as problematic: 
for example: 
I think we've suffered traditionally from different government authorities classifying 
waste in different ways. So the Department of Environment federally, the EPA here, 
the Office of Climate Change, for example, Department of Agriculture, Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, all have their own ways of classifying things, and they all ring up 
on a different day, and they all want the same thing within a week…… we know how 
to actually do it. But that's probably the most frustrating thing that we need to deal 
with. (Interviewee 9)  
A few managers again drew attention to the importance of effective waste data collection 
tools to improve waste data collection systems. For example, the first respondent below drew 
attention to weighbridges and software as being a prerequisite to improving waste data 
collection systems, while the second respondent remarked that the software should be 
integrated across agencies and jurisdictions: 
People still don't have weighbridges. I would say that was the first step towards 
improvement. [The] Next step is the software itself. Now we use a system called 
[name withheld]…..specifically for waste companies so some of the other councils 
and clients use it….. (Interviewee 5) 
But most people, I think, are running the same software these days. I think that's an 
important factor. It would make sense if everyone was using the same sort of software, 
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and it had the same capabilities, and also the same waste categories, and things like 
that. (Interviewee 11) 
In addition to improved waste categorisation and automated systems, staff training and 
departmental restructuring are also considered areas where improvements can be made; for 
example:  
But every site in this day and age should have the relevant capability. If the federal 
comes in and says, ‘You need to report like this,’ it should be as simple as just 
changing all your stuff, and away you go, and being able to do it. Probably a bit of 
[sic] training sessions for your operators to appropriately identify what the waste 
classification changes are…... in days gone by it would just be a tip operator who 
would go down and sit in the toll booth and man it. But it creates a whole range of 
issues, incorrect classifications and similarly if they're not trained in customer service 
or they're not trained in cash handling. (Interviewee 11) 
Interviewee 5 cautioned that all improvements are subject to cost considerations (Williamson 
1979), lending support for the argument that the principal/agent relationship will remain 
constrained if no incentives are negotiated by the regulatory authorities (principal) with the 
waste data providers (agents) (Hart & Moore 1999; Jensen & Meckling 1976):  
We'll have to put more staff, but I doubt if that will happen because these days, it is 
about business and unless it is done – I mean, I'm afraid to say it, environment or 
safety and things like that, they're all priorities. But they're all, at the end of the day, 
counted with dollars. 
In contrasting the views of managers of LGAs with those of the managers of their service 
providers, Interviewee 7, a manager of a waste service provider, observed that no need for 
improvement of collection systems is considered necessary as none was demanded by the 
regulatory authorities, strengthening the argument that suppliers of waste data consider 
themselves to be accountable based on minimum legal requirements:  
No, they haven't said that they're not happy with the data we give them. 
In line with the responses of most LGA managers, Interviewee 6, the senior manager of a 
service provider, chose to comment on constraints in improving waste data collection systems. 
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The manager commented that additional expertise is required regarding contract management 
and management of the new generation of consolidated transfer stations:  
Knowledge of multiple contracts or a giant transfer station [will be of assistance].  
Interviewee 10, the general manager of a service provider, echoed the sentiments of other 
interviewees in earlier responses that the seamless integration of automated waste data 
collection systems designed to prevent duplication of data capturing would be a major 
improvement:  
It'd be much easier if we were working with a format the same as [sic] the 
Government was working with, and that's not always the case. That would be an 
improvement, and I think we've got – we track everything that we do, so I don't think 
there's any – there's always room for improvement. That's obviously how we do it, 
and the ease with which we can extract it, but I don't think we need to improve on the 
actual diligence of tracking, if you like. It's just the tools you might use. 
The manager argued that a networking approach will offer major benefits to improving the 
regional waste data collection (Feiock 2013). The observation that leaders in the SWSA 
network should reach out to other less-connected actors in the network supports the findings 
of local government networking studies in the US (Delabbio & Zeemering 2013; Minkoff 
2013):  
I guess we've got a limited impact as to what we can influence. However, that being 
said, we're one of the major facilities in southern Tasmania and pretty much just to act 
as a leader I guess, and as an information source for anyone wanting to look at a new 
weighbridge software or recording software, they can come and see what we do. 
(Interviewee 10) 
The councillor and representative of an environmental interest group observed that fellow 
councillors and officers of small LGAs are not necessarily interested in any aspect of waste 
data or even functional aspects of waste management, suggesting that no accountability 
relationship exists because no acceptance of responsibility is apparent (Barton 2006; 
Lindberg 2013). The waste data asymmetry especially between small, rural councils and the 
regulatory authorities will therefore remain until such time as a more complete contract is 
negotiated (Hart & Moore 1999; Miller 2005) through improved communication between the 
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regulatory authorities and councils (Bigdeli, Kamal & de Cesare 2013; Christ & Burritt 2013; 
Rai et al. 2012; Reid 2012; Wüllenweber et al. 2008):  
If you asked one of my colleagues regarding the municipal waste program, most of 
them wouldn't know anything about it. They'd know where the waste transfer stations 
were, but as far as the workflow and as far as where the stuff actually ends up, I don't 
think they're aware of any views [on the council waste program]. They probably 
wouldn't necessarily be aware that data is collected. This is just sadly recognition of 
the fact that it's a really low issue on anybody's concerns…… Council staff is aware 
of their obligations, but it's just that they don't take the EPA or the environmental 
permits seriously. They've always burnt green waste so why is it a problem? And if 
there are a few car tyres in the middle of it, ah, who cares? (Interviewee 2) 
There are counsellors that are not particularly interested…..in what's happening with 
waste management on our council. (Interviewee 4) 
The state government manager again highlighted the categorisation issues regarding C&D 
wastes which require attention. The manager also echoed the sentiments of other participants, 
both in the public and private sector, that an IT-based approach to the integration of waste 
data will strengthen regional waste collection systems by avoiding double-handling and the 
possible duplication of waste data: 
There are some problems with estimating what is coming out of the transfer station 
that is C&I and what is MSW. That's a problem, and there are some conversations that 
we need to have around that….. I think the single most important improvement we 
could get would be software programs within the weighbridges that had a 
standardised EPA report, that we saw signed off on, that with the data that went in, 
with minimised handling - the number of times someone inputs the data. So ideally, 
the toll booth operator's entry is the final entry, and the only entry that occurred, and 
everything else was done by the software program so we're just basically printing 
reports with us not doing any data entry. That would be the big change. (Interviewee 8)  
An analysis of the data above does not suggest that participants are uncertain how to improve 
data collection systems. The domain of account-giving appears to be sufficiently clear 
(Lindberg 2013; Miller 2005) to establish an accountability relationship. Some participants 
reflected on the fact that improvements will be affected as a reactive regulatory response as 
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and when required (Kloot & Martin 2001), thus again suggesting an accountability 
relationship based on minimum legal requirements (Bebbington & Gray 1993). 
Improvements in data collection tools and waste identification processes can improve 
communication and strengthen the various accountability relationships (Bigdeli, Kamal & de 
Cesare 2013; Goliday 2012; Wüllenweber et al. 2008).  
7.7 Waste data collection and reporting as a key performance area 
In analysing the corporate plans of LGAs, no evidence could be found of LGAs having 
included improvement of waste data collection and collection systems as a specific key 
performance area in their corporate planning documents. Only two LGAs made reference to 
regulatory waste management prescripts, albeit not specifically for the purposes of complying 
with the federal government’s public reporting expectations (Appendix 2, para. 3 & 9).  
Interview question 6 addresses the concern that the actors in the network, firstly, do not 
attach operational importance to the federal government’s demand for waste data and 
improvement of data collection systems (Walker 2008), and, secondly, that they consider it 
someone else’s responsibility (Dubnick 2005) and, thirdly, that they are waiting for guidance 
from the state government (Burritt & Welch 1997): 
In compiling the 3-yearly national waste report does your organisation consider 
the collection of waste data and the improvement of waste data collection systems 
a Key Performance Area? 
In comparing the observations of LGA managers, Interviewee 1 and Interviewee 12, it is 
apparent that none considers the collection of waste data and improvement of data collection 
systems as a KPA for their respective LGAs. Interestingly, the first respondent indicated that 
it should be a KPA in future, whilst the second respondent indicated that the information 
asymmetry will remain as long as the report is not considered to be of any value. These 
observations lend support for the argument that improved communication from the federal 
government to explain the value of national waste reporting is required:  
As far as us doing anything about it, no…. And certainly in a future iteration of the 
organisation, data collection I would like to think would actually be one of those key 
functions. At the moment it's not. (Interviewee 1) 
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Probably not at the moment;-because it's not actually providing me feedback that's 
actually that useful. I've not even read it so it can't be that important. So I mean 
effectively, no.….. In other words – in summary – there's no point getting a report 
that's at a very high level, You go, ‘Oh, that's interesting.’ and throw it on the shelf 
then never to be seen again type of thing, it's got to be something that has some sort of 
guts in it or some sort of meat in there that you can actually take away and say, ‘Yeah, 
I'll do that comparison there and if I want to, then I can actually report that back to 
council via a standard benchmark.’ Something like that to say this is how we're 
travelling as compared to other people. (Interviewee 12) 
The remaining three managers all considered waste data to be important from a stakeholder 
and transaction cost perspective, with no consideration given to national reporting. The 
remaining life spans of landfills appear to be particularly important to these managers in their 
collection and reporting of waste data: for example:  
So that's the kind of community stakeholder stuff we're doing at the moment, saying, 
‘Well, look, we're doing a new waste strategy, looking at really seriously trying to 
reduce waste, and we're doing it because we're filling up our landfill. We might be 
shut in 15 years, but if we can do some really wicked stuff in the next 5, 10 years, we 
might be there for another 40 years, and delay all these costs’. (Interviewee 11)  
...even for our own KPIs [key performance indicators], we use it to say how much 
waste we received indirectly that would also feed into the accounts and to how much 
money it made in fees and charges. Then we set our fees and stuff based on that 
record…… it's always been questioned from a political level who gets questioned by 
the public who elects them. How long do we have the length [sic] in the tip? 
[Landfill]…….. The life of the landfill is very crucial…... So we need the data as 
much as we have to have to report to the EPA. (Interviewee 5)  
Waste data's critical for us running a business, particularly in terms of efficiency, also 
in terms of rehabilitation of our landfill. So if we look at our landfill, we're looking 10 
to 15 years depending on – you can make one or two decisions with landfills: you fill 
them as quick as you can, and although your costs are divided over a shorter period of 
time, the revenue's higher. But you face the reality of – like many municipalities all 
around the world – this is your last landfill. Is it better to get money short term or is it 
better to keep space long term? (Interviewee 9) 
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In comparing the responses of the managers of waste service providers with those of LGAs, it 
is apparent that the managers of waste service providers show more awareness of the need for 
collection and public reporting of waste data. In comparing the individual responses of 
managers of waste service providers, a general manager confirmed that data collection for 
national reporting purposes does play a key part in their operational decision making, with 
the second at pains to highlight that they consider statutory reporting to the Tasmanian EPA 
rather than the federal government a performance area:  
As I say [sic], we're required to report 12-monthly and three-yearly to [name withheld] 
as well, so it forms a key part of that reporting structure as well. (Interviewee 10) 
No, it's not, because we don't have any direct interaction with it. So one of our 
indicators is whether we comply with the EPA's requirement to submit our waste data, 
split up [in] the way they require it [and] within the time frame that they specify. So 
that's one of our – I wouldn't say it's a key performance indicator, but it is a 
performance indicator and it's reported on. (Interviewee 7) 
Interviewee 6 chose to comment on the importance of waste data collection and reporting for 
operational rather than public reporting purposes, suggesting that waste data collection is a 
KPA for the organisation but not for public reporting purposes:  
So, all these things, it's all coming to data. You are asking about tonnage, I'm talking 
about data for every concept of waste management. The sole reason being; how many 
bins do you have in the city? How many do you want to replace? What is its life 
expectancy? (Interviewee 6) 
The councillor echoed the sentiments of other participants by clearly indicating that improved 
national waste reporting is not a KPA for local councils. The councillor also argues strongly, 
similar to other respondents above, that waste data collection and reporting are more 
important from an internal transaction cost perspective than from a public reporting 
perspective:  
No. Look I don't think it is…. because for a lot of councils, that's neither here or there. 
That's warm and fuzzy sort of stuff. What they're looking at – what the bean counters 
really want, [the] finance officers and the general managers, are to see savings and 
better outcomes. (Interviewee 2) 
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The representative of a community-based environment interest group remarked that whilst 
they may not be able to influence data collection and collection systems, that unlike some 
other participants, they do consider the national report important to reflect on waste 
management in Tasmania. This further reinforces the argument that communication from the 
federal government regarding the purpose and importance of national waste reporting should 
be improved:  
We can't influence the collection of waste data, except maybe just to hope, in 
retrospect, that the data is collected in a way that shows how there's a deficit in waste 
management…..only by showing – by using the reports to say, ‘Look at the woeful 
way that Tasmania collects waste and doesn't recycle. Can we have a voice in that?’ 
(Interviewee 4) 
The state government manager confirmed that national waste data reporting is important but 
that it is currently not formalised in official KPAs in the relevant state departments, 
reinforcing an earlier conclusion that political accountability should precede managerial 
accountability (Gains & Stoker 2009):  
It's certainly an important area, and I believe it's a very important area. I believe it's 
one of the things that are externally judged in terms of Tasmania's recycling 
performance. So whether or not it's a performance indicator for me personally is a 
difficult question to answer….. But there's nothing written in my position that says, 
‘You've improved the data performance,’ or ‘You've increased the recycling rates.’ 
Because we don't have that governance structure with the regional waste authorities 
and councils or government policy saying; ‘we shall reach these targets of recycling 
or recovering rates or whatever they may be’. (Interviewee 8) 
The manager again reflected on how he perceived the relationships between the state 
government and local government in supplying waste data for national reporting purposes to 
be relationships between partners by remarking:  
What we've now been able to do is become very clear on the conversation we want to 
have with local government about the things we can support them on and participate 
in with them. So the waste data conversation is working quite well at a technical level. 
(Interviewee 8) 
139 
 
An analysis of the data reveals that only a waste service provider with a national footprint and 
the state government manager consider the collection of waste data and improvement of data 
collection systems for national reporting purposes to be a performance area of importance. 
The data suggest that managers of LGAs and their service providers hold clear self-interested, 
TCE views (Williamson 1979, 1993, 1999) of why they collect and report internally on waste 
data. They attach operational importance to the improvement of waste data collection systems 
which can be leveraged to improve on public reporting of waste data. This finding is similar 
to that of earlier studies (Qian & Burritt 2009; Qian, Burritt & Monroe 2011). 
From the above, it can also be argued that there is a misalignment between the federal 
government as the principal’s waste data collection expectations for public reporting 
purposes on the one hand, and LGAs and their waste service providers as agents’ self-interest 
in waste data collection on the other (Miller 2005). This detracts from developing a strong 
accountability relationship between principal and agent, which can only be resolved through 
re-negotiation and improved communication (Bigdeli, Kamal & de Cesare 2013; Brown, 
Potoski & Van Slyke 2006). 
The accountability relationship is constrained by the lack of perceived value of national waste 
reporting, which can be addressed by the federal government improving communication. This 
can be in the form of a more relevant data feedback mechanism to allow individual councils 
to benchmark their performance against national averages and against those of other actors in 
the network (Folz 2004).  
7.8 The role of a landfill-waste-disposal levy in improving waste data collection 
systems 
Waste data in the SWSA jurisdiction is omitted, duplicated or misclassified by LGAs and 
their service providers (Blue Environment 2011, pp. 28,30,31, 57–60 & 71). The apparent 
improvement required of data collection and reporting systems in the region is constrained by 
a lack of resources experienced by actors in the waste network (Blue Environment 2014, p. 
31; Interviewee 1 ; Interviewee 3 ; Interviewee 7 ; Interviewee 10). Blue Environment (2014 
& 2011) suggests that the introduction of a regulated waste disposal levy may alleviate such 
resource constraints and recommended it, but cautioned that revenue generated from the 
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introduction of waste disposal levies may not necessarily be solely applied by the state 
government pursuing waste reduction and related strategic objectives. 
Interview question 7 addresses the concern that high-powered incentives will not necessarily 
be applied to motivate agents (Jensen & Stonecash 2005) to improve waste data collection 
systems. These include improvement in governance of structures arising from active 
partnerships and collaboration as contemplated by the National Waste Policy Implementation 
Plan (EPHC 2010a, p. 9) and the Tasmanian Waste Strategy (Environmental Protection 
Authority 2009, pp. 3 & 9); 
To what extent will the introduction of a waste disposal landfill levy assist you to 
overcome constraints in your waste data collection system? 
Financial incentives designed to strengthen accountability relationships in local government 
networks improve the governance and functioning of such networks (Doberstein 2013a; 
Miller 2005). Interviewees 1 and 12 supported this view by observing that the introduction of 
a mandatory waste levy is desirable and that it will alleviate existing funding constraints, thus 
improving the waste data collection systems. The respondents qualify their opinions, with the 
former arguing that the introduction of such a levy should be done through stakeholder 
engagement to ensure buy-in from actors in the larger Tasmanian waste network and the 
second respondent cautioning that the levy should be substantial enough to allow for 
adequate funding: 
Why doesn't every waste transfer station or facility have a weighbridge? Now, that's 
something which, if you're looking to collect data, that's-- but again, there's no money 
to invest in this infrastructure ….. as far as one of the benefits that a mandated waste 
levy could mean, is that we've got resources to apply to getting a consistent data 
collection…… the state government, at the moment, doesn't actually have any flesh in 
the game. They don't actually provide any money to local government regarding 
waste management, but if they provide the regulatory framework for a mandated 
waste levy, and ……that local government would agree, would consent to a mandated 
waste levy – and industry, as well, agrees with it, on the basis that it's 100% 
hypothecated to waste management. Now, that's a pretty big ask. No other jurisdiction 
does that. (Interviewee 1) 
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Well, there is one at regional level at the moment, and it hasn't improved data 
collection. It is a very small levy [but] if there was a regional or state levy that was a 
much higher amount, and generated significant income to go around every site and 
upgrade their software, or pay for a person to go around and teach people stuff – you 
know, this is what this waste should be, this and that, and we want you to call it this, 
and a six-month project, or something like that, for someone to do that – yes, I think it 
would improve the waste data around the region. But it would need to be significant 
enough to effect significant change. But it hasn't been demonstrated particularly well 
in the past. (Interviewee 11) 
Interviewee 12 confirmed the Blue Environment (2014 & 2011) observations that LGAs are 
concerned about how funds will be applied that are generated from the introduction of such a 
levy and that the introduction of the levy per se will not necessarily improve the ability of 
regional waste networks to improve their data collection systems: 
It depends on what they use it for, that's the issue with this. A landfill levy is a good 
idea because it gives you that working fund if you like, to do a number of different 
things so you look at things more closely from a regional perspective. If part of that is 
to actually say, ‘Well okay, let's get some meaningful data that we can actually use 
and we'll use that meaningful data to look at things like education programs and a 
number of other things like that.’ then I think it's useful. 
Access to funding from the proceeds of such a levy will not necessarily become available to 
meet all the waste management strategic objectives of the federal government on an equal 
footing. Interviewee 9, for example, again confirmed a TCE approach with regard to 
constrained landfill space and argued that funding should be prioritised to meet objectives 
designed to alleviate short-term landfill constraints: 
Yes. Yes. Absolutely – And we would certainly be putting our hand up, I think. I 
think all big councils would certainly be seeking to use that levy money to improve 
our waste diversion, particularly for us that have short-term landfill solutions, any 
opportunity to use that levy funding on projects that develop alternatives to disposal, 
we would be certainly be chasing up. I think all councils will be. 
The prioritisation of funding of short-term waste disposal solutions may result in actors in the 
network competing for funding on an unequal footing. This is borne out by a manager 
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observing somewhat cynically that it may not be the most deserving projects that eventually 
get access to grant funding; 
I wouldn't say my council or any one council should get all the money, or we 
shouldn't be writing grant letters and things like that. Which if it is administered that 
way, you won't be giving money to the best project – you are giving money to the best 
grant applicant……having dealt with local government application of grants and stuff, 
which we kept missing out on many grants [sic] and we wondered why, and the 
reason is simple….. grant writing is a specialist art, I was told, which has apparently 
degrees to back it up and we have degrees for every damn thing now, but the reality 
is…… a noble [idea] type [sic] of improving waste management through a levy, kind 
of get compromised. (Interviewee 5) 
From the above, it becomes apparent that the managers of LGAs are apprehensive whether a 
mandated landfill levy will generate sufficient funding, and they also question whether they 
will have access to such funding to improve their waste data collection systems. The 
managers of waste service providers mostly echo the views of LGA managers and deem it 
unlikely that such a levy will allow them to improve their waste data collection systems: for 
example: 
The levy itself, I don't know whether that would improve the systems. Legislation 
needs to be consistent throughout the State, which it isn't at the moment….. I don't 
think it would affect or assist, because I don't think there'd be any monetary return 
relating to systems. (Interviewee 10) 
Because the Landfill Levy won't – if there ever is one, which it's a bit odd that there 
isn't, seeing that everybody agrees that it would be a good idea – the Levy is not going 
to be used, as far as I'm aware, on that sort of project. It could be if somebody puts 
forward a project, but it's more a voluntary thing. My understanding is some of it will 
go to the EPA to do some of the administration of the Levy, but other than that, it will 
be a project-by-project basis, and it's not designed to go to any particular [name of 
service industry withheld], so I don't see it helping us particularly. It's more likely it 
would help the waste-management industry in the state overall, and that may roll 
down to us being asked to provide some additional information. (Interviewee 7) 
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A substantial portion of such a levy will be directed to strengthen the EPA’s internal capacity. 
Interviewee 6 expanded on the observations above that the introduction of the levy may result 
in an increase of inappropriate disposal, especially C&D wastes, to avoid payment of the levy. 
The manager was of the opinion this will require increase policing: 
When the levy comes that's when the policy and enforcement will happen…… The 
current voluntary levy does not include concrete, but when a levy comes for all waste, 
it can also include concrete. …..So in that case they have to police us vigorously to 
make sure people are not dodging, or not counting.  
From the above, the strengthening of waste data collection systems is not considered a 
priority area for LGAs and their service providers. As such, the limited funding that may 
become available through the introduction of a mandated waste disposal levy is likely to be 
applied elsewhere in what they consider to be more pressing areas of importance. This 
interpretation is supported through the lack of reference by the councillor of a small rural 
LGA to aspects of data collection systems when offering examples of pressing waste 
management issues: 
Absolutely – Yeah, we've got big problems regarding unregulated landfills. The old 
farm rubbish dump which was still being used and a lot of nasties [are] going into 
them. We've got issues with dumps of chemical drums on properties. …. Car tyres, 
which were big legacy issue[s]…… So, yes, if the resources are settled, we'll certainly 
gain some benefit….. One of the big challenges, particularly in rural Tasmania is that 
there's not a huge capacity within the community to pay any more money. 
(Interviewee 2) 
In contrasting the views of community leaders with those of other interviewees, the 
representative of a Tasmanian environmental interest group offered a more optimistic view 
by arguing that the introduction of the levy will display leadership in waste management by 
the Tasmanian state government, suggesting again that political accountability is a 
prerequisite to managerial accountability (Gains & Stoker 2009; Grant & Fisher 2011): 
But I think that the role the government has to play there is, as I say, is to set the 
regulatory environment which encourages that innovation. A waste levy is a perfect 
way to start doing that. It is probably one of the most critical tenants now. 
(Interviewee 3) 
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The representative of a local community group agreed with the above community leader’s 
views on political accountability but supported the views of other participants that funding 
should be prioritised for operational issues rather than accountability aspects: 
Federal government should now be making sure that the state governments are 
coming into line, and that they're all giving incentives now, and that's mostly with 
levies, imposing waste management levies to make sure there's incentives there for 
businesses who develop waste to make it part of their business to control that waste. 
(Interviewee 4)  
The Tasmanian state manager interestingly confirmed the observations of other participants 
that a substantial portion of funding collected through the introduction of such a levy will be 
allocated to regulatory oversight bodies. The manager confirmed that funding constraints 
such as staff availability will be alleviated. The manager reiterated earlier views that political 
accountability must precede managerial accountability by commenting that WAC must 
consider funding models as a precursor to the introduction of the levy. The manager is of the 
opinion that Tasmanian LGAs are largely supportive of the introduction of a waste disposal 
levy: 
Assuming how that money is provided and how much of it. You know one, two staff 
[could be employed] ….. It would be a rare arrangement where a proportion of those 
funds from 10% to 50% didn't go to an EPA… the Waste Advisory Committee…. the 
first thing it was required to do was to put together some funding models. And you 
really can't do much without that. And then the rest of what it's done really has been 
then to try and justify why the levy is an important beast, and how that might look, 
and how that might be spent. Now, local government's supported that right across the 
board. I think of the 29 councils, 26 have supported it through their general meetings 
with community members. (Interviewee 8) 
An analysis of the data suggests that although all participants agreed that an introduction of a 
waste disposal levy will benefit the Tasmanian waste management industry in general, a 
number of participants saw limited scope in accessing funds to benefit their organisations’ 
waste data collection systems.  
The funds generated by the introduction of such a levy would to a large extent be applied to 
administer and police the levy itself. The remainder is likely to be subjected to a process of 
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advocacy (Henry & Dietz 2012) through grant applications which would mostly benefit urban 
councils suffering waste disposal constraints rather than those who wish to improve their 
waste data collection systems or indeed rural councils.  
The financial implications of regulated landfill levies for principals and agents in waste 
management networks are under-studied, with little guidance available from the scholarly 
literature (Simões & Marques 2012). 
7.9 The Partnership Agreement on Communication and Consultation with the state 
government: The collection and public reporting of waste data 
The development of new information sharing networks may result in a lack of clear 
responsibilities and poor communication flows (Albrecht et al. 2014; Bãlan & Radu 2012; 
Goliday 2012; Lee, I, Feiock & Lee 2012). This study’s theoretical framework suggests that 
in responding to policy interventions by higher levels of government, appropriate 
mechanisms available to LGAs should be considered (Feiock 2013). Service-level 
agreements, as an example of such a mechanism available to LGAs, may serve as a device to 
clearly identify roles and responsibilities of actors in regional waste networks, which in turn 
may improve communication (Moll & Hoque 2008; Reid 2012).  
Per example, Kingborough Council entered into a partnership agreement with the state 
government, the purpose of which is to improve communication and strengthen the 
accountability relationship between the two levels of government (Appendix 9, para. 3). 
Interview question 8 addresses the concern that the partnership agreement may not be 
effective in supporting waste data collection and reporting by LGAs to the state government. 
Has the Partnership Agreement on Communication and Consultation with the 
State Government improved the collection and public reporting of waste data in 
your organisation? 
The LGA managers surprisingly appeared largely unaware of the existence of such an 
agreement; for example: 
Now, as far as any communication agreement with the state government, I'm 
completely unaware of it. (Interviewee 1) 
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Not really. My relationship on waste data with the state system has always been a 
one-by-one, except when we're developing or refining, when we come together with 
the regional groups. (Interviewee 9) 
I couldn't tell you. I don't know. I've not done any work in that space. (Interviewee 11) 
Another manager added that as a communication tool it served no purpose with regard to the 
communication of waste data between local and state government: 
…..but the fact that I've never even heard of it before – and I think, ‘Well, it's not that 
great a communication tool in that case.’ And I think quite often people put it on their 
website as to say, ‘Yeah okay, we'll put that on there.’ and it's almost like a bit of a 
motherhood statement but nothing really actually happens out [sic] the other end. I 
suspect that [this] one might fit into that ball-court. I could be wrong, there could be 
someone here that gets a lot of value out of it but I haven't heard of it. (Interviewee 12) 
In contrasting the views of the waste service provider managers, a similar response was 
offered by a manager who is also unfamiliar with the agreement: 
 I'm not familiar with that partnership agreement. (Interviewee 7) 
The remaining managers chose to respond on the nature of a service agreement as an 
effective communication device. Interestingly, the managers showed a preference for 
regulation as a formal communication tool rather than service-level agreements; for example: 
…..directly go to enforcement. Have a good system. Have a good permit in place and 
say every month you have to supply [waste data] or we will have to charge [sic] you. 
(Interviewee 6) 
From a personal perspective, I think it [communication between LGAs and the state 
government] needs to be more formalized, and clearer, so there's a certain regulation 
there, if you like. (Interviewee 10) 
The councillor remarked that for such an agreement to serve a meaningful purpose, the 
relationship must be clear and the service must be considered important, suggesting that 
supplying waste data is not considered important or that the roles and responsibilities for the 
supply of waste data by LGAs are not entirely clear: 
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Look – and a lot of those agreements, they capture a range of informal arrangements. 
But also – there are some specific roles where there is a role, such as an emergency 
management. Yes, look – there are some very important functions where there's a 
quite clear relationship between local government, [and] state government. 
(Interviewee 2) 
The community leaders and Tasmanian state government manager did not respond to this 
question. 
The partnership agreement on communication and consultation with the state government 
cannot be considered an effective communication device to clearly identify roles and 
responsibilities with regard to the supply of waste data by LGAs for public reporting 
purposes (Moll & Hoque 2008).  
An analysis of the data form this interview question, as well as data from earlier responses in 
this chapter, would indicate that whilst the state government perceives the communication of 
waste data from LGAs to be based on partnership processes (Rai et al. 2012), managers of 
LGAs and their service providers in contrast show a preference for communication and 
accountability based on compliance with regulations (Bebbington & Gray 1993).  
7.10 The Partnership Agreement on Communication and Consultation with the state 
government: Improving regional waste data collection systems 
The development of new information-sharing networks may result in a lack of clear 
responsibilities and poor communication flows (Albrecht et al. 2014; Bãlan & Radu 2012; 
Goliday 2012; Lee, I, Feiock & Lee 2012). The introduction of service-level agreements as a 
communication device to clearly identify roles and responsibilities of actors in regional waste 
networks may improve communication (Moll & Hoque 2008; Reid 2012).  
Per example, Kingborough Council entered into a partnership agreement with the state 
government, the purpose of which is to improve communication and strengthen the 
accountability relationship between the two levels of government (Appendix 9, para. 3). 
Interview question 9 addresses the concern that the partnership agreement may not be 
effective in support of improving waste data collection systems of agents in the SWSA 
jurisdiction. 
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Has the Partnership Agreement on Communication and Consultation with the 
State Government led to an improvement in regional data collection systems 
such as weighbridges and waste audits? 
The responses from LGAs managers are varied. Earlier observations regarding a lack of 
political will and constrained resources are reiterated by Interviewee 1, who argues that these 
constraints limit the effectiveness of agreements between the state and local government: 
Very few of those partnership agreement actions actually eventuate. Because when it 
came down to the individual – for instance, in our case there was an undertaking that 
the state government would support a public safety committee being formed in my 
municipal area, and it never happened because the local police district simply didn't 
have the resources to do it…..unless people can see a purpose for it, how's this 
actually going to help us and what's it going to do? But the current government has 
really moved away from these partnership agreements. I haven't heard anything about 
them being reviewed or refreshed. 
There must be a very specific purpose or reason for such an agreement. Interviewee 9 sees a 
specific future use for the agreement in the ambit of developing an IT systems approach to 
waste data collection. Data collection should be systems-driven according to Interviewee 9, 
who remarked that the agreement may have some future application in support of developing 
data collection systems: 
So somehow, we have an agreement both at a state and federal level about where that 
data can be mined. It's placed into a system and it's mined, and however you wish to 
mine it, you mine it, but we don't have to do anything from our end; it's in agreed 
form as we put it into the system. 
Interestingly, Interviewee 5 chose to comment on the lack of cooperation between the 12 
councils in the SWSA jurisdiction as a factor limiting communication and consultation. The 
manager perceives the lack of cooperation as a far more important issue than the 
effectiveness of the service-level agreement. This observation supports findings from other 
studies that policy makers underestimate the extent of competition between LGAs, even in 
the same jurisdictions (Lee, I, Feiock & Lee 2012; Minkoff 2013), which often negates the 
benefits intended by the drafting of regional agreements: 
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I wouldn't say communication or consultation is compromised [by the lack of an 
effective agreement], it's more like [constrained by a] lack of cooperation between the 
twelve Councils and what they want to do together. 
In contrasting the observations of the LGA managers with the managers of their service 
providers, Interviewee 7 observed that an agreement or similar communication protocol 
between waste service providers and the state government may potentially improve 
communication with regard to the improvement of data collection systems: 
We do have trouble communicating with the EPA… So from that point of view, I 
would like to see a protocol so that we can get some two-way communication 
happening, because at the moment, it's a black hole. 
The councillor observed that the service-level agreements outlined LGAs’ obligations in 
general terms, without funding provided by the state government to support these obligations. 
This observation supports earlier findings that the incentives and guidance of higher levels 
designed to improve communication are inadequate: 
The big problem was that partnership agreements were full of stuff local government 
was expected to provide, but there is nothing on the state government side of the 
ledger. What we've said is, look, we want some dollars in those columns because we'll 
provide that if you can help us provide it. They're looking at getting something for 
nothing. 
The senior state government manager and community leaders did not respond to the question. 
While the existing partnership agreement has not improved data collection systems, a few 
participants pointed out that it may have some future communicative benefit to strengthen 
accountability relationships (Rai et al. 2012). In contrasting the responses to interview 
questions 8 and 9, participants prefer a regulatory communicative model (Bebbington & Gray 
1993) with regard to the supply of waste data for national reporting purposes. Service-level 
agreements may have a limited role to play in bolstering communication with regard to the 
improvement of especially IT driven waste data collection systems. 
7.11 The role of contract management and monitoring in the collection of waste data 
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The Australian federal government expects state governments to be accountable for the 
improvement of waste data (EPHC 2010a, p. 19). The federal government suggests that the 
state governments discharge their accountability obligations by engaging in outsourcing 
initiatives such as ‘multi-agency management arrangements’ and ‘active partnerships’ (EPHC 
2010a, p. 9).  
Such management arrangements and partnerships necessarily entail the drafting of contracts. 
Contracts entered into by the actors in the SWSA jurisdiction are of a longer-term nature, 
especially with waste disposal agreements favoured to be 20 years (Appendix 10, para. 6 & 
7). Collection of accurate waste data requires weighbridges and waste audits, and with these 
techniques being expensive, if the contract does not allow for regular renegotiation, it may 
not be possible to negotiate contract amendments to facilitate new and improved data 
collection techniques (Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis 2006).  
Question 10 addresses the concern that the accountability expectation of the federal 
government for more and improved waste data is constrained by inadequate monitoring and 
management of contracts between LGAs and their service providers: 
In contrasting external contracts for kerbside waste collection and waste 
recycling with those of waste disposal to landfill, what are the major constraints 
with regard to managing and monitoring the collection of waste data in terms of 
the contracted requirements? 
Only one manager specifically answered the question by admitting that the contractual 
stipulation for waste data is lacking in current contracts and that the LGA is constrained by 
the length of the contract: 
If I look at our waste contracts, I think that's got some stuff in there that just shouldn't 
be in there and stuff that should be in there, that's not in there so it's got it's issues but 
it's tied up with another –it'll be another two or three years before the opportunity 
exists to change that again…… There's no clause in there about waste data 
whatsoever. There's other stuff about the type of machinery and things like that but 
nothing about the actual waste data. (Interviewee 12)  
The LGA managers are mostly concerned with contract management and monitoring issues 
that may impact indirectly rather than directly on the demand for waste data; for example, 
strategic managerial issues related to TCE issues (Williamson 1976, 1979, 1981, 1987, 1993, 
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1999) and trust in reputable suppliers (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2007; Das & Teng 2001; 
Lamothe, M & Lamothe 2012) are raised by LGA managers; 
There's also the issue of strategic approaches to these issues. The councils that are 
relatively wealthy and produce quite larger volumes of waste really dominate the 
market, in the sense that any other recycler or any other contractor, in order for them 
to be viable, they really need a couple of those big contracts. (Interviewee 1) 
The first issue would be depending on the contract with [name withheld] in terms of 
whether or not they have differential pricing for various waste types. If they had a 
single price for all waste, then everything's dependent upon us to classify [wastes] at 
our waste transfer station. (Interviewee 9) 
Yeah exactly, we can [demand waste data] and it's in terms of the contract. Mind you, 
like with a good contract, sometimes it's hard as [a] contract may be perfectly fine but 
you might end up with a very bad contractor. But then you get a very good contractor 
who has all the good systems, and say for a company like [name withheld] ……and 
they have their reputation, and so they have good systems…… we never had any 
issues getting data. (Interviewee 5) 
I suppose it also comes back to your contract management and type of contractors you 
actually get as well. So for example, you can get good contractors and bad contractors. 
Now you can write in your contract that you're required to actually get all this data 
back or whatever, but then you've got to enforce it and that can be hard sometimes 
because bearing in mind, a lot of contracts – whether you like it or not – tend to be 
heavily swayed towards price as well. (Interviewee 12) 
No manager specifically differentiated between different types of waste contracts having 
different monitoring and management requirements and capacity constraints to monitoring, 
and management of contracts is not considered a major issue by managers: for example: 
So look, to me it is all in how you write your contracts, and how well your contracts 
are reviewed by councillors, or if you're using a consultant to write your contract, how 
good their knowledge is and how much they much they know [what] your 
requirements are for reporting. I honestly think it's as simple as if it's written in the 
contract that the contractor needs to report back to Council in this manner, in this 
frequency, in this type, in this format, then that should be job done…..we spell out the 
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reporting requirements very clearly in there, and it's quite a decent section in most of 
our contracts about reporting requirements, either to us or to other organisations - 
usually back to us…..we have a contracts unit…..if they [other LGAs] don't have their 
in-house unit or experience…..there are plenty of people out there that will 
superintend contracts for you and manage contracts for you. (Interviewee 11) 
In accordance with the outsourcing management literature discussed earlier in this thesis, the 
managers of waste service providers are in agreement that a strong written contract with clear 
stipulations regarding the demand for waste data is essential for proper monitoring and 
management of those demands (Das & Teng 2001; Kakabadse & Kakabadse 2003; Lacity, 
Hirschheim & Willcocks 1994; Vagadia 2012); for example: 
So it is the duty of the local government when they give out contracts to make sure 
that they got [sic] to report ……. You've got to give the monthly tonnage by the first 
ten days of the month – very crystal clear. Again, yes we will have lapses here and 
there but that's all – like very minimal. And look, when selecting the contract, you've 
got to do a little bit of homework. (Interviewee 6) 
And that's where the councils have to be careful with the way they word their 
contracts, so they've got to get the data and also potentially and preferably have the 
right to go and audit the data so that they know that it's correct. So you've got the two 
arms. You've got to be able to get the data and be satisfied as to its quality. 
(Interviewee 7) 
We can adequately service, and probably have the capability to service beyond 
requirement….. We would've taken into account when we were tendering for that 
process – the requirements of data collection. So there's a cost, but we could 
adequately provide what they want…..and they probably need to be a little bit more 
specific in their contracts with what the requirement is for data provision….. It all 
depends on the ability of the transfer station to segregate waste. If the waste 
segregation is done properly then our systems can pick it up okay…..and [then] there's 
probably no need for a weighbridge per se there. But it all goes back to the written 
document then as well. (Interviewee 10) 
Small and rural LGAs may be affected by internal resource constraints, resulting in 
outsourcing initiatives, with small contractors not always able to supply waste data for 
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national reporting purposes (Bel & Fageda 2011; Qian, Burritt & Monroe 2011). The 
councillor of a small rural council confirmed that they engage in outsourcing practices. The 
councillor also makes reference to the limited availability of a contractor, suggesting this 
constrains the council to supply adequate waste data 
We are a small council. [Contractor name withheld] works two days a week…… part 
of his responsibility is to record that information…..We get our information from 
[name withheld] because all of our waste going to landfill, goes to [name withheld]. 
(Interviewee 2). 
Further support for the findings of the above studies can be found in the councillor’s arguing 
that cost constraints in small and rural councils’ impact on the quality of waste data: 
What it costs – and this is another huge issue. Each year it's just becoming more and 
more expensive…..we know exactly how much goes to landfill. As far as recycling, 
we don't know how much is recycled, because our contractor can't even give away 
what he gets out of the kerbside collection.….. And the reason we went to [landfill 
name withheld] was actually because they cut their price. So we go there, not because 
we think they're particularly good, but because it's more efficient. We'll take the 
cheapest one we can get….. And if we required that level of data collection from our 
small country contractor, basically he couldn't afford it. (Interviewee 2) 
The representative of a Tasmanian environmental group took issue with the strategic aspects 
of LGAs contracting for waste disposal, which may impact on the supply of waste data as 
LGAs are locked into long-term waste-to-landfill contracts, but at the same time not wishing 
to report on their resulting poor recycling performance 
For council to ‘make money’ from the endpoint of waste disposal necessarily implies 
a landfill outcome as it is the only endpoint outcome for waste that [so] they can 
afford the capital infrastructure and potentially make a margin from [sic]. More 
advanced waste management options require capital investment from medium to large 
corporates who in turn need to be able to guarantee supply of waste volumes from 
MSW which are currently locked into landfill contracts with a council owned 
operation. In effect they are monopolising the market leading to the very poor overall 
outcomes for waste recovery in Tasmania. (Interviewee 3) 
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The representative of the community-based environmental group echoed these observations 
by arguing that commercial intent is an impediment to environmental accountability 
(Hukkinen 1995) and may well lead to a lack of transparency (Barton 2006) in waste 
contracts LGAs enter into: 
I can't see anything really that if it impacts on community through local government 
that shouldn't be open. I can understand within a small community – especially with 
controlled waste reporting….. I can't really see why there should be any ambiguity or 
any commercial in confidence, really…. that's as far as I'm concerned – yeah, they 
shouldn't have a profit motive, because I think then the profit motive becomes at all 
costs [sic], so then you get sort of shady business deals. (Interviewee 4) 
The Tasmanian senior government manager pointed out that contracting out waste disposal in 
contrast to in-house solutions creates a cost burden for LGAs. He argued that future solutions 
should be based on an integrated regional cost and service delivery perspective. This cost-
driven approach may well impact on future amalgamations and consolidations of LGAs and 
their areas of responsibility:  
Cost of disposal – because a lot of these councils ran their own landfills for nothing, 
so they didn't have a disposal problem. And all of sudden, they're paying to [names 
withheld] or wherever else, and it's chewing into 2% to 3% to 4% to 5% of their 
budget…. So they started to see a financial end cost that they hadn't seen before when 
they had their own little landfills….. And so, okay, what's the governance structure, 
what's the infrastructure that we need, do we build a transfer station at [names 
withheld] or at wherever. Not because of a boundary, but because of a time frame for 
service delivery that we think that every resident has the right to be within 15 minutes 
of a transfer station. And then it doesn't matter where it's built…... It has to be where 
it makes sense economically and technically. That's what's not happening in waste. 
(Interviewee 8) 
LGA managers and their service providers first and foremost consider a combined approach 
of selecting reputable suppliers and having strong written contracts to be essential for 
demanding high-quality waste data (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 2007; Dekker, Sakaguchi 
& Kawai 2013). The observations of Interviewee 11 suggest that it may not always be 
possible to negotiate contract amendments to facilitate new and improved data collection 
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techniques as expected by the federal government, confirming the findings of the earlier 
study (Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis 2006). 
Strong cost considerations are apparent from the data, thus supporting the notion that self-
interested TCE principles play a major part in decision making in the SWSA waste 
management network, which may impact negatively in demanding high-quality waste data 
(Hart & Moore 1999; Miller 2005)s. Interviewee 3 implies that that the commercial approach 
to contracting of waste disposal may be an impediment to reporting on recycling rates in the 
region due to underperformance against national averages (Hukkinen 1995), whilst the 
response from Interviewee 4 supports the findings of other studies that argue that the 
principles of accountability and transparency in public sector contracting should always be 
favoured against claims of confidentiality (Andon 2012; Ball 2012; Barton 2006; Brown 
2013; Kluvers & Tippett 2010; Purse 2009; Quiggin 1996; Shaoul, Stafford & Stapleton 
2012).  
7.12 The role of regional networks in improving waste data collection systems 
The STCA, a regional network with a historical membership identical to that of the SWSA,
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provides a range of facilitation services to its member councils. With the LGAT, which 
represents a number of councils across Tasmania, also taking a number of policy positions on 
aspects regarding waste management practices on behalf of its members, the concern is 
expressed that these policy positions amongst the various networks appear to overlap and are 
in some instances conflicted (Blue Environment 2011, pp. 2, 9 & 12). 
Collaboration through inter-local outsourcing and outsourcing to network governance 
structures is available to LGAs to respond to policy interventions from higher levels of 
government (Carr & Hawkins 2013; Hilvert & Swindell 2013; LeRoux, Brandenburger & 
Pandey 2010). Collaborative outsourcing practices appear to satisfy the waste public policy 
prescripts of establishment of ‘multi-agency management arrangements’ and ‘active 
partnerships’ between governments (EPHC 2010a, p. 9). Interview question 11 addresses the 
concern that these outsourcing practices by LGAs have not improved on waste data collection 
and collection systems, thus negating the accountability expectations of the federal 
government. 
                                                 
27
 Hobart City Council resigned its membership in the SWSA effective from 30 June 2014 (Alderman Damon 
Thomas 2014). 
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Have or will (your perception) your organisations’ involvement with the SWSA, 
SWS, STCA and LGAT regional networks result in improved waste data 
collection systems?   
The various managers offered mixed views on whether individually the various regional 
bodies have indeed improved their waste data collection and collection systems. Individual 
actors only engage in collective action (Feiock 2013) if the benefits of such engagement 
exceed the transaction costs (Delabbio & Zeemering 2013; Williamson 1979, 1981, 1993, 
1999). For example, Interviewee 9 explained that Hobart City Council resigned from the 
SWSA due to a perception that they were not receiving adequate value for their voluntary 
levy contribution: 
From what I know that between the Hobart – and Glenorchy City Councils’ they were 
paying almost 45% of the levy and yet received two twelfths of the service. And so 
there was a general feeling that – so there was a sense within the [Hobart City] 
Council that – there was a frustration that the SWSA was not providing the level of 
service that the funds justify. 
The perceived lack of service provided by the SWSA in the past is echoed by Interviewee 12, 
who explained that the SWSA had limited impact on the improvement of waste data 
collection systems due to a lack of political support and resource constraints; 
Look, they've done a little bit. They haven't done what you would want them to 
possibly do but, if you haven't had a drive for waste being pushed down externally 
from someone else, then typically that's what will actually happen – it was only a 
couple of people effectively at SWSA that's all it was. …… there's not a drive for 
actually doing any of this sort of stuff from a waste perspective. And usually a drive 
will come down from either being mandated from a legislative point of view, or it's a 
dollar driven thing and at the moment neither of those is in place. (Interviewee 12) 
In considering the STCA as an alternative vehicle to the SWSA to facilitate the improvement 
of regional waste data collection systems, the former may provide better political 
representation and improve the advocacy positions of some councils with the state 
government. The STCA may suffer from a similar lack of resources and expertise constraints 
and may not necessarily improve waste data collection and data collection systems; for 
example: 
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I think the theory would be that STCA is a bigger organisation. It's got a higher 
profile – most people have heard of it – and it probably is better resourced staffing 
wise, and it probably has a much better connection with the Lord Mayors and the 
councillors themselves than the SWSA. So I think from that point of view, it may get 
more traction, but ……whether it will have the ability to just focus on waste might be 
the risk, whereas the current organisation should-- that's all they exist for, is to do 
waste stuff…..whereas the STCA does a lot of different things. I would imagine it 
would be better resourced and better placed to deal with it, if it had the expertise in 
that area and the want to do it. I don't think that's probably the best place for it anyway. 
(Interviewee 11) 
From the above, LGA managers appear to be very aware of their surrounding political power 
structures and which of these structures best represents their constituencies’ interests at 
higher levels of government (Keast, Mandell & Brown 2006). The above observation that 
preference for STCA as an alternative to the SWSA may be based solely on the fact that 
advocacy positions on regional waste policies of some actors in the network may improve is 
supported by a senior manager remarking: 
STCA wants to take hold of waste – but again that's a political thing. STCA is just the 
mayors which run it [sic], it's a political thing. (Interviewee 5) 
Some LGA managers argue that the consolidation of landfill services under the banner of 
SWS is advisable and should improve waste data collection systems due to an improved scale 
of economics resulting from such inter-local contracting (Bel & Fageda 2011); for example: 
I think it does because it's like anything, you've got one organization [SWS] so it only 
gets funnelled through one organization and it's easier to get all that data, it's easier 
for EPA or whoever it happens to be, to actually collect that data …… and it's easy to 
make sure you get consistency. (Interviewee 12) 
Yes. I mean, well it has to, it will be the only landfill, so it'll only be one site, the EPA 
will have only one operator to deal with. (Interviewee 11) 
In considering a possible role the LGAT can play to improve waste data collection systems in 
a larger regional context, a manager remarked rather scathingly that the LGAT has not 
contributed meaningfully to the improvement of waste data collection and collection systems: 
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No. Yeah, look, it just perhaps adds more noise, and not meaningful noise, because 
the regional waste groups have really had to drag the Local Government Association 
of Tasmania, kicking and screaming, to do anything regarding [sic] trying to 
prosecute our case for reforming regional waste arrangements. (Interviewee 1) 
In contrast, it is argued that the LGAT has played a limited role in the past, for example, to 
assist with procurement of waste assets which could be extended to data collection tools in 
future: 
LGAT just helps us in procurement of things and stuff like that. And they do give 
some good assistance when you are buying things… they have contracts in place to 
buy trucks or whatever it is – waste items. But they could include software, which 
could be valuable. (Interviewee 5) 
In contrasting the responses of the managers of waste service providers, two general 
managers offered an opinion on the involvement of the SWSA, with the former commenting 
that it has improved regional waste data collection systems marginally, whilst the latter felt 
strongly that it did not: 
I'd say that [SWSA] has improved it marginally. I wouldn't say there have been huge 
improvements and I wouldn't say there's been a huge drive to improve it, but it 
definitely has moved forward over the last ten years. (Interviewee 10) 
No. And in fact, trying to find out the data is like getting blood out of a stone. I think 
the Southern Waste Strategy Authority might be about to be abolished. (Interviewee 7) 
No opinion on whether the STCA and LGAT have improved waste data collection was 
offered by any manager of waste service providers. Interviewee 10 indicated that SWS may 
in future improve data collection due to the increased availability of weighbridges but 
hastened to add that such improvement may not eventuate if individual council systems are 
not integrated and automated: 
It [the involvement of SWS] would make it easier through weighbridge systems, that 
type of thing, should assist in the tracking. As long as everybody actually fills in their 
data – a lot of it is still very much paperwork. 
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The councillor did not offer a relevant response. The representative of the Tasmanian 
environmental interest groups remarked that the involvement of the regional structures did 
not improve the quality of waste data they are interested in; for example: 
When we go to each council and say, ‘Can you please provide data on actually how 
much hazardous waste is generated within your municipality?’ We get basically a 
response of, ‘We don't know, we don't have collection or we produce basically none.’ 
(Interviewee 3) 
The representative of the localised environmental interest group complained that the data they 
require are outdated and that operations of the regional bodies are constrained by the 
expertise of board members. Earlier concerns that corporatisation and the commercial intent 
of some of the regional structures are impediments to reducing waste disposal to landfill 
(Hukkinen 1995) were repeated: 
There are the people that are on board of [name withheld] and on the board for 
other…..on other panels. Their expertise is probably likewise – perhaps ten years old, 
and they haven't kept up what's happening overseas or in other states, and still are 
maintaining the same information that is landfill is viable….. the profit motive in the 
end drives, so I think that structure should not – I think the corporate structure doesn't, 
I really I don't think it works. (Interviewee 4) 
In contrasting the roles of SWSA and STCA, Interviewee 3 argued that the STCA is 
politically driven to advocate for a centralised landfill agenda which, in line with the 
concerns expressed in the responses to earlier interview questions, may detract from 
improved data collection and public reporting: 
SWSA at least appears to create a modicum of independence in their role as an 
authority. I think if the Southern Tasmanian Council Association was to take over that 
role – I think basically that is a political move to lock in Copping [a southern joint 
LGA regional landfill facility aka SWS] for basically all southern councils. 
The state manager is of the strong view that the SWSA did improve waste data collection and 
collection systems and positively remarked on their involvement with establishing recycling 
rates and waste classification systems: 
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Yes. Particularly early on, they modelled quite well what was in the bin, the amount 
of waste that was in the bin. So they got right down to the micro level of what was 
happening at an individual council-by-council level. They were heavily involved in 
participation rates for recycling. So, yes, they certainly did improve data 
collection…..with this being the state-wide system, essentially the SWSA created 
probably 80% to 90% of the classifications. (Interviewee 8) 
In comparing the various landfill facilities, the manager believes that the reporting of waste 
data from some facilities is better than others. The earlier theme of communication as an 
essential element of improved accountability (Christ & Burritt 2013; Reid 2012; 
Wüllenweber et al. 2008) is apparent from the manager’s response, which implies that it 
cannot be assumed that waste data collection and collection systems will automatically be 
improved by centralising landfill facilities under the banner of the SWS: 
So [name withheld] is at the forefront of data collection. And [name withheld] have 
been very good. [Name withheld] has taken while to come on board. So I would say 
it's an easier conversation. I'm not sure it would necessarily be a better conversation. 
An analysis of the data suggests that the SWSA, STCA, SWS and LGAT as voluntary 
regional authorities partially satisfied the Australian federal government’s expectation that 
‘multi-agency management arrangements’ can improve waste data collections and collection 
systems (EPHC 2010a, p. 9). 
The data support the findings in Chapter 6 that tensions between actors in the regional waste 
management networks exist, which increase the risk of defection from these structures and 
has in fact resulted in the defection of actors from these networks as the result of different 
policy positions, for example, STCA on landfill (Lester & Reckhow 2013). The actors in the 
network appear to align themselves with the regional authority best suited to advocate for 
their constituency’s immediate needs (Keast, Mandell & Brown 2006). 
The data support findings from studies that found that political reasons do play a role in 
LGAs’ outsourcing decisions (Ball, Broadbent & Moore 2002; Bel & Fageda 2007, 2009, 
2010; Bisman 2008; Hefetz, Warner & Vigoda-Gadot 2012; Kloot & Martin 2002, 2007; 
Kluvers & Tippett 2010; Warner & Hefetz 2012). 
The preference to engage with or disengage from the different waste networks is a 
consquence of immediate political and other transaction costs experienced by the self-
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interested agents in the larger SWSA jurisdiction (Feiock 2013). The data support the ICA 
framework’s contention that natural response prefences, largely based on agency theory and 
TCE, will be to reduce these transaction costs. If the self-interested costs relating to, for 
ecample, community dissatisfaction with regional waste disposal networks are higher than the 
costs of meeting the federal government’s expectations that waste data collection systems be 
improved by regional network governance strustures, these systems will not be improved by 
establishment of ‘multi-agency management arrangements’ and ‘active partnerships’ between 
governments (EPHC 2010a, p. 9).  
As a mechanism to improve future data collection systems (Feiock 2013), the data suggest 
that SWS as a single regional landfill authority may indeed improve waste data collection if 
communicative shortcomings (Goliday 2012; Wüllenweber et al. 2008) and system 
constraints can be overcome (Bigdeli, Kamal & de Cesare 2013) and if transparency concerns 
of environmental groups can be adressed (Barton 2006). 
7.13 The formalisation of regional relationships to improve the supply of waste data 
for national reporting purposes 
LGAs contemplate a spectrum of involvement with the various regional agencies in the 
SWSA jurisdiction (Appendix 11, para. 1–10). Different levels of participation may result in 
tensions between networks and actors within a network (Bertelli & Smith 2010; Carr & 
Hawkins 2013).  
The natural response of LGAs in aligning with the various networks is to limit agency and 
related transaction costs resulting from policy interventions from higher-order governments 
(Feiock 2013). Question 12, firstly, addresses the concern that these tensions may impact on 
the accountability relationships between these agencies and higher levels of government, 
which may negatively impact on LGAs ability to supply waste data and improve waste data 
collections systems, and, secondly, seeks ways to illicit suggestions for possible 
improvements in regional relationships. 
How can the monitoring and managing of regional relationships regarding the 
supply of waste data for the purposes of national reporting be formalised and 
improved? 
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Barton (2006) suggests that an essential element of an accountability relationship is the 
acceptance of responsibility by the agent to account to a principal. In the same vein, 
principals must take responsibility for guiding and sanctioning agents (Lindberg 2013; Millar 
2013; Sanger 2008).  
LGA managers chose to respond to the question by either apportioning blame or by offering 
suggestions for improvements. In comparing three LGA managers’ responses, the blame for a 
lack of acceptance of responsibility is apportioned in different degrees to various principals 
and agents. The first manager argued that the lack of political guidance is the key factor 
constraining the improvement of regional waste data collection and data collection systems. 
This view is supported by a second manager, who intimated that waste management is not 
high on the state government’s agenda but hastened to add that local councillors, as both 
principal and agent in different accountability relationships, are also partly to blame for a lack 
of interest in waste data and data collection systems. According to a third manager, the lack 
of acceptance of responsibility to account for national waste data is primarily a consequence 
of LGAs themselves not taking responsibility for the shortcomings of the existing regional 
structures: 
…..revisit what the expectations of the state government would be of the regional 
waste groups. At the moment, we don't have any ideas what their expectations are. 
The agreement, formalising regional waste groups, is about two pages long. All it says 
is that local government will form and support regional waste groups….. Or they 
might say, we'll only have one waste group for all of Tasmania, but one of the key 
functions in that organisation will be to provide this data……and as I've identified, it 
is a huge weakness. (Interviewee 1) 
Some [councillors] have an interest, some don't have an interest, so your 
communication has to be completely different to each of those and I don't think that 
works. You're better off actually saying, "Well, we've got someone like a SWSA and 
LGAT and waste on our agenda and therefore these are the things we're pushing and 
we're dealing with the state government on these issues and they're providing some 
feedback on some other stuff." And then they filter all that stuff down to all their 
various different council bodies that are actually a part of it, that's a better way of 
doing it. But I think until waste – if it does – ever [sic] get some teeth, then that's 
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going to be hard I think because I don't think even on the local agenda, it's not that 
high – so it's not rated very high. (Interviewee 12)  
I don't think the concept of regional waste management and regional waste authorities 
should be defined by what the SWSA has become. I think the need for regional 
solutions in waste still exist; it's just the councils themselves need to take 
responsibility for failing. And it's failure; it's nothing less than failure……So what's 
happened is; the Southern Waste Strategy Authority's ability to deliver has been 
hampered by its governance structure and the people it sought to employ in terms of 
delivering waste solutions. (Interviewee 9) 
From the above, multiple agents and principals in the SWSA jurisdiction do not accept 
responsibility to account for national waste data or indeed improve waste data collection 
systems which impact negatively on the accountability expectations of the federal 
government (Doberstein 2013a). Communication between the state government and actors in 
the SWSA jurisdiction with regard to the supply of waste data is perceived to be inadequate 
(Reid 2012). Communication between agents responsible for the supply of waste data is 
similarly constrained (Goliday 2012).   
In considering possible solutions offered by three LGA managers to improve the collection of 
waste data and data collection systems, the first manager considered all the regional 
structures to be able to adequately represent the various communities’ interests. The manager 
hinted at the self-interested behaviour of individual actors and groups of actors as the factor 
most constraining the effective functioning of a regional waste management network. The 
second manager observed that what is important is improvement of waste data collection for 
internal and regulatory compliance purposes rather than how regional relationships can be 
best managed, suggesting a stronger regulatory approach being required rather than 
strengthening voluntary collective structures. In a similar vein, the third manager suggested 
that waste data collection systems should rather be run by a department of the Tasmanian 
EPA by increasing the existing staff complement and removing funding constraints: 
SWSA has had a similar sort of structure [than the STCA]. STCA has a few things 
they've done then but you can't look at STCA and say, ‘They're the shining light of 
Tasmania.’ and therefore just by having that structure all of a sudden everything's 
going to be important and it'll actually happen, I don't really believe that. I think 
maybe that's [name withheld] view-point, I don't think that's the case. Having said that, 
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from a southern point of view, there's no-one else who really represents southern 
Tasmania and ideally it's probably better for everything to go to one authority rather 
than not at all……. LGAT is a little bit different because they represent all of 
Tasmania as compared to just southern Tasmania…... There is a feeling of this north 
and south sort of divide, but there's no reason why you can't have a regional body that 
looks at both of those areas. Now you could have a regional body and then you could 
have some sub-groups that are underneath [it] like a northern sub-group….. So yeah, 
you could run it through LGAT as well. (Interviewee 12) 
Irrespective of the [regional waste governance structure], waste data still has to be 
recorded. So whether it is with SWSA or becomes some other ABCD or STCA won't 
make a difference to what we are doing now – we still have to report to the EPA. But 
we have to record more precisely for our own interest [sic] because we are eight years, 
seven years now away from running out of landfill space. (Interviewee 5) 
I can think of a much better place for it [waste data collection] is with the state 
government, or an arm under the EPA……spent the rest on waste stuff, plus 
enforcement and regulation. I think that would be a much better model, and that a 
state based model everyone paid – you know, every ton of waste was charged at 20 
bucks a ton, or whatever, and it went into that fund, and there was ten million bucks 
across the state. Which would fund a decent – enough money for an office in the EPA 
with four staff, something like that, and to roll out five million bucks worth of 
projects a year. (Interviewee 11) 
The data support the findings of similar studies that observed that network governance 
systems are constrained by complex communicative interactions between actors in such 
networks, which in turn impacts negatively on accountability (Goliday 2012; Millar 2013). A 
preference is shown for stronger regulation as the most appropriate communicative tool to 
align the federal government’s accountability expectations with the collective action of 
agents in the SWSA jurisdiction (Christ & Burritt 2013; Reid 2012). 
In contrasting the responses of the managers of two waste service providers, the former 
cautioned that the number of actors in the waste network should be kept at the bare minimum, 
supporting the above suggestion that there is a limited need for a regional authority, thus 
advocating for an integrated systems approach between LGA waste service providers and the 
state and federal governments to improve waste data collection and public reporting. The 
165 
 
latter argued that LGAs should be removed from the waste management network. This would 
suggest that waste services should be outsourced to private enterprise from a regional 
authority, which process should be overseen by the state government, thereby improving the 
scale of economics: 
You need to be careful. More isn't better in lots of cases, and less can be best, if you 
like. The more entities you have to deal with, the bigger the task is. The risk you run 
of data being corrupted, if you like, through a process if you're going through 
different – or more entities with different processes. So if you can shrink that back to 
three – you've got local, State, and national – it can only be better. If you had State 
and national, it'd be even better still. But the more times you have to go to the well or 
the void the bigger the issue. I think that's where they were going with the waste 
tracking system, was to make it the one-stop-shop, if you like, that would have all the 
data. And that would be probably the best model. (Interviewee 10) 
Just remove all the waste management activities from the council – there you go. 
Have one set of common trucks, contract it out, and you will get the best price, [with] 
everything [being] uniform. State government appoints an authority and if that runs 
the waste it'll get [sic] at least [a] $10 million profit.  
The observations above lend empirical support for the suggestions by Reid (2012) that 
effective governance structures at the community level require ongoing communication 
between the various spheres of government, with empowering statutes for LGAs that avoid 
duplication and unnecessary transaction costs.  
The three community leaders chose to reflect on service delivery, transaction costs and how 
the self-interested behaviour of agents detracts from achieving desirable community 
outcomes. In comparing the responses of the three community leaders, the councillor argued 
that future programs to improve waste data collection and data collection systems will be 
conducted through a regional agency to the extent that it facilitates the saving of transaction 
costs for LGAs and the state government, whilst the representative of a Tasmanian 
environmental interest group advocated for stronger regulation rather than relying on regional 
waste agencies. The representative argued for stronger state government leadership due to the 
perception that members of regional agencies have vested interests in commercial waste 
activities. The representative of a localised environmental interest group shared the opinion 
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of other participants that alignment with regional agencies is largely driven by advocacy 
considerations: 
I think the days of one program just for one local government area are over. Very 
difficult to get funds just for unilateral projects, so co-operative measures where we 
partner with industry, community organizations and the local government build a lot 
[sic] stronger funding propositions. And that's how I'd certainly like to see it 
done…… And a big one would be if it could say - we could negotiate contracts on a 
regional basis which would deliver savings and better service for the area. That's what 
would sell it, simple as that. Whereas, simply for the sake of saying ‘we'll put this 
structure [sic]’ – those clear benefits need to be there. (Interviewee 2) 
Southern Tasmanian Council Authority – by virtue of the fact that a quarter of its 
members are owners of the landfill – It's in their vested interest to promote for the 
landfill. Why they feel they need a C cell? Well, from a council perspective, they 
don't. That's a problem for industry….. at the end of the day when you're talking about 
bulk industrial volumes of waste…..which should be overseen by state government 
regulation, not at the whims of a particular council or collective of councils. 
(Interviewee 3) 
There is a hierarchy between the representatives of different LGAs within the south, 
that's the only part that I know – that some council representatives…..on the STCA 
have much more say, much more strength and much more power than some of the 
other representatives, and what they say is always going to be the thing that is taken 
up…… It's that thing about the person with the most powerful voice in the meeting is 
the one that is going to persuade the rest of the meeting what happens, and that 
apparently is what happens…….there are a few advisers [to the STCA] that are 
determined what they've advised is right, which is a bit of a worry as far as we're 
concerned, because their advice is landfill. (Interviewee 4) 
The above observations provide additional support for the argument that the alignment with 
networks, such as the SWSA, is a mechanism used by LGAs to respond to the national and 
state policy interventions but that TCE and resource-based considerations related to service 
delivery are the primary response drivers when deciding on the extent of alignment with 
networks such as the SWS and STCA. 
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The state government manager considered this area of concern to be of high importance by 
responding comprehensively (Appendix 12). The manager reflected on Tasmania’s being a 
relatively small jurisdiction as compared with the other Australian states. The manager 
echoed the views of Interviewee 12 that waste management is low on the list of priorities of 
public managers in Tasmania: 
I think in the [timeline withheld] years that I've been involved in this, if I've got a 
single, consistent criticism, it's that people who have been working in waste 
management are too low down on the decision-making tree to effectively participate 
in making decisions about waste management at a point where it matters or it 
influences significant decision makers. And this is because we are a small jurisdiction, 
and so most of the senior environmental decision makers are generalists. Whereas, a 
bigger jurisdiction, we would have a Director-General of Waste Recovery and a 
Director-General of Waste Policy……my experience in local government was waste 
sat way below wastewater and water in the hierarchy of importance, and below the 
roads and a few other things. 
In support of the observations of Interviewee 4, the manager argued that the ability to 
advocate at a ministerial level is important when deciding on an appropriate governance 
model to improve waste data collection systems. The manager also argued that prioritising 
waste management is a critical consideration in deciding on an appropriate governance 
structure: 
So by the SWSA being consumed into the STCA, I think you'll find that the risk is 
that the north and the northwest could push forward more easily and flexibly than the 
south because the south are looking at other issues as well within their regional 
authority…..It's almost like the regional authorities themselves have said to the LGAT, 
"You have a limited role. Only in areas where we do not have a role should you be 
there." This makes it complex for the LGAT when the person that the staffs there are 
accountable to seek answers to things [sic]. It makes it complex. But the other thing 
too is; who talks to the state at a senior ministerial level? Is it the regional waste 
authorities via the Waste Advisory Committee? Or is it the LGAT via the GMC 
[general management committee] and the President? 
The manager reiterated earlier support for a partnership approach to govern ‘multi-agency 
management arrangements’ as suggested by the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan 
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(EPHC 2010a, p. 9). The manager again suggested that stronger legislative guidance 
regarding the introduction of a waste levy should be a prerequisite to developing governance 
structures aimed at improving regional waste data collection systems: 
So there's a strong spirit of cooperation amongst the regional waste authorities, the 
state government via the EPA and the department of State Growth to keep the Waste 
Advisory Committee in place if the government was to ever bring in a levy. I imagine 
they would take that role of governance of the system. Any levy coming in would 
require significant legislative reform, significant in terms of waste [legislation], not in 
terms of total Tasmanian government legislation. (Interviewee 8) 
An analysis of the data suggests that improved guidance from the state government, stronger 
political will and improved regulation is more important to improve accountability for waste 
data than choosing between existing agencies to govern data collection systems (Brown, 
Potoski & Van Slyke 2006; Feiock 2013; Godfrey, Scott & Trois 2013; Heinrich, Lynn & 
Milward 2010; Lamothe, S, Lamothe & Feiock 2008). 
The data also suggest that collaboration between councils may be impeded by self-interested 
service delivery considerations, related transaction cost considerations and the competition 
between councils and representative agencies to advocate on self-interested waste matters to 
politicians (Henry & Dietz 2012; Minkoff 2013).  
Enhancing communication between actors in the various waste management networks, 
between the various networks and between networks and the state government is more 
important in meeting the accountability expectations of the federal government than the mere 
choice of a specific network governance structure (Bigdeli, Kamal & de Cesare 2013; Millar 
2013; Reid 2012).  
7.14 Summary 
Responses to a number of interview questions developed from an analysis of the corporate 
plans of LGAs in the SWSA waste management network in Chapters 5 and 6 are reported. 
The responses of participants addressed the following concerns: 
Public managers are uncertain of their role related to the collection of national waste 
data and ‘supporting’ or improving the regional waste data collection systems. 
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Guidance by the Tasmanian government to clarify these roles is not adequate. 
The lack of sanction of non-compliance with waste regulations by the Tasmanian 
government negatively impacts on agencies’ willingness to supply waste data. 
The absence of clear guidance negatively impacts on the accountability relationship 
between the Tasmanian state government and LGAs and their service providers. 
Actors in the network do not consider the demand for waste data or improvement of 
data collection systems to be important, urgent or their responsibility. 
The introduction of a regulated waste disposal levy will not incentivise actors to 
improve their waste data collection systems. 
The partnership agreement on communication and consultation is not effective in 
supporting and improving waste data collection and reporting systems. 
The collection and supply of waste data is constrained by inadequate monitoring and 
management of contracts between LGAs and their service providers. 
Tensions between agencies negatively impact on LGAs’ ability to supply waste data 
and improve waste data collections systems. 
A discussion of the findings is presented in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter consolidates the findings of the textual analysis of the corporate documents in 
Chapters 5 and 6 with the responses of interviewees in Chapter 7.  
8.2 Discussion 
8.2.1 Accountability expectations of the federal government 
The minimum duty of accountability is complying with legislation and regulation 
(Bebbington & Gray 1993). The expectations of the Australian federal government for state 
governments and LGAs to (i) supply more and improved waste data and also to (ii) improve 
their waste data collection systems are embodied in the National Waste Policy 
Implementation Plan, 2010 report (EPHC 2010a, p. 19). These accountability expectations 
are enforceable on state governments through application of the Public Governance, 
Performance and Accountability Act, 2013. LGAs in this study, being those active in the 
SWSA jurisdiction, are obliged to provide waste data to the Tasmanian state government 
through application of the Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act, 1994 and 
the related Waste Management Regulations, 2010. 
In meeting the strategic objectives of the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan, the 
outsourcing of waste management services are being advocated by the federal government by 
suggesting the creation of ‘multi-agency management arrangements’ and ‘active partnerships’ 
between governments and industry (EPHC 2010a, p. 9). The Tasmanian Waste Strategy 
reinforces the national outsourcing directive by recommending that LGAs engage in 
initiatives such as ‘collaborative partnerships’ with industry (Environmental Protection 
Authority 2009, pp. 3 & 9).  
8.2.2 Outsourcing practices in the SWSA jurisdiction 
A wide array of outsourcing practices (Appendix 3, 4 & 5) are observed in the SWSA 
jurisdiction. These outsourcing practices are in some instances found to be collaborative and 
often inter-local (Appendix 6). For example, Glamorgan Spring Bay Council aims to improve 
service delivery and respond to resource constraints by engaging in such collaborative 
outsourcing arrangements with other LGAs (Bel & Warner 2013; McIvor 2008):  
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Look for resource sharing opportunities with surrounding Councils …..., and 
Partner with other councils and regional organisations to achieve community 
outcomes……Continue to explore resource sharing and shared services initiatives 
with peak local government bodies and other Councils. (Appendix 6, para. 3 & 4) 
The LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction engage in these collaborative, network-type outsourcing 
arrangements of waste management services with actors in both the public and private sector 
(Delabbio & Zeemering 2013; LeRoux, Brandenburger & Pandey 2010; LeRoux & Carr 
2010; Zeemering 2012a, 2012b; Zeemering & Delabbio 2013). In the process, a complex 
array of relationships between actors in structured regional networks, such as the SWSA, 
STCA, LGAT and SWS, are created.  
LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction engage in collaborative outsourcing arrangements, such as 
shared services and resource sharing practices, to improve service delivery and reduce costs 
(Appendix 3, 4, 5 & 6). Earlier Australian local government studies derived similar 
conclusions (Dollery & Akimov 2008b; Dollery, Akimov & Byrnes 2009; Dollery & Grant 
2009; Dollery, Grant & Akimov 2010).  
8.2.3 Accountability expectations of the Tasmanian government 
LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction are directed to commit to improvement of waste data 
collection systems, whether on an individual or collective basis, by the Tasmanian Waste and 
Resources Management Strategy through the development of individual or joint action plans 
(Environmental Protection Authority 2009, p. 6). The development of these corporate plans 
by LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction is enforceable through the application of the Local 
Government Act, 1993.   
The increase in the extent of regulation reflects the similar findings of Bebbington & Gray 
(1993) that regulation and policy directives with regard to environmental reporting are 
becoming more commonplace. The introduction of the various acts and public policy 
directives are clear examples of Gray, Brennan & Malpas’s (2013) findings that distant 
relationships, such as between LGAs and the Australian federal government, result in more 
formal methods of accountability, such as more empowering legislation and regulation (Reid 
2012) to avoid misalignment between accountability expectations and obligations.  
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Ball, Broadbent & Moore (2013) and similar studies caution that where a local government 
sector acts under a distant central government agenda, there is a likelihood that the 
integration of the central government’s more formal accountability expectations with those of 
local communities service delivery expectations will be difficult (Ball, Broadbent & Moore 
2002; Dumay, Guthrie & Farneti 2010; Gray 2002). This finding is supported by the 
Tasmanian government’s perceiving serious shortcomings in the Tasmanian LGAs’ ability to 
provide waste data to the Tasmanian state government by reflecting on incomplete data sets 
and the need to improve data collection (Environmental Protection Authority 2009, p. 1). 
8.2.4 Nature of the principal/agent accountability relationships 
In studying the scope and nature of this problem also referred to as a dilemma in the ICA 
framework (Feiock 2013), the nature of the accountability relationship between the federal 
government and LGAs was first explored. Strong accountability relationships require 
acceptance of an agent of the responsibility to account to the principal (Barton 2006). No 
evidence could be found from the corporate plans of the LGAs that they accept the obligation 
to improve waste data collection or waste data collection systems for the purposes of national 
reporting. With the exception of Hobart City Council and Glamorgan Spring Bay Council, no 
other councils made reference to regulatory waste management prescripts (Appendix 2, para. 
3 & 9). The responses of interviewees clearly indicated that they do not consider their 
organisations’ accountable to the federal government in respect of the supply of waste data; 
for example:   
No, we're not particularly concerned about the federal government, if you like. Our 
main concern is satisfying the EPA…..we don't really care about that reporting to 
government; we care about that for our own internal purposes….. It’s really EPA 
requirements. Whatever they want us to submit it in, whatever format, we will do that. 
(Interviewee 11) 
On a positive note, some LGA managers in the SWSA jurisdiction do accept responsibility 
for the improvement of regional waste data collection systems; for example: 
Well, we worked really closely with the State Government back in '06, '07 to develop 
a reporting tool, which the State Government adopted and it's still on their website. 
(Interviewee 9) 
173 
 
National policy makers and state government legislators should take note that whilst 
managers of LGAs and their service providers accept some responsibility on moral grounds 
for the improvement of regional waste data collection systems (Gray 1992), they accept 
responsibility for the supply of the data itself only on the basis of minimum legal 
requirements (Bebbington & Gray 1993). This implies that stronger state regulation is 
required to improve waste data collection. 
8.2.5 The importance of waste data collection for national reporting purposes  
As in the Kloot (2001) study, KPIs with regard to waste management are found to be lacking 
in the LGAs corporate plans, with only six of the 12 councils having clear KPIs related to 
waste management objectives (Appendix 2). In accordance with classic agency theory, LGAs 
in the SWSA jurisdiction are found to be self-interested agents (Jensen & Meckling 1976) 
with strong TCE views (Williamson 1979, 1981) driving waste management outsourcing 
decisions. For example, waste data are considered critical in urban LGAs to evaluate direct 
and indirect transaction costs related to waste disposal:  
Waste data's critical for us running a business, particularly in terms of efficiency, also 
in terms of rehabilitation of our landfill. So if we look at our landfill, we're looking 10 
to 15 years depending on – you can make one or two decisions with landfills: you fill 
them as quick as you can, and although your costs are divided over a shorter period of 
time, the revenue's higher. But you face the reality of – like many municipalities all 
around the world – this is your last landfill. Is it better to get money short term or is it 
better to keep space long term? (Interviewee 9) 
Once LGAs decide to outsource waste disposal, they consider the responsibility to account 
for waste data to become that of the new service provider; for example: 
In terms of our data, we [will] have few obligations once our landfill closes to report 
because our permit will be varied to show that we are no longer an operating 
landfill…... So data collection will be someone else's issue…..in terms of regulatory 
requirements for data, we will have limited requirements. (Interviewee 9) 
The managers of LGAs and their service providers repeatedly indicated a preference for 
stronger legislation and regulation to communicate waste data to higher levels of government; 
for example: 
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From a personal perspective, I think it [communication between LGAs and the state 
government] needs to be more formalized, and clearer, so there's a certain regulation 
there, if you like. (Interviewee 10) 
The Tasmanian government manager, in contrast, suggests that waste data remain the 
responsibility of LGAs and that the Tasmanian government assists in a partnership role in 
collecting and providing their waste data to the federal government; for example: 
So what our role is basically, we have a [sic] – we work with the councils to compile 
their data, which then becomes the Tasmanian profile of waste data that goes up to the 
Commonwealth for our contribution to the National Waste Report. ... 
What we've now been able to do is become very clear on the conversation we want to 
have with local government about the things we can support them on and participate 
in with them. So the waste data conversation is working quite well at a technical level. 
(Interviewee 8) 
An analysis of the above responses suggests that the relationship between the Tasmanian 
state government and LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction, whether as principal to LGAs or 
fellow agent to the federal government, will remain constrained until such time as a more 
complete accountability contract is negotiated with regard to the collection and supply of 
waste data for national reporting purposes (Hart & Moore 1988, 1999, 2008).  
8.2.6 Service level agreements and accountability relationships 
Communication is a critical element of a strong accountability relationship between various 
levels of government (Bigdeli, Kamal & de Cesare 2013; Burritt & Welch 1997). In contrast 
with the suggestion in Reid (2012) that service level agreements between different levels of 
government improves communication and hence accountability, no support could be found 
that such agreement improved the flow of data between LGAs, their service providers and 
higher levels of governments. Only one reference is made to such agreement in the corporate 
plans of the LGAs (Appendix 9, par 3). Interviewees are often unaware of the existence of 
such agreements and those that are aware strongly suggested that it does not improve the 
collection of waste data for national reporting purposes; for example: 
…..but the fact that I've never even heard of it before – and I think, ‘Well, it's not that 
great a communication tool in that case.’ And I think quite often people put it on their 
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website as to say, ‘Yeah okay, we'll put that on there.’ And it's almost like a bit of a 
motherhood statement but nothing really actually happens out [sic] the other end. I 
suspect that [this] one might fit into that ball-court. I could be wrong, there could be 
someone here that gets a lot of value out of it but I haven't heard of it. (Interviewee 12) 
8.2.7 Incongruent waste data collection goals 
Policy makers should take note that strategic considerations regarding waste disposal to 
landfill in contrast with resource recovery and recycling are unique to Tasmania, as borne out 
by SWSA stating:  
Internationally there are few jurisdictions with economies, governance structures, 
population characteristics and waste profiles similar to Tasmania. (Blue Environment 
2011, p. 34) 
Tasmania is performing dismally in terms of resource recovery and recycling in comparison 
with other states and international standards, with the amount of waste disposed at landfills in 
the SWSA steadily increasing (Blue Environment 2013, p. 9; Environmental Protection 
Authority 2009, p. 1). SWS, a joint LGA between four member councils, indicates that it will 
explore recycling only if it is commercially viable (Southern Waste Solutions 2012b, p. 9) 
and thus compatible with the primarily commercial strategic objectives of SWS and its 
member councils (Appendix 7, para. 2). The seemingly incongruent objectives of the SWSA, 
STCA and SWS (Appendix 7, para. 8) may result in tensions between the various SWSA 
member councils, which detract from meeting the federal government’s accountability 
expectation of improved waste data and data collection systems (Heinrich, Lynn & Milward 
2010; McIvor 2008; Vagadia 2012); for example: 
SWSA at least appears to create a modicum of independence in their role as an 
authority. I think if the Southern Tasmanian Council Association was to take over that 
role – I think basically that is a political move to lock in Copping [a southern joint 
LGA regional landfill facility aka SWS] for basically all southern councils. 
(Interviewee 3) 
8.2.8 The flow of waste data across organisations and jurisdictions 
Waste collected from councils within the SWSA jurisdiction are disposed of in other 
jurisdictions, such as Launceston and Hamilton, and across jurisdictions within the SWSA 
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jurisdiction; for example, waste is disposed of at the Copping regional landfill either directly 
or indirectly by most councils in the SWSA jurisdiction. The SWSA remarked that the waste 
data flow across jurisdictions resulted in serious anomalies in reported waste data, and not 
enough detailed waste data are available to determine where wastes are generated and 
disposed of and what wastes are generated by the various sectors, such as the C&I and C&D 
sectors (Blue Environment 2011, p. 31). The flow of waste data is difficult to integrate across, 
in and between these networks (Ball & Bebbington 2008; Ball, Broadbent & Moore 2002), 
which some interviewees suggested is the result of funding and competency constraints 
(Interviewee 1 ; Interviewee 7 ; Interviewee 10).   
In accordance with other Australian local government studies on sustainability reporting and 
environmental management accounting (Ambika, Amrik & Carol 2008; Qian, Burritt & 
Monroe 2011; Williams 2011; Williams, Wilmshurst & Clift 2011), evidence here is that 
LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction are constrained in improving on waste data collection 
systems resulting from the lack of expertise to manage wastes and costing of waste data; for 
example: 
I think local government is a practitioner in this, but I don't think there's a huge 
amount of expertise as to how business should work. And one reason for that is 
because councils don't have the discipline of actually having to rely on customers to 
be [sic] their income, because they've got recurrent, never-ending income from rates 
[and] government grants. (Interviewee 1) 
The existence of multiple agents in the SWSA jurisdiction complicates the flow of waste data, 
as it is uncertain who is accountable for what waste data (Jensen & Stonecash 2005); for 
example: 
You need to be careful. More isn't better in lots of cases, and less can be best, if you 
like. The more entities you have to deal with, the bigger the task is. The risk you run 
of data being corrupted, if you like, through a process if you're going through 
different – or more entities with different processes. (Interviewee 10) 
8.2.9 The role of the Tasmanian government in waste data collection 
A lack of guidance from the Tasmanian state government, as principal to LGAs and their 
service providers, constrains the agents to adequately account for waste (Miller 2005); for 
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example, the categorisation and definition of various MSW waste types are considered to be 
vague:  
I do know that the categories that we report to the EPA – they're a bit vague in 
guidance [sic] as to which category which type of waste belongs in. And we've had a 
bit of confusion about what's commercial and industrial. (Interviewee 7) 
Waste ultimately disposed of in landfill sites is the final point where waste data can be 
collected and serves as a final check for measuring performance against sustainability targets, 
such as waste reduction (Hyder Consulting 2011, p. 6).  There are perceptions from some 
stakeholders that the EPA is not consistent in application of norms and standards over all 
seven landfill sites in the SWSA (Appendix 11, para. 8). The apparent lack of sanction of 
actors not complying with existing waste regulations also detracts from strong accountability 
relationships with the state government (Lindberg 2013). A number of participants suggested 
that improved political accountability is a prerequisite to improved managerial accountability; 
for example:  
I think it's very difficult for it to be enforced, because there's not the impetus there 
from the authorities that oversee it for there to be any real enforcement. And so it's – 
without there being any sort of enforcement from people like the EPA that are 
supposed to track and manage waste collection, and therefore there's no real data 
collection either…..that's because the EPA is very underfunded and couldn't possibly 
do it……if it was found to be important by state government, then there would be 
more funding. (Interviewee 3) 
8.2.10 Data collection tools, techniques and funding 
Data flow from landfills in the SWSA jurisdiction is also constrained by a lack of data 
collection techniques, such as weighbridges, volumetric measurement and waste audits 
(Appendix 9, para. 9). The lack of data recording tools of agents seriously impacts on the 
Tasmanian government’s ability to adequately guide waste strategies and meet the federal 
government’s accountability expectations:  
Well, I think it is [waste data] very poor quality at the moment and I don't think it 
should be that poor. For instance, the EPA rightly say that the data looks like 
Tasmania doesn't recycle as much as other states. But then when you actually talk to 
them, they say, ‘Well, that's not actually true. That's what the data says but our data is 
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faulty. We don't have the data.’ And so they admit that. They think that our recycling 
rate is probably twice as much as is reported, but they just can't prove it. And part of 
that's because there isn't good data at all facilities because a lot of them don't have 
weighbridges….. The little landfill at [name withheld], I don't think that's got a 
weighbridge, and they wouldn't know what was landfilled and what was recycled. 
(Interviewee 7) 
Improved data collection techniques are more costly and detract from the various disposal 
facilities’ profitability, making improvement unlikely without additional incentives provided 
by higher levels of government; for example: 
We'll have to put more staff, but I doubt if that will happen because these days, it is 
about business and unless it is done – I mean, I'm afraid to say it, environment or 
safety and things like that, they're all priorities. But they're all, at the end of the day, 
counted with dollars. (Interviewee 5) 
Participants in the study do not believe that the introduction of a compulsory landfill levy will 
necessarily improve regional waste data collection and data collection systems. For example, 
some interviewees suggested that potential funding arising from funds generated by the levy 
will be applied in more pressing operational matters: 
The levy itself, I don't know whether that would improve the systems. Legislation 
needs to be consistent throughout the State, which it isn't at the moment….. I don't 
think it would affect or assist, because I don't think there'd be any monetary return 
relating to systems. (Interviewee 10) 
8.2.11 Contract management in support of accountability relationships 
In addition to the agency relationship between the Tasmanian government and LGAs with 
their service providers in the SWSA jurisdiction, LGAs also stand as principals in agency 
relationships with their individual service providers. A number of councils do not require 
their contractors to provide waste data regarding the amount of kerbside recyclables collected 
through enforcement of appropriate contract provisions (Appendix 9, para. 7). Similar to the 
findings of Qian et al. (2011) and Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis (2006), evidence was found that 
not all LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction are able to demand waste data from their service 
providers or to improve on contract stipulations regarding waste data collections; for example: 
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If I look at our waste contracts, I think that's got some stuff in there that just shouldn't 
be in there and stuff that should be in there, that's not in there so it's got it's issues but 
it's tied up with another-- it'll be another two or three years before the opportunity 
exists to change that again…… There's no clause in there about waste data 
whatsoever. There's other stuff about the type of machinery and things like that but 
nothing about the actual waste data. (Interviewee 12) 
8.2.12 Responses of agencies in terms of the ICA framework 
Agency theory alone does not address all the complexities associated with outsourcing of 
waste management services in the SWSA jurisdiction; for example, horizontal accountability 
relationships resulting from cooperative outsourcing are not necessarily based on an agency 
relationship (Bertelli & Smith 2010). This study followed the ICA framework as the primary 
theoretical approach, which includes but is not limited to agency theory as a theoretical 
foundation. The ICA framework suggests that the natural response preferences of LGAs to 
policy interventions from higher levels should be considered once the scope and nature of the 
problem the policy intervention seeks to address is understood (Feiock 2013).  
This study found that in response to the accountability expectations of higher levels of 
government, the outsourcing of waste data collection and improvement of waste data 
collection systems may be an preferred option for some LGAs; for example: 
So the whole idea of all the data collection and so forth…..should be one of those 
ones that's considered by that more regional type body [sic] as compared to individual 
councils. (Interviewee 12) 
The outsourcing practices of LGAs in the SWSA are primarily guided by the demands of 
local constituencies that operational efficiencies be improved (Burritt & Welch 1997) rather 
than the federal government’s accountability expectations. Financial considerations, such as 
transaction costs and cash flows, are important reasons why LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction 
outsource waste management services (Appendix 3). This finding is in accordance with other 
outsourcing studies (Bel & Fageda 2007, 2009; Bel, Fageda & Mur 2014). Managerial 
concerns regarding social choice issues, such as improved service delivery, play a role in the 
decision of LGAs to outsource waste management services (Bel & Fageda 2007). This study 
found that improvement in service delivery through innovation and technological investments 
is also a major reason why the LGAs in this study outsourced waste management services 
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(Appendix 4, para.5). Political influence and strategic considerations play a role in the 
outsourcing decisions of LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction (Appendix 7, para. 1) This finding 
is in line with other studies that found that strategic considerations and political influence 
play a role in Australian LGAs’ outsourcing decisions (Bisman 2008; Kloot & Martin 2007).  
Transaction costs, managerial concerns and social choice issues not only influence the 
decision to outsource or not but also the type of outsourcing arrangement contemplated by 
LGAs (Bel & Fageda 2007, 2009). LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction engage in outsourcing 
initiatives in a collective institutional setting when there are both financial and social choice 
incentives for them to do so (Appendix 3, para. 7; Appendix 4, para. 4). This finding is in 
accordance with other studies that found that highly specified and difficult-to-measure 
services (Williamson 1999), such as highly regulated landfill developments, are more likely 
to be outsourced by LGAs to municipal corporations or through other similar inter-local 
arrangements than normal arm’s-length commercial contracting (Bel & Fageda 2008; Bel, 
Fageda & Mur 2014). For example, the SWS as the primary supplier of waste to landfill 
disposal services is governed by a complex management structure of unequal votes and 
varying management involvement by its four member councils (Southern Waste Solutions 
2012a, p. 11). SWS has the primary aim of maximising economic benefits to its members 
(Appendix 7, para. 2, 6 & 8). 
Councils in the SWSA jurisdiction respond to institutional collective action policy problems 
or dilemmas (Feiock 2013) through alignment with the SWSA, STCA and LGAT networks 
(Appendix 11). SWSA is a network largely motivated by improvement of sustainability 
principles as contemplated by the National Waste Policy Implementation Plan, whilst the 
STCA and LGAT are networks involved in aspects of waste management that are to a large 
extent motivated by political and economic principles; for example: 
STCA wants to take hold of waste – but again that's a political thing. STCA is just the 
mayors which run it [sic], it's a political thing. (Interviewee 5) 
Councils/principals contract with the various regional authorities/agents with different 
relational and contractual management measures employed to monitor the agents; for 
example, Glenorchy City Council observes a closely connected relational approach:  
Actively participate in peak local government bodies (LGAT & the STCA) to advance 
community priorities. (Appendix 11, para 3)  
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8.2.13 Best-practice outsourcing frameworks 
The ICA framework suggests that mechanisms available to LGAs to adequately respond to 
policy interventions and directives from higher levels of government should be understood 
when exploring problems or dilemmas emanating from these policy interventions and 
directives (Feiock 2013). In contemplating outsourcing practices that will result in efficient 
‘multi-agency management arrangements’ (EPHC 2010a, p. 9) and ‘collaborative 
partnerships’ (Environmental Protection Authority 2009, p. 3 & 9), a number of outsourcing 
frameworks are identified which can guide and assist efficiency-seeking outsourcing 
practices (Ali, Ali Asghar Anvary & Ali 2008; Hassanain & Al-Saadi 2005; Lacity & Khan 
2009; McIvor 2008; Mohr, Sengupta & Slater 2011; Quinn 1999, 2000; Vagadia 2012; 
Verner & Abdullah 2012; Zhu, Hsu & Lillie 2001).  
These frameworks are limited by the assumption that parties to outsourcing arrangements are 
indeed willing or able to share information (Quinn 2000). Outsourcing frameworks should 
therefore be used in conjunction with theories explaining the behaviours of the parties to 
outsourcing (McIvor 2008). This study found some evidence that not all LGAs and their 
service providers are indeed willing or able to supply waste data; for example: 
When we go to each council and say, ‘Can you please provide data on actually how 
much hazardous waste is generated within your municipality?’ We get basically a 
response of, ‘We don't know, we don't have collection or we produce basically none.’ 
(Interviewee 3) 
The best-practise outsourcing frameworks suggest that principals can protect themselves 
against potential holdup costs by either entering into long-term contracts or by participating 
in the governance structures of the service providers (agents) (Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke 
2010; Zhu, Hsu & Lillie 2001). LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction are prudent in their 
outsourcing initiatives by either entering into strong written contracts with waste 
management service providers (Appendix 10) or by participating in the governance structures 
of those service providers. For example, the rules of SWS make it clear that participation by 
its member councils in its governance structures is by intent long term and tied to a 50-year 
lease with the Sorrell Council (Southern Waste Solutions 2012a, p. 29).  
The data extracted from the LGA corporate plans are not sufficiently clear to contrast the 
duration of all the inter-local contracts where councils are not participating in governance 
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structures. Some indications are that these are generally 20 years in duration (Appendix 10, 
para. 6 & 7). Static long-term contracts and long-term governance arrangements may not 
always be desirable in a changing regulatory environment, as councils may find themselves 
tied into contractual arrangements that prevent them from complying with new or revised 
regulatory directives regarding sustainability targets, such as waste reduction and resource 
recovery (Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis 2006).  
The SWSA observed that the collection and public reporting of waste information and the 
sharing of such knowledge is inadequate in the SWSA jurisdiction. According to the SWSA, 
there is very little information available on what types of waste are disposed of at landfill 
sites, with the volume and tonnages disposed of all landfill sites appearing equally uncertain 
(Appendix 9, para. 5–8).  
Participants mostly considered the policy environment uncertain, which detracts from 
accounting for waste data. Outsourcing arrangements by LGAs to improve on waste data 
collection and reporting will not meet the accountability expectations of the federal 
government until such time as the unstable regulatory environment is improved upon 
(Bebbington & Gray 1993): 
The state level policy for a waste strategy is out of date. It requires reviewing. The 
agreement that local government concluded with the state government, establishing 
regional waste groups, that was over ten years ago. That hasn't been revisited or 
reviewed. (Interviewee 1) 
I think there's space for regulation, that's what I suppose I'm getting at because 
without it – I think that's the driver so if I do without it, you don't have a driver there. 
If you leave it up to the individual organizations then they'll only be interested in 
providing data if they get something back. If they're not getting anything back, they'll 
just do the minimum that they have to do and I think it's fair to say, we're not getting 
anything back so that's probably what's happening. (Interviewee 12)  
8.3 Summary 
In this chapter, the findings from the textual document analysis are consolidated with the 
responses of interviewees regarding areas of concern. The findings are discussed with the aim 
of reaching the conclusions presented in the following chapter.   
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a conclusion to the discussion of the findings in the previous chapter. It 
points out the limitation of the research methods used and considers areas that require future 
research. 
9.2 Summary 
This study responds to the call of Qian, Burritt & Monroe (2011) to explore environmental 
management accounting practices in waste management industries. They suggest that 
researchers should investigate how larger environmental management accounting systems are 
impacted by actions and attitudes of downstream players such as remanufacturers and landfill 
operators.  The study focusses on the accountability expectations of the Australian federal 
government for lower level environmental management accounting systems to supply 
adequate waste data for national reporting purposes. 
It is shown that LGAs and their service providers in the SWSA jurisdiction engage in a wide 
range of waste management services, including landfill operations that generate waste data. 
The minimum duty of accounting for waste data is that of compliance with the law and 
reporting on the extent of compliance (Bebbington & Gray 1993). However, Gray (2005) 
contends that the right to information is not just derived from legal or quasi-legal sources but 
could also be based on moral grounds. This study finds that the LGA managers and the 
managers of their service providers are only willing to supply waste data through an 
accountability relationship with higher levels of government based on compliance with 
minimum legal requirements. These managers do not consider themselves accountable to the 
federal government for the supply of waste data on moral or other grounds. 
Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis (2006) argue that there is a need to understand the best channels to 
disseminate good waste practices and new ideas.  The findings reported here show that LGA 
managers and managers of their service providers express a willingness to contribute to the 
improvement of regional waste data systems rather than a willingness to be accountable to 
higher levels of government for the data itself. In line with the findings of Qian, Burritt & 
Monroe (2011), it is suggested that policy makers should take note of the willingness of 
actors in local government to engage in environmental management accounting systems. The 
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improvement in environmental management accounting systems will assist local government 
to meet the federal government’s accountability expectations. 
Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis (2006) suggest that improvements in sustainable waste management 
practices are supported financially and politically by some central governments. The 
participants in this study do not consider improvement to regional waste data collection 
systems to be adequately guided by the Tasmanian government due to EPA resource 
constraints. 
Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis (2006) also suggest that changes are necessary at political and 
institutional levels, and in terms of individual and collective behaviour and consciousness, to 
make the transition to global sustainable waste management practices.  They argue that 
sustainability accounting and reporting is part of, and could support, such change. This study 
finds that the actors in the SWSA jurisdiction do not behave collectively. It is found that the 
state government considers the ownership of waste data for the purposes of national reporting 
to be that of LGAs and their service providers, whilst managers of agencies do not accept 
such responsibility and consider the supply of waste data a statutory responsibility, to the 
state government in terms of state-driven legislation and regulation. They believe the 
ownership of the waste data, for the purposes of national reporting, passes to the Tasmanian 
state government. 
Qian & Burritt (2007) found that the type of local governments and waste services and 
operations do not provide full explanations for the variability of current environmental 
accounting practices for waste management in local government in Australia. Here it is also 
found that waste data collection tools of facilities situated in the SWSA jurisdiction are 
inadequate to satisfy the accountability expectations of the federal government. The poor data 
collection tools constrains the ability of these agencies to adequately collect and supply waste 
data for the purposes of national reporting and thus offers an explanation for variable 
environmental accounting practices.  
Reid (2012) argues that inter-governmental agreements appear to be useful mechanisms for 
local governments to influence the agenda of higher level authorities, even if all they achieve 
is regular contact and communication.  In contrast this study finds that the partnership 
agreement to facilitate improved communication between the Tasmanian government and 
LGAs is ineffective in the SWSA jurisdiction with regard to the supply of waste data and 
improvement of data collection systems.  Stronger support is found for the contention that 
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councils need a strong empowering statute that guides behaviour (Reid 2012; Brown, Potoski 
& Van Slyke 2007, 2008, 2010). 
Brown, Potoski & Van Slyke (2006) found that legal mandates define the boundaries within 
which public managers can operate to optimize and balance targeted values, whereas contract 
management and monitoring incapacity increase the risk of failed contracts. The research 
contained in this thesis concurs with their findings in the context of waste management. LGA 
managers do not believe that once LGAs have outsourced waste disposal services they should 
be held accountable for the supply of waste data to higher levels of government (Interviewee 
9; Interviewee 12). This has important implications for federal policy makers, who consider 
LGAs instrumental in providing waste data for national reporting purposes even if they do 
not own or operate landfill sites.  Some long-term waste contracts in operation in the SWSA 
jurisdiction are inadequate with regard to the ability of LGAs to demand waste data from 
their service providers. LGAs are constrained by the length of the contract periods to 
negotiate new clauses enabling them to demand the waste data expected by the federal 
government. 
Simões & Marques (2012) call for more studies on regulatory impacts on economic 
performance of waste management enterprises. In this context it is found that an 
improvement in the flow of waste data demanded by the Tasmanian government and the 
agencies responsible for supplying requires costly renegotiation. The respondents in this 
study do not believe that the introduction of a compulsory waste disposal levy will generate 
sufficient funding to facilitate renegotiation or to provide incentives for agencies to improve 
their waste data collection systems. Policy makers at both state and federal level should 
contemplate the cost of improving waste data collection and whether mooted waste disposal 
levies will be sufficient to defray the increased waste collection costs.  
Carr & Hawkins (2013) found that third parties play an important role in negotiating 
agreements and reducing environmental uncertainty that can undermine cooperation. This 
study finds a lack of certainty which of the SWSA, STCA, SWS or LGAT network should 
have responsibility for supplying waste data to the Tasmanian government. These networks 
hold conflicting views on the handling, treatment and disposal of MSW. Participants to the 
study do not believe the process of assigning responsibility for improving regional waste data 
collection networks are adequately guided by the Tasmanian legislature.  
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Ball & Bebbington (2008) and Ball, Broadbent & Jarvis (2006) call for more accountability 
studies on complex public sector networks.  The outsourcing practices of LGAs in the SWSA 
jurisdiction resulted in some complex forms of ‘multi-agency arrangements’ and 
‘partnerships’ as contemplated by public waste policy prescripts. The findings here indicate 
that LGA managers respond to directives from higher levels of government only to the extent 
that it is regulated by state legislation.  Mangers of LGAs and their service providers’ appear 
to view waste regulation as the preferred mode of communication.   
Lodhia, Jacobs & Park (2012 found that Australian public managers are significantly 
influenced by coercive legislation when reporting on the environment.  Managers of LGAs 
and their service providers, in the SWSA jurisdiction, also respond to coercive regulatory 
requirements when reporting waste data.  The conclusion is therefore that improved 
regulation would facilitate improved communication.  In the absence of improved 
communication the Australian federal government’s accountability expectations will not be 
met.  Improved regulation will facilitate communication and consultation between all 
principals and agents in the SWSA jurisdiction which in turn will satisfy the accountability 
expectations of the Australian federal government for more and improved waste data and 
improved data collection systems.   
9.3 Limitations of this study 
The textual analysis of the narrative content of the corporate plans and transcribed interviews 
of actors in the SWSA jurisdiction is highly interpretive and has its limitations. Data 
extracted from the reports largely reflect on economic and institutional aspects and are 
supplied in ample detail for other researchers to arrive at different conclusions. Social aspects 
– such as public managers’ fears, career aspirations and trust between actors in the networks, 
political influence and ideological pre-dispositions – are difficult to gauge from this research 
method. 
While it is difficult to generalise, this study offers some messages for the wider global waste 
management sector.  Lessons learned from this study are likely to find application in the local 
government sector in other Australian states.  The conclusions drawn from the data obtained 
in this case study cannot be transposed to other jurisdictions without first obtaining additional 
empirical evidence due to the unique geographical and cultural context of southern Tasmania.   
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9.4 Future research 
Evidence was found that that relationships between LGAs in the SWSA jurisdiction and the 
Tasmanian state government are strained, which may detract from establishing strong 
accountability relationships; for example:  
The relationship between local government and state government back in the nineties 
when there was the rationalisation of councils from forty six to twenty nine - and it 
wasn't a cooperative rationalisation; it was a realignment of the boundaries. So local 
government felt; ‘Well, we're pretty powerless.’ Then the levy [discussions] came 
along, and then there was going to be the great Hobart amalgamations as well at that 
time…So there was a lack of trust, I think. (Interviewee 8) 
As discussed earlier in the thesis, partnerships and collaborations require a large measure of 
trust. The lack of trust results from a fear of amalgamations and rationalisations of LGAs. 
Whether the lack of trust plays a role in the waste outsourcing decisions of LGA managers to 
counter amalgamations and service consolidations requires future research.  
The governance and accountability of new structures that develop from collaborative waste 
management outsourcing practises also require future research. Local government studies 
from other international jurisdictions caution against the use of municipal corporations 
designed to avoid public scrutiny and regulatory oversight (Doberstein 2013a; Girth 2014; 
Tavares & Camöes 2010). SWS as a joint LGA, with powers similar to those of a municipal 
corporation, limits accessibility to certain documents; for example: 
Minutes, papers and reports marked ‘Commercial-in-Confidence’ are, unless the 
Authority or the Board agrees otherwise, to be made available only to Members of the 
Authority and Directors and, through the ‘closed agenda’, to Participating Councils. 
(Southern Waste Solutions 2012a, p. 20) 
A community representative argues that contracts in the public sector should not be withheld 
from public scrutiny: 
I can't see anything really that if it impacts on community through local government 
that shouldn't be open. I can understand within a small community – especially with 
controlled waste reporting….. I can't really see why there should be any ambiguity or 
any commercial in confidence. (Interviewee 4) 
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In light of the community concerns, mechanisms to enhance public accountability of hybrid 
institutional arrangements in respect of outsourced waste management services require future 
research. Aspects such as representative board representation of joint LGAs, public 
attendances of meetings, consolidation of results and adequacy of stakeholder/public 
interaction through environmental impact assessments are considered to be important 
accountability topics for future research. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 Australian classification 
of LGAs 
Garbage 
collection 
frequency 
Kerbside 
garbage 
collection 
type 
Kerbside 
recyclables 
frequency 
Recyclables 
collection 
type 
Land 
area  
Population  Population 
per km of 
road 
Public 
recycle 
bins 
Brighton Council Urban Small 2 weekly 240L Bin 2 weekly 240L Bin 170 15813 95,66 No 
Central Highlands 
Council 
Rural Agricultural Medium weekly 140L Bin 2 weekly 50 L Crate 7976 2322 3,09 Yes 
Clarence City 
Council 
Urban Medium weekly 80L Bin 2 weekly 140L Bin 377 53081 115,08 Yes 
Derwent Valley 
Council 
Rural Agricultural Very 
Large 
weekly 120L Bin weekly 50 L Crate 4103 9956 30,66 No 
Glamorgan 
Springbay Council 
Rural Agricultural Medium weekly 120L Bin 2 weekly 120L Bin 2587 4507 12,77 Yes 
Glenorchy City 
Council 
Urban Medium weekly or 
2 weekly 
140L or 240L 
Bin 
Weekly or 2 
weekly 
140L or 
240L Bin 
120 45382 144,25 Yes 
Hobart City Council Urban Medium weekly 120L Bin 2 weekly 240L Bin 77 50342 154,09 Yes 
Huon Valley Council Rural Agricultural Very 
Large 
weekly 120L Bin None None 5947 16020 21,77 No 
Kingborough 
Council 
Urban Medium weekly 80L Bin 2 weekly 140L Bin 719 35090 63,63 No 
Sorell Council Rural Agricultural Very 
Large 
weekly 80L or 140L 
Bin 
2 weekly 140L Bin 582 13407 33,19 No 
Southern Midlands 
Council 
Rural Agricultural Large weekly or 
2 weekly 
120L or 240L 
Bin 
Weekly or 2 
weekly 
65L Crate 2611 6306 7,65 No 
Tasman Council Rural Agricultural Medium weekly 120L Bin weekly Crate 659 2413 9,39 No 
(Blue Environment 2011; Local Government Board 2012) 
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Appendix 2 Key performance area Data on key performance indicators in corporate reports 
Central Highlands Council 
(Central Highlands Council 2012, p. 41 & 42) 
Garbage removal and 
kerbside recycling 
‘No. of services…..Participation Rate….. Amount Collected….. No. of 
complaints….. Comply with budget…..’ 
 Landfill operation ‘Amount of fees collected per opening hour…..No. of users….. No. of 
complaints…..Cost per opening hour…..’ 
 Landfill development ‘Completed within budget allocation…..’ 
Glamorgan Spring Bay Council 
(Glamorgan Spring Bay Council 2013a, pp. 74, 76 & 86) 
Waste management 
programs and projects 
‘Compliance with environmental licence conditions…… Increased community 
participation in recycling….. Acceptable Waste Transfer Station operations…… 
Operation cost reduction in Waste Management…..’ 
 Waste management and 
recycling services 
‘Maintain appropriate level of service that is equivalent to community expectations’ 
 Street cleaning ‘Number of complaints in relation to overall township presentation and 
cleanliness.’ 
Hobart City Council 
(Hobart City Council 2013, p. 9 & 10) 
City Cleanliness ‘Community survey results, rating 1-5, 1 being worst, 5 being best’ 
 Waste Management ‘Kerbside recycling – 4000T by 2013….. Kerbside waste – 13,000T by 2013….. 
Green waste compost – 9,500T by 2013…..40% by 2013…..100% 
compliance…..annually 363 days annually…… 16,550 Tonnes of CO2 by 
2013…..’ 
Hobart City Council 
(Hobart City Council 2010, p. 14) 
Waste Management ‘Monitor the progress of the Waste Advisory Committee (WAC), and its Local 
Government Representative(s), when put in place.’ 
Huon Valley Council 
(Huon Valley Council 2010, p. 21) 
Waste Management ‘Increased volume of recycling….. Decreased household waste collected….. 
Establishment of tip shop at Huonville Waste Transfer Station.’ 
Kingborough Council 
(Kingborough Council 2013, p. 7) 
Waste Management ‘Volume of waste going to landfill….. Composting program….. Volume of 
recycled material…… Extent of green waste recycling….. Number of local 
recycling enterprises…..’ 
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Appendix 3 Data on financial objectives, costs and cash flow considerations underlining the SWSA-LGAs’ outsourcing practices 
Glamorgan Spring Bay Council 
(Glamorgan Spring Bay Council 2013a, p. 74) 
‘Develop, implement and monitor an efficient and environmentally responsible Waste Management Strategy that provides cost 
effective disposal methods for the municipality and encourages the participation of local enterprises…..’ 
Hobart City Council 
(Hobart City Council 2010, p. 6) 
‘To ensure waste management services are effective and efﬁcient, it is necessary to identify opportunities for service 
delivery…… taking into consideration Council’s ﬁ it is  performance and level of service……. This will involve internal 
assessments and reviews, and benchmarking processes.’ 
SWSA 
(Blue Environment 2011, p. 45) 
‘…..hydrogeological characteristics may see the impact of leachate on the surrounding environment for 100-200 years, the 
future need and cost of rehabilitation may be significant. The lack of full cost recovery included in landfill gate fees charged in 
the past means that there may be a large gap in council resources for future rehabilitation, management and monitoring of 
closed landfills.’ 
SWSA 
(Blue Environment 2011, p. 72 & 74) 
‘…..funding for waste minimisation and resource recovery must come from somewhere…..‘user pays’ principle…..A levy 
applied to landfilled waste is the most equitable way of apportioning the cost to waste generators, while also encouraging 
material segregation and recovery….. If a levy is introduced only on C&I waste, the financial impacts on SWSA member 
councils may be limited…..if a levy is applied to all waste…..councils may require rate increases and communities should be 
prepared for this…...’ 
SWS 
(Southern Waste Solutions 2012b, p. 3) 
‘Remain commercially focussed and market competitive and use appropriate pricing mechanisms to enhance commercial 
viability…..Provide quantifiable economic benefits to Owner Councils and work towards the achievement of sustainable long-
term financial returns on investment for Owner Councils…..Minimise the need for short-term or emergency cash injections 
from Owner Councils…..’ 
SWS 
(Southern Waste Solutions 2012b, p. 3) 
‘Negotiate commercially attractive long-term contracts to complement the life of the Copping site, and seek the site operator’s 
support to share any emerging economies of scale.’ 
Tasman Council 
(Tasman Council 2011, p. 32) 
‘Increase the cost effectiveness of Council operations through resource sharing with other organisations.’ 
Tasman Council 
(Tasman Council 2013, p. 13) 
‘Council’s long term involvement with the Copping landfill will continue with the new business and board structure delivering 
improved guidance and financial outcomes both with regard to shorter term profitability and debt servicing.’ 
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Appendix 4 Data on service delivery through innovation and technological investment and resource constraints underlining the 
SWSA-LGAs’ outsourcing practices  
Central Highlands Council 
(Central Highlands Council 2012, p. 7) 
‘Programmes are implemented using Council staff and resources together with the employment of external contractors and 
other service providers. External providers are supervised by Council staff.’ 
Central Highlands Council 
(Central Highlands Council 2012, p. 38) 
‘Actively pursue resources to assist in environmental and natural resource management planning through programs such as 
Caring for our Country or by contracting with external agencies to provide specialist local services.’  
Glenorchy City Council 
(Glenorchy City Council 2013a, p. 17) 
‘…..deliver a range of services vital to the Glenorchy community, including advocacy for additional services… waste 
management…..Identify opportunities for outsourcing services that will create value for money and meet the expectations of the 
community.’  
Glenorchy City Council 
(Glenorchy City Council 2013b, p. 13) 
‘Identify and facilitate linkages with Council and other service providers to create opportunities for our communities…… 
Advocate for, partner with, or deliver services that address identified levels of community need.’ 
Hobart City Council 
(Hobart City Council 2010, p. 17) 
‘Continuous improvement of waste management services occurs through innovation and new technologies. It is essential that 
the Council continues to be aware of possible improvements to services through innovation. This will occur through 
professional development and involvement with regional authorities’ 
Hobart City Council 
(Hobart City Council 2010, p. 7) 
‘This Plan has identiﬁed the need to construct a Waste Transfer Station at McRobies Gully in the near future…… identiﬁed the 
need to construct a Resource Recovery facility at the Waste Management Centre. This is required in order to provide a best 
practice facility for the receival (sic) of recyclable materials and to maximise the recovery of discarded resources.’ 
Hobart City Council 
(Hobart City Council 2010, p. 10) 
‘Progressively rehabilitate the McRobies Gully Waste Management centre…..prepare a comprehensive rehabilitation plan 
for……approval by the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA)…… Ensure appropriate funding is provided to conduct 
works as required under the rehabilitation plan.’ 
Kingborough Council 
(Kingborough Council 2011, p. 9) 
‘Failure to provide community services in a timely manner due to inadequate knowledge, skills or resources.’  
Sorrel Council 
(Sorell Council 2008, p. 9) 
‘Access external expertise …..Transfer knowledge into business processes….. Transfer knowledge to the community….. ‘ 
SWS 
(Southern Waste Solutions 2012b, p. 1) 
 
‘Keep abreast of and invest in appropriate and affordable advanced technology…..to provide superior solutions for the receipt, 
transport and containment of all permissible waste including the preload compaction, treatment and high payload transport of 
medical waste.’ 
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Appendix 5 Data on strategic considerations and political influence underlining the SWSA-LGAs’ outsourcing practices  
Derwent Valley Council 
(Derwent Valley Council 2011, p. 4) 
‘…..participation and building relationships to gain unity and find common ground on issues…..’ 
Hobart City Council 
(Hobart City Council 2010, p. 7) 
‘Investigate issues associated with collection, receival (sic) and transport of waste to another facility following closure of the 
landﬁll…..Consider options to maximise the life of McRobies Gully landﬁll through diversion of waste to other facilities.’ 
Hobart City Council 
(Hobart City Council 2010, p. 13) 
‘Participate in and support the household hazardous waste collection program currently coordinated by the Local Government 
Association of Tasmania.’ 
Hobart City Council 
(Hobart City Council 2010, p. 13) 
‘Investigate and implement ‘best practice’ procedures for acceptance of materials to landﬁll (ie not accepting certain waste 
types – TVs, batteries, oils etc)….’ 
Hobart City Council 
(Hobart City Council 2010, p. 14) 
‘Work in co-operation with neighbouring and other Councils to develop further opportunities in the areas of resource sharing 
and regional co-operation…… Liaise with other Councils in information sharing and benchmarking process.’ 
Sorrel Council 
(Sorell Council 2012b, p. 2) 
‘Review of Local Government pressuring the sector to facilitate mergers that are politically motivated at the expense of 
community collaboration……Actions/Controls in place…..Independent Review of Structures for Local Governance and 
Service Delivery in Southern Tasmania undertaken by STCA…..’ 
Sorell Council 
(Sorell Council 2008, p. 11) 
‘Cooperation with other Councils in the Southeast Region…..Identify regional cooperation opportunities…..Engage with and 
lead other councils…..Implement agreed cooperative arrangements…..’ 
SWS 
(Southern Waste Solutions 2012a, p. 9) 
‘Each Participating Council is to use the Site as its principal landfill refuse disposal site unless otherwise agreed in writing by 
the Authority.’ 
SWS 
(Southern Waste Solutions 2012a, p. 8) 
‘…..to transfer assets and liabilities from the Authority to a Council or from a Council to the Authority…..to transfer employees 
and the rights of employees from a Council to the Authority, or from the Authority to a Council…..’ 
Tasman Council 
(Tasman Council 2011, p. 32) 
‘Periodically review outsourcing arrangements to ensure they are providing the best value for money.’ 
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Appendix 6 Data on strategic service arrangements when outsourcing in corporate reports 
Clarence City Council 
(Clarence City Council 2010, p. 10) 
‘Consider Council’s strategic direction in relation to our neighbouring Councils including resource sharing, 
opportunities for joint tenders, expansion of the Copping Refuse Site Joint Authority and other opportunities for mutual 
benefit …..’ 
Derwent Valley Council 
(Derwent Valley Council 2011, p. 8) 
‘To develop partnerships [with] relevant stakeholders on the development, management and maintenance of services in 
the municipality…… Actively pursue efficiency gains through resource-sharing.’ 
Glamorgan Spring Bay Council 
(Glamorgan Spring Bay Council 2013a, p. 34) 
‘Look for resource sharing opportunities with surrounding Councils …...’ 
Glenorchy City Council 
(Glenorchy City Council 2013a, p. 28) 
‘Partner with other councils and regional organisations to achieve community outcomes……Continue to explore 
resource sharing and shared services initiatives with peak local government bodies and other Councils’ 
Hobart City Council 
(Hobart City Council 2010, p. 14) 
‘Develop strategic linkages with other Councils for resource sharing…..Work in co-operation with neighbouring and 
other Councils to develop further opportunities in the areas of resource sharing and regional co-operation.’ 
Kingborough Council 
(Kingborough Council 2013, p. 3) 
‘Promote the concept of resource sharing to deliver cost effective services to the community……Actively research and 
develop opportunities for initiating joint projects and obtaining external grants …..Develop and maintain strong 
networks and communication channels with other spheres of Government.’ 
Sorell Council 
(Sorell Council 2012a, p. 2) 
‘Proactively to seek regional resource sharing opportunities …..’ 
Southern Midlands Councils 
(Southern Midlands Council 2012, p. 32) 
‘Identify opportunities for resource sharing with other Councils. Identify and implement working relationships with the 
Councils in our sub region across a wide range of operational and support areas…..’ 
Southern Waste Solutions 
(Southern Waste Solutions 2012b, p. 4 & 5) 
‘Actively encourage other Councils to join the Authority……Continue to work with Hobart and Glenorchy City 
Councils to identify beneficial opportunities for them to utilise the Authority’s facilities…… Work with Brighton 
Council to identify beneficial opportunities for that Council to utilise the Authority’s facilities’ 
Tasman Council 
(Tasman Council 2011, p. 32) 
‘Increase the cost effectiveness of Council operations through resource sharing with other organisations…..Continue to 
identify opportunities for resource sharing with other Councils…..’ 
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Appendix 7 Data on the goal congruence governance dimension in corporate reports 
Hobart City Council 
(Hobart City Council 2010, p. 14) 
‘The McRobies Gully landﬁll is expected to be closed by 2017. The Jackson Street Waste Management Centre has an estimated 
remaining life of 19 years. The Copping landﬁll has an estimated remaining life of several hundred years. The difference in 
landﬁll lives is an issue that will need to be addressed when considering any partnership arrangements. Hobart City Council 
ofﬁcers are working closely with other local government authorities such as Kingborough Council and Glenorchy City Council 
to ensure that any future developments are planned at a regional level.’ 
Southern Waste Solutions 
(Southern Waste Solutions 2012b, p. 1). 
‘To receive, contain and, where possible, utilise waste in accordance with best environmental and commercial practice to the 
benefit of stakeholders and customers.’ 
Southern Waste Solutions 
(Southern Waste Solutions 2012b, p. 8) 
‘Achievement…..of a cooperative working arrangement with Hobart and Glenorchy City Councils.’ 
Southern Waste Solutions 
(Southern Waste Solutions 2012a, p. 6 & 24). 
‘…..to manage successfully the Site and Balance Area by…..operating efficiently in accordance with sound commercial 
practice…..maximising the net worth of the Authority’s assets; and…..operating and managing both to maximise benefits to 
Participating Councils’ 
 ‘The Business Plan shall include performance measures, and reflect these measures in reporting the achievement of strategic 
outcomes and objectives for the year….. Subject to any commercially sensitive aspects being separated into a separate section, 
the Plan shall be made fully accessible to stakeholders and to the public…..The ‘open’ sections of the Authority’s Annual 
Reports and Business Plan shall be made available for publication in the public domain on Participating Council websites.’ 
Southern Waste Strategy Authority 
(Blue Environment 2011, pp. 2, 65 & 68) 
‘…..the purpose of SWSA is to…..implementation of the Southern Waste Management Strategy’. Its function is ‘to provide the 
most cost effective management and facilitation of municipal waste minimisation programs, waste stream control and 
performance monitoring…..’ 
 ‘…..future projections of landfill airspace needed (including likely achievements of waste minimisation programs)…..each 
landfill site’s capabilities (including engineering profile, compaction rate, operating and management characteristics)…..waste 
generation centres and transport needs…..economic analysis of transport options, landfill operation &management costs and 
cost recovery.’ 
 ‘The Copping landfill authority has a financial interest in maximising revenue by maximising waste disposed to landfill. This is 
in opposition to the waste minimisation responsibilities of SWSA and the recommended guiding principles. Incorporating both 
objectives within the same organisation would result in a fundamental internal conflict of interest.’ 
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Appendix 8 Data on the alignment of stakeholder values as a governance dimension 
Brighton Council 
(Brighton Council 2011, p. 1) 
‘Involve key stakeholders, working together, to develop strategies to achieve the best possible outcome for the Brighton 
Municipal Area…..the best available infrastructure to our community by third party providers’ 
Clarence City Council 
(Clarence City Council 2010, p. 10) 
‘Develop stronger sub regional, regional and country wide alliances to best represent Clarence’ 
Southern Waste Strategy Authority 
(Blue Environment 2011, pp. 9, 12, 28, 60, 66, 67 
& 68) 
‘There is not enough detailed information to determine the generation by sector…..Copping landfill figures would indicate a 
high percentage generation by the C&I sector…..anomalies……in recording municipal waste deposited at Copping and the lack 
of information available on C&I and C&D waste being deposited at SWSA member landfills, does not allow for meaningful 
sector-based analysis.’ 
 ‘to plan for the management of municipal waste in the region in partnership with member councils…..to coordinate the 
activities of member councils that implement state and regional policies, strategies and programs relating to waste…..’ 
 ‘The current SWSA rules of governance (established in 2001) have minimal description of the waste functions of the 
organisation…..’ 
 ‘…..coordinate the waste management activities of its members including: - introducing measures that lead to conformity of 
standards for waste minimisation, waste management and litter prevention and control between member councils investigating 
and advising on landfill disposal costs and charges in the region…..’ 
 ‘As a regional authority…..important role…..SWSA…..planning for waste and recovery facilities in the future…..consent of the 
state government…..embedded in planning regulations…..establishing SWSA as a referral authority for all such facilities in the 
region’ 
 ‘LGAT…… state government should provide adequate resources for waste management…..supports the removal of regulatory 
barriers to sustainable recycling favours phased implementation of improved standards of landfill management…..strongly 
opposes the introduction of a waste management disposal levy’ 
 ‘STCA outlines its priorities as…..improved physical infrastructure…..enhanced economic development…..improved 
environmental performance…. improved inter-regional cooperation.’ 
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Appendix 9 Data on the communication and knowledge sharing dimension in corporate reports 
Derwent Valley Council 
(Derwent Valley Council 2011, p. 4) 
‘We are committed to openness, communication, participation and building relationships to gain unity and find common 
ground on issues’ 
Hobart City Council 
(Hobart City Council 2010, p. 14) 
‘Liaise with other Councils in information sharing and benchmarking process.’ 
Kingborough Council 
(Kingborough Council 2013, p. 3) 
‘…..commitment to the Statewide (sic) Partnership Agreement on Communication and Consultation with the State 
Government.’ 
Southern Waste Strategy Authority 
(Blue Environment 2011, pp. ES (iii), 44, 58 & 66) 
‘…..dissatisfaction with SWSA in its current operational guise…. deficiencies in the current strategic plan and delivery against 
planned objectives…...gaps in communication between SWSA and its member councils ….’ 
 ‘The lack of good recordkeeping often means there is a lack of knowledge of the types of waste that may have been deposited 
in the landfill in the past.’ 
 ‘There is a lack of communication between local government and the C&I sector on waste and recycling issues. Potential 
opportunities for waste minimisation and resource recovery should be explored through an ongoing collaborative approach.’ 
 ‘A number of councils do not collect data on the amount of kerbside recyclables collected and/or do not require their 
contractors to provide such information to them. The supply of this data should be a standard contract provision.’ 
 ‘…..coordinated communication and education programs…..information-sharing networks which build waste/recovery 
knowledge and capacity within member councils …..’ 
 ‘There are gaps in recorded data in southern Tasmania, both on the amount and source of generation of waste and on the 
amount and type of materials recovered. Council contracts should address regular provision of this information by contractors; 
information could then be provided by councils to SWSA for recording in a regional database. While weighbridges will give 
the most accurate data by weight, a regime of regular volumetric surveys of landfills will improve on current data at small 
landfills where installation of weighbridges is not economically feasible at present. Additional data on the composition of 
domestic garbage could be gathered by a series of regional waste and recycling audits.’ 
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Appendix 10 Data on the contract management dimension in the corporate reports 
Clarence City Council 
(Clarence City Council 2013, p. 72) 
‘Implement new 7 year contract for wheelie bin based Green Waste collection service…..Implement new 7 year contracts for 
the collection of Residual Waste and Recyclables.’ 
Derwent Valley Council 
(Derwent Valley Council 2011, p. 12) 
‘Arrange a long-term waste disposal and waste transfer system for the municipality in conjunction with other southern 
councils.’ 
Southern Waste Solutions 
(Southern Waste Solutions 2012a, p. 8 & 29) 
‘…..to enter into contracts provided that any contract that is entered into does not extend beyond the term of the Lease …..’ 
 ‘The Owner Councils are to lease to the Authority the Land on the following terms…..for an initial term of fifty (50) 
years…..’ 
Southern Waste Solutions 
(Southern Waste Solutions 2012b, p. 4) 
‘Negotiate commercially attractive long-term contracts to complement the life of the Copping site, and seek the site 
operator’s support to share any emerging economies of scale.’ 
Southern Waste Strategy Authority 
(Blue Environment 2011, pp. 18, 72 & 33) 
‘Huon Valley Council provides the following waste services….. Waste from the kerbside garbage collection and transfer 
station skips is deposited at Copping landfill under a 20 year contract (expiring in 2020).’ 
 ‘Discussions with the Copping authority indicated that they have a number of long term (20 year) contracts with users 
(especially councils and waste management contractors) ….review of the base fees only every 10 years.’ 
 ‘…..recent initiatives undertaken by SWSA include the coordination of tendering for regional/sub- regional kerbside 
collection contracts on behalf of some member councils and a survey of community perceptions on waste.’ 
Glamorgan Spring Bay Council 
(Glamorgan Spring Bay Council 2013a, pp. 34, 53 & 74) 
‘Compile a contract register to ensure a more streamlined approach to contract management across the organisation.’ 
 ‘Administer external contracts in relation to major projects.’ 
 ‘Council has four Waste Transfer Stations (WTS’s) in operation ….. Manage relevant leases and contracts.’ 
Kingborough Council 
(Kingborough Council 2011, p. 9) 
 ‘The top organisational or strategic risks are; ….. Failure of Council to deliver expected infrastructure and services through 
poor and inconsistent management of large contracts.’ (Kingborough Council 2011) . 
Tasman Council 
(Tasman Council 2013, p. 35 & 36) 
‘Manage Council’s external contracts…..Manage refuse services in accordance with contracted requirements.’ 
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Appendix 11 Data on the monitoring and management of network relationships dimension in the corporate reports 
Hobart City Council 
(Hobart City Council 2010, p. 14 & 15) 
‘Continue to provide representation on regional waste authority (sic) Management Committees and Board’  
 ‘Work in conjunction with the STCA and SWSA in regard to the development of waste management structures within 
Tasmania……Monitor the progress of the Waste Advisory Committee (WAC), and its Local Government 
Representative(s), when put in place.’ 
Glenorchy City Council 
(Glenorchy City Council 2013a, p. 28) 
‘Actively participate in peak local government bodies (LGAT & the STCA) to advance community priorities.’ 
Kingborough Council 
(Kingborough Council 2013, p. 3 & 18) 
‘Develop network knowledge and planning capacity…..’ and ‘Actively participate in the Southern Tasmanian Councils 
Authority and support the development and implementation of regional strategies, including regional planning and 
development, physical infrastructure, economic development, environmental performance …..Actively support the Local 
Government Association of Tasmania’ 
Sorell Council 
(Sorell Council 2012b, p. 2) 
‘Lack of leadership from Local Government to look of (sic) differing amalgamation models, e.g. resource sharing, 
mergers with like neighbouring Councils, shared services…..’ 
Southern Waste Strategy Authority 
(Blue Environment 2011, pp. 45, 66 & 70) 
 
‘…..there were seen to be some advantages for incorporation of waste under the umbrella of the STCA…..main drivers 
for initial formation of SWSA were to maintain local government control of waste management and oppose the 
introduction of a state government waste levy…… expectations of SWSA’s role had changed over time, and that the 
past (and current) organisational ethos did not reflect their future aspirations for the organisation.’ 
 ‘Additional topics that should be addressed by the charter include…..the roles and responsibilities of SWSA board 
members, the SWSA chairperson and the CEO…..a process for addressing disputes and providing mediation…..’  
 ‘…..some stakeholders indicated a level of dissatisfaction with DPIPWE’s lack of enforcement of waste regulations; 
there was a view that a lack of resources led to different application of legal requirements in some 
circumstances.....generators opting for cheap disposal options that undercut the financial viability of reputable operators 
in the industry.’ 
Tasman Council 
(Tasman Council 2011, p. 17) 
‘Continue to be an active participant in the Southern Waste Management (sic) Authority’ 
Southern Midlands Council 
(Southern Midlands Council 2012, pp. 16, 32 & 33) 
‘Continue to be an active participant in the Southern Waste Strategy (sic)’, ‘Identify and implement working 
relationships with the Councils in our sub region across a wide range of operational and support areas’ and ‘Continue to 
participate in State and Regional forums, including the Southern Tasmanian Councils Authority and LGAT…...’  
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ANNEXURES 
Annexure I: E-mail to potential participants requesting an interview 
From: Heinrich Oosthuizen  
Sent: Wednesday, 24 June 2015 10:07 AM 
To:  
Subject: Request for an Interview - UTAS PhD Research project Heinrich Oosthuizen - 185066 
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL 
 Dear Sir 
My name is Heinrich Oosthuizen. I am currently conducting a PhD research project through a 
scholarship awarded by the University of Tasmania (Tasmanian School of Business and 
Economics) under the supervision of Professor Roger Willett. The topic of my research 
project is 
Accounting for national waste data by Local Government Authorities and their 
service providers in the Southern Waste Strategy Authority jurisdiction 
I have received approval from the UTAS ethics committee to conduct 12 selected, 
confidential 1 hour interviews with managers of government, LGAs’ and their waste service 
providers as well as Councillors and representatives of community interest groups.   
I would appreciate the opportunity to post 12 semi-structured interview questions to you 
specifically relating to the above topic that was approved by the UTAS ethics committee.  
Your assistance will be of great benefit to this project. Please respond in confidence by return 
e-mail if you are willing to assist me in this PhD research project. I can also be reached on 
my mobile phone. 
Attached please find a comprehensive information sheet for your perusal. 
Should you require any additional information or would like to post some questions please do 
not hesitate to contact me.  
Yours faithfully 
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Annexure II: Number of narrative references coded 
against NVivo interview question case nodes for each 
category of interviewee  
LGA managers Councillor Environmental 
interest group 
representatives 
Waste service 
provider 
managers 
Tasmanian 
government 
manager 
IQ1 - Organisation's role in the collection of waste data 28 1 4 14 (2) 1 
IQ2 - Organisation's role in improvement of the regional 
waste data collection system 
16 1 4 11 3 
IQ3 - Tasmanian government's guidance of waste data 
collection 
34 (2) 2 17 (1) 12 3 
IQ4 - Adequate enforcement of waste regulations 29 3 8 8 6 (3) 
IQ5 - Improvement required of organisation's waste data 
collection systems 
32 (3) 7 (2) 12 (2) 7 9 (2) 
IQ6 - Collection of waste data and improvement of 
collections systems as KPA's 
27 6 (3) 2 4 3 
IQ7 - The waste disposal levy's role in improving waste data 
collection systems 
24 4 7 11 3 
IQ8 - The role of the Partnership agreement between state and 
local government in improving waste data collection and 
reporting thereon 
6 1 1 3 0 
IQ9 - The role of the Partnership agreement between state and 
local government in improving regional waste data collection 
systems 
6 1 0 1 0 
IQ10 - Constraints in contractually managing and monitoring 
waste data collection 
53 (1)* 15 (1) 10 20 (1) 4 
IQ11 - Have regional networks improved waste data 
collection systems 
34 (2) 1 8 13 (3) 5 
IQ12 - Monitoring and managing of regional relationships for 
the supply of waste data for national reporting purposes 
34 (2) 3 11 (3) 9 10 (1) 
 
* Ranking top three most coded narrative references per category in brackets 
 
